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Abstract
The four papers in this dissertation use various methods to examine the question of in-
equality in the labor market. The first three focus on the theme of “atypical employment,”
a term used to describe many forms of employment that are not full-time, permanent jobs
through a single employer. In recent years, this theme has garnered attention as people
perceive that these supposedly insecure and poorly compensated jobs are a growing part of
the labor market that threaten all workers’ security. The last chapter looks at organizational
inequality among academic sociology departments.
The first paper takes a macro approach, examining country level determinants of three
types of atypical employment (fixed term, part-time, and self employment) in 30 devel-
oped countries. Support is found for three hypotheses: atypical work arrangements are
more prevalent i) when there is a strong entrepreneurial culture, ii) when there are legal
constraints on firms, and iii) when economic constraints force workers to accept atypical
employment. The paper also qualitatively examines countries’ legislative and judicial his-
tories with respect to atypical work, and future policy directions are suggested.
The second paper uses propensity score matching and regression analysis to show that
fixed term workers’ wages are lower than comparable permanent workers’ wages. This
can result from several mechanisms such as: firms in strict legislative environments using
fixed term work as an extended probation period; unions advocating disproportionately for
permanent workers; or inferior workers being sorted into fixed term work in a weak labor
market. Results suggest that fixed term wages are relatively lower in those countries with
strict employment protection legislation.
ix
The third paper takes a theoretical turn, introducing a micro-simulation of job-worker
matching with intermediaries (i.e. temp agencies). While many suggest that firms hire
workers through intermediaries to save money on compensation, this paper finds that in a
world of limited information and geographically limited job search, intermediaries’ human
resources ability could be a strong enough incentive, independent of compensation. The
study also has some auxiliary findings showing that traditional fee structures encourage
firms to use intermediaries for low-skill hires and that firms are more likely to use inter-
mediaries when there is more worker heterogeneity. In the empirical analysis, it becomes
clear that studies’ estimates of indirect employment in the United States are inconsistent,
partly because individuals are uncertain of their contractual status and their employer.
The final chapter continues from the organizational perspective, looking at inequality
across organizations. This study is the first to consider the relationship between university
departments’ prestige rank and their centrality in the academic hiring network independent
of department size and training. These new controls are important as the correlation be-
tween prestige rank and employment network centrality may result from the fact that highly
ranked schools train more PhDs, their graduates are more likely to continue in academia,
and that highly ranked schools have more faculty. Past research has characterized the corre-
lation between academic departments’ prestige rank and their centrality in academic hiring
networks as indicative of a “caste” system. However, if academics move between institu-
tions for assorted reasons like wages, location, and specialty areas, there should be no cor-
relation between hiring network centrality and rank. This suggests that academics might
prefer to make career switches to top ranked departments, creating the correlation between
prestige and centrality, and giving top departments a competitive advantage. This would be
one possible explanation why academic rankings are static.
In sum, this dissertation examines several instances of labor market stratification, con-





This thesis examines individuals’, organizations’, and nations’ characteristics and actions
as determinants of labor market inequality. Labor market inequality is an important ques-
tion in both public policy and sociology, and has been of particular interest in recent years as
American and European wage inequality (before taxes and transfers) has increased. While
there are many hypothesized causes, one that has drawn significant attention is the decline
of “traditional” jobs in contrast to the perceived growth of “atypical employment” (work
that is not full time and permanent). This kind of employment is often held culpable, as
it is generally less well paid and more unstable. While the first three papers (chapters 2
to 4) focus on atypical employment and its effects on inequality, the last paper (chapter
5) takes a different perspective, examining how the labor market can generate inequality
across organizations, in this case universities’ sociology departments.
The first paper focuses on why countries have different levels of atypical employment.
Three main hypotheses are tested for three types of atypical employment (self employment,
part-time work, and fixed term work) including: Do entrepreneurial cultures encourage
atypical employment? Do institutional constraints like employment protection legislation
encourage atypical employment? And, do labor market conditions (e.g., unemployment)
encourage atypical employment? This paper includes a historical narrative of the three
European countries with the highest levels of atypical employment (fixed term workers in
Spain, part-time workers in the Netherlands, and the self employed in Greece) and exam-
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ines how well a quantitative analysis can capture the historical dynamics of these three
exceptional cases. The paper ends with a review of policy approaches for protecting atypi-
cal workers.
The second paper expands on this theme, considering how one type of atypical employ-
ment, fixed term work, effects wages. The first question posed is whether empirically fixed
term workers earn less than their permanent counterparts, controlling for the fact that less
skilled workers tend to be selected into fixed term work. Second, the paper considers how
the size of the wage gap between fixed term and permanent workers varies across countries
based on institutional characteristics. The paper concludes with a review of recent policies
directed at fixed term employment such as those limiting fixed term contract renewals.
The third paper is also on the topic of atypical employment, but takes a theoretical turn,
using a micro simulation to examine the role of intermediaries in an artificial labor market.
The model is a worker-job matching algorithm implemented in a spatial environment with
limited information. The simulation tests whether intermediaries’ better matching capabil-
ities are sufficient motivation for firms to hire workers through intermediaries despite the
additional cost incurred by the fees they charge. The model also suggests that when inter-
mediaries are paid using a traditional percentage pricing scheme, firms tend to use them
for their less skilled positions, sorting less skilled workers into indirectly hired positions.
Finally, the model illustrates that intermediaries are more important in labor markets where
the workers have more heterogenous skill levels. The policy implications of these findings
are that removing the differences in legal protections between atypical workers and regular
workers might not eliminate atypical employment or the sorting of low-skilled workers into
atypical employment.
Up to this point, the dissertation treats organizations as actors contributing to labor
market inequality. In contrast, the last paper looks at how organizational stratification is
impacted by individuals’ choices in the labor market. This paper uses network analysis
to consider the relationship between universities’ sociology departments’ prestige rank (a
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ranking developed from an index compiling various departmental attributes) and their po-
sitions in the sociology labor market. The position in the labor market is captured by
a network connecting universities through professors’ career moves. First, the analysis
considers two important, but incomplete, explanations for the relationship between depart-
mental prestige and network position: the fact that the most prestigious departments are
larger in terms of faculty and that they provide the doctoral training for the vast majority
of academic sociologists. However, the analysis shows that the centrality of departments
in the employment network is a key predictor of academic prestige independent of these
two factors. The structure of the employment network may result from a simple preference
among professors to move to better ranked schools if they can or to remain in their current
positions. The subsequent central position in the employment network can translate into an
advantage in prestige through multiple mechanisms, thus contributing to static academic
prestige rankings.
Taken alone, each paper addresses a very specific question, but taken together, they pro-
vide an overview of the labor market as a complex system with three main actors: countries,
organizations, and individuals. Countries make several decisions that influence labor mar-
ket inequality including their legal classification of workers, legislation protecting workers,
and the design of social insurance programs. Organizations also make decisions influenc-
ing labor market inequality such as when to hire and fire workers and what type of contract
to use. Workers, in turn, decide when to take a job, to leave a job, whether to take an atypi-
cal job, to organize, and to approach the courts to reclassify their contractual status. All of
these decisions interact, changing conditions and outcomes for all three actors.
Even though this dissertation does not propose a complete policy strategy to address
atypical employment, it does outline some policy directions. The first three papers suggest
that governments need to remove a two-tier legal system for atypical and permanent work-
ers and outline some legislative approaches as well as recent changes in union organizing
and judicial intervention that influence atypical employment. The last paper has no pol-
3
icy conclusions beyond suggesting that some labor market dynamics are self-perpetuating
and if, for example, a lower ranked academic department wished to alter the current con-




National Context and Atypical
Employment
2.1 Introduction
“Atypical” employment is any type of employment that is not full-time and permanent
with a single direct employer. It includes many diverse forms of work including part-
time, self employment, fixed term contracts, temp work, free-lancing, piecework, unpaid
family labor, and informal day labor. The label “atypical” lumps together arrangements that
workers and employers choose for various reasons and with distinct consequences. This
paper tests three hypotheses about how macro-context influences the total level of three
types of atypical employment: fixed term, part-time, and self employment. Fixed term
employment is similar to regular full-time work, with the exception that it has a specified
end-date at the time of hire. In the United States, which has “employment at will,” this is
not theoretically different from regular employment, which can be terminated by both the
employer and the employee at any time. Definitions of part-time work vary by country with
thresholds normally between 30 and 35 hours a week. Workers working less than 10 hours
per week are often considered “casual” workers rather than part-time. In the US part-time
is employer-defined so that a worker working 38 hours a week in the US could be part-time,
but in France the same worker is working overtime.
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“Self employment” usually includes two distinct types of atypical employees: en-
trepreneurs and “dependent self employed” workers (free-lance or independent contractors
who for all intents and purposes are employees although their contract is not an employment
contract but a contract for services). In many studies the two groups are indistinguishable.
Studies attempting to parse out the two groups have various estimates of how many workers
are dependent self employed. In the UK, approximately 9% of the self employed (or 1.3%
of the entire labor force) have no employees and only one purchaser of their services, likely
dependent self employed workers. These workers are predominantly in construction, finan-
cial services, or skilled trades, are men, have less education than employees, and are likely
to remain in positions as contractors (Böheim and Muehlberger, 2006). In Italy, estimates
of the dependent self employed range from .88 to 5.3% of the labor force (Muehlberger
and Pasqua, 2006; Alteri and Oteri, 2004), depending on the definition used. The depen-
dent self employed in Italy differ from the average worker in that they are younger, more
often single, more educated (in contrast to in other countries), in the service sector, and
more often in Northern Italy. It is estimated that as many as 30% of Italian firms use these
workers (Aris et al., 2001) and that most of these workers would prefer regular employ-
ment (Muehlberger and Pasqua, 2006). Their chances of transitioning to a standard job are
higher the more they earn (Berton et al., 2005) and they are actually more likely to transi-
tion to unemployment than regular workers (Muehlberger and Pasqua, 2006). In Austria,
the dependent self employed make up approximately 1.6% of the workforce (Heineck et al.,
2004) and only 1% of the Greek workforce (EIRO, 2005). While the distinction between
the two types of self employed workers is very important, this study is unable to distinguish
between them. In surveys, workers generally self-report their status. Some dependent self
employed (who generally commute to the same firm every day) misreport themselves to
be employees (Bjelland et al., 2006). Part-time and fixed term workers are better able to
correctly self-identify their status.
This paper proposes three main hypotheses regarding the macro level contexts influ-
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encing the level of atypical employment. The first hypothesis is that firms might employ
more atypical workers when permanent employment contracts are strictly regulated, the
“free-market seeking hypothesis.” The second hypothesis is that in a weak labor market,
firms have more bargaining power and can successfully offer workers atypical jobs (which
generally have lower salaries, benefits, and protections). Theoretically, a firm might also
hire permanent workers at lower wages during downturns, although qualitative research
suggests that there is less resentment when workers with different contracts receive differ-
ent treatment (both better and worse) than when workers with the same contract receive
different treatment. As such, it seems reasonable that when the market will bear lower
wages, firms hire these new, lower paid, workers under atypical contracts. We call this
the “constrained individual choices” hypothesis because this is when workers are forced to
accept atypical employment, against their preferences, in a weak labor market. The third
hypothesis, “entrepreneurial spirit,” posits that workers prefer atypical employment when
they have entrepreneurial goals. This is not only an individual-level cause, but it is also a
macro-level hypothesis insofar as entrepreneurial motivation is time-culture specific. The
entrepreneurial hypothesis is normally discussed in the context of self employment, al-
though individuals starting their own businesses are likely to prefer to work in other forms
of atypical employment as well. Finally, it is already a well-established fact that the pro-
portion of women in the labor force strongly influences the overall level of part-time em-
ployment, and possibly other types of atypical employment, because women prefer flexible
employment while raising children.
These three hypotheses are not mutually exclusive and can simultaneously influence
atypical employment levels. For example, self employment might normally be driven by
entrepreneurial spirit, but individuals might also chose self employment as a last resort in
economies with high unemployment (constrained individual choices) or firms seeking to
avoid regulations might use more independent contractors (free-market seeking hypoth-
esis). Similarly, firms might seek flexibility from legal constraints by using less tightly
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regulated part-time workers (free-market seeking hypothesis) but part-time work can also
be a form of underemployment (constrained individual choices) and entrepreneurial spirit
might also influence part-time work, as it enables individuals to start their own businesses
in their free time. The primary motivation for fixed term employment is likely that firms
seek flexibility by avoiding regulations (free-market seeking hypothesis), although again,
workers preferring full-time work might be forced into these positions in a weak economy
or workers with entrepreneurial aspirations (e.g. artists) might prefer fixed term assign-
ments, working on their own projects between assignments.
This paper proceeds with a review of the literature on the causes of atypical employ-
ment, a description of current trends in atypical employment, followed by research design,
findings, a discussion of policy trends related to atypical employment, and finally a conclu-
sion discussing both the quantitative findings as well as policy implications.
2.2 Literature
The most commonly cited explanation for atypical employment is the free-market seek-
ing hypothesis. Several authors suggest that countries’ employment protection legislation
(EPL) influences the incidence of fixed term and temporary work (OECD, 2003; Kalle-
berg, 2000b; Kahn, 2007). Often, using atypical workers allows firms to increase external
flexibility and to extend screening periods in an environment where it is difficult to sever
employment relationships (Kalleberg, 2000b).1 Strict regulations can also encourage firms
to shift towards internal flexibility (as has been shown in Germany (Keller and Seifert,
2005)), which would not affect atypical employment. Even in liberal labor markets like
the United States, it has been shown that firms use atypical work to avoid legal constraints.
For example, US federal tax code encourages firms to provide health insurance to all their
employees by offering a tax deduction for firms offering a certain share of their workers
1“External flexibility” is adjusting labor inputs by hiring and firing workers in contrast to “internal flexi-
bility” where firms adjust the workers’ hours or switch workers’ functions within the firm.
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benefits. This encourages firms to buy services rather than hire employees for those posi-
tions for which they do not want to provide health insurance for, thus qualifying the firm for
the tax deduction while still saving on non-wage compensation. Similarly, the post-1970
increase in part-time work in America may be partially attributed to increases in full-time
benefit costs following the Federal and Family Leave Act of 1993 (Kalleberg, 2000b).
The constrained individual hypothesis is highly contested for all types of atypical em-
ployment except self employment. Some studies find that in a weak economy workers
are forced into part-time, fixed term, and self employment (Grip et al., 1997; Blau, 1987)
while others find that part-time employment does not increases in a bad market (Grip et al.,
1997), and still others find an ambiguous relationship between economic conditions and
atypical employment (Blanchflower, 2000). Grip and Basardi find that for couples, hus-
bands’ wages have no effect on women’s decisions to work part-time, suggesting that, at
least for women, economic constraints are not a consideration in choosing part-time work
(Grip et al., 1997; Bardasi and Gornick, 2000). In contrast, assuming that boom times are
accompanied by unexpected demand for labor, unemployment rates could have the oppo-
site effect with firms more likely to use fixed term workers during unanticipated periods of
high economic activity (Pfeifer, 2005). This hypothesis contradicts the constrained worker
hypothesis, since it posits that in a booming economy firms seek atypical workers, increas-
ing the share of atypical employment, while the constrained worker hypothesis posits that
in a booming economy workers can pressure employers to offer permanent employment,
decreasing the share of atypical employment. The uncertain relationship between economic
conditions and atypical employment become clear in the next section, where we explore the
high levels of part-time work in the economically robust Dutch labor market and the high
levels of self employment in the weaker Greek labor market. Economic conditions can also
impact workers in different ways—in a bad economy workers desiring regular jobs can be
forced into atypical jobs, but in a good economy, workers can choose atypical employment
to engage in other activities. In contrast to fixed term and part time work, self employment
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has been consistently shown to be positively correlated with a weak economy.
The third hypothesis, entrepreneurial spirit, should be related to many types of atypical
employment, as part-time, fixed term, and temp work all provide the flexibility for work-
ers to start their own enterprizes while guaranteeing a secondary source of income. The
concept of “entrepreneurial spirit” is hard to operationalize. The proportion of workers in
self employment or the flows into self employment (or some combination of them, such
as the TEA index) are the standard entrepreneurial variables (Chandler and Lyon, 2001;
Gartner and Shane, 1995; Iversen et al., 2005). Of course, using self employment to opera-
tionalize entrepreneurship is not a solution when predicting self employment. Further, self
employment is not really a direct measure of entrepreneurship since it includes indepen-
dent contractors and casual workers (for example selling food off a street cart) who would
rather be employed. While it is difficult to capture empirically, theoretically entrepreneur-
ship should encourage other forms of atypical employment.
Some of the most important motivations for atypical employment happen at the individual-
level. For example, age and gender are important determinants of self employment since
older men are the most likely and able to start their own businesses (Blanchflower, 2000)
and women with young children are more likely to work part-time (Carr, 1996; Grip et al.,
1997; Bardasi and Gornick, 2000). Part-time work is also more common among the very
old and very young during partial retirement or one’s studies (Grip et al., 1997). Personal
values and experiences are also important determinants of atypical employment and both
religion (or the social support associated with it) and exposure to entrepreneurship in one’s
family are said to encourage entrepreneurship (Carrol and Mosakowski, 1987). Also, firm-
level factors are important determinants of atypical employment; service sector firms and




The OECD and Eurostat data used in this paper suggest that there is considerable variation
in the level of atypical employment across countries, but that levels have been relatively
stable and low since 1990. This contradicts several articles including the 2006 EU Green
Paper on fixed term employment, which claims that up to 40% of the EU workforce was in
atypical employment in 1995 (EU, 2006). The OECD and Eurostat data actually suggest
that the biggest increases in atypical employment occurred in the 1980’s. Of course, trends
in atypical employment are particularly difficult to operationalize since they can vary de-
pending on whether data are reported by employers or employees, by grouping together
different types of atypical employment, and by analyzing shorter time periods, extrapolat-
ing from small blips in an otherwise stable trend (Grip et al., 1997; LeBlansch et al., 2000;
Keller and Seifert, 2005; Magnani, 2003). Figure 2.1 shows the level of self, part-time, and
fixed term employment in 2005 for 16 EU countries and the levels of self and part-time
employment for the US, Canada, New Zealand, Switzerland, Japan, and Australia. There
are three outliers, one for each type of atypical employment. Spain has very high fixed term
employment, Greece (and to a lesser extent the other Mediterranean countries) have more
self employment, and the Netherlands has more part-time employment. The US has less
self and part-time employment than most other countries in the dataset.
The first panel of figure 2.2 shows the time trends for the average percent of the work-
force in atypical employment across all countries illustrated in figure 2.1.2 Part-time and
fixed term work have increased slowly while self employment has declined. The second
panel illustrates a few representative countries: UK (Anglo-Saxon), Czech Republic (for-
mer eastern bloc), Sweden (Nordic), and Italy (Mediterranean), as well as France and Ger-
2The average presented is just for Western Europe (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United
Kingdom) and is weighted by population. Non-Western European countries have sparsely available time
trends, so they are not included. Including all countries, the trends are mostly the same, but the self em-
ployment line shifts up. Using an unweighted average (where Luxembourg is equivalent to Germany) has a




























































































source: Eurostat (fixed term), Source OECD (part-time and self employment)
Figure 2.1: Levels of atypical employment by country, 2005
many. Across all countries (including those not illustrated in the graphic- see table 2.1 for a
list of countries) from 1990 to 2006 self employment was relatively stable with higher levels
in poorer countries and recent small declines in all countries except the former eastern-bloc
countries like the Czech Republic and Romania. Fixed term employment increased slightly
in Europe, with the exception of Ireland and Norway where it declined, and Poland and Por-
tugal, where it grew rapidly. Part-time work has increased in most countries (particularly
Germany) with the exception of Iceland and the United States.
Descriptions of the three extreme cases (fixed term employment in Spain, self employ-
ment in Greece, and part-time employment in the Netherlands) suggest which of the three
hypotheses are relevant and whether the quantitative analysis will capture them.
Approximately 30% of Spain’s workforce is in fixed term employment, about twice
that of any other European country. The original growth in fixed term contracts (from 10
to 30% of the workforce) occurred in the 1980’s and was the consequence of both labor
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Figure 2.2: Trends in atypical employment
following it, employment policy was centralized and employment protection was strict.
Employment policy was dominated by Instituto Nacional de Empleo (INEM), a central
clearinghouse that matched jobs and workers, and managed unemployment benefits, voca-
tional training programs, and employment records. Originally, unemployed workers and
firms with vacancies were obliged to register with INEM although by 1980, 90 percent of
vacancies were filled independently. Centralized administration and strong worker protec-
tions were liberalized in 1980 under the pressure of rising unemployment rates (Dolado
et al., 2002). The “Ley Basica de Empleo” or “ Ley del Estatuto de los Trabajadores”
deregulated fixed term contracts, allowing them for temporary activities or as preliminary
contracts for young workers. The law mandated equal wages for fixed term workers, re-
inforced private temporary work agencies’ illegal status, and reaffirmed INEM’s place as
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the central placement organization. This legislation allowed firms the first legal means to
circumvent strict employment regulations, while at the same time reinforcing most con-
straints. In another attempt to reduce unemployment, fixed term contracts were liberalized
in 1984 under the Worker’s Statute Reform which allowed firms to use fixed term workers
for permanent activities and created a new form of contract that endured a minimum of 6
months, and was renewable up to 3 years. Under this contract, after three years the worker
had to be either permanently hired or replaced with 12 days of severance pay. The final
step towards liberalizing atypical employment was legalizing temporary work agencies un-
der Royal Decree 18 (1993), although in fact, temporary work agencies already existed in
practice. Strict limitations on temporary work agencies exist to this day, as they must be of-
ficially registered and authorized as non-profits and are generally run by local governments,
unions, or employers’ associations.
In the early 1990’s, when it became apparent that the liberalization of fixed term con-
tracts had divided the labor market into separate and unequal sectors, the government began
to relax the strict EPL governing regular employment contracts and increased constraints
on fixed term employment, equalizing their legal status. In 1992, the typical 6 month-3
year renewal contract was changed to a 1 year contract, again renewable up to a total of
3 years. In 1994, this contract was restricted to hard-to-employ workers including those
over 45 years old and the long-term unemployed. Finally, in 1997 the contract was entirely
eliminated. In 1997 and 1998, laws 8/1997, 63/1997, and 15/1998 made small adjustments
to the difference in EPL for fixed term and permanent employees and finally in 2001, dis-
missal costs for fixed term workers were introduced (8 days per year of service) (Izquierdo
et al., 2005). The most recent limitations on fixed term employment were passed in law
number 43/2006, “Reforma Laboral,” a direct response to the 1999 EU directive demand-
ing limits on either the number of fixed term contract renewals or their cumulative duration
(MTAS, 2006). This law requires fixed term contracts to be justified by the employer as
“training” or fulfilling “short-term production needs” such as specific projects or replac-
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ing employees on leave. The law specifies that contracts cannot endure beyond 2 contract
cycles for a maximum of 24 months in a 30 month period, after which the worker automati-
cally becomes a permanent employee. The reform also set tax benefits for firms converting
fixed contracts to permanent ones, offering 850 euro for women, 1,200 euro for people over
forty-five, 600 euro for the long-term unemployed, and 6,300 euro for the disabled with all
bonuses annual and renewable for up to four years of employment, except the disabled
bonus which endures indefinitely. According to the Spanish government, this legislation
was successful: from 2005 to 2006, there was 108% growth in the rate of turnover from
fixed to permanent contracts and in 2007 a full 42% of permanent contracts were initiated
as indefinite contracts, compared to only 30.1% in December 2006 (MTAS, 2007b). This
method can be strongly biased by the possibility that in recent years more people have
started their jobs in fixed term employment. Correcting for this error Guell and Petrongolo
(2007) finds there has been no increase in the hazard of transitions to permanent contracts.
In sum, Spain has come full circle, first supporting fixed term contracts as a solution to
high unemployment, and then creating incentives for transitions to permanent employment
after realizing they created a two-tier system of employment. Despite the policy rever-
sal, fixed term contracts are still more common in Spain than elsewhere in Europe. While
some (Toharia, 1999) argue that Spain naturally has a labor market with a core/periphery
structure that lends itself to two-tier employment, it seems more likely that the high rate
of fixed term contracts is a historical legal legacy of the earlier policies (Toharia, 1999;
Casals, 2004; Royo, 2005; Amuedo-Dorantes and Serrano-Padial, 2005; MTAS, 2007a).
The econometric analysis will partially capture this dynamic, measuring the strictness of
regular and fixed term workers’ employment protection, but it will fail to capture the his-
torical legacy of the 1980’s.
This policy reversal, first liberalizing atypical employment and then bringing its reg-
ulation closer to that of regular employment (either through making atypical EPL stricter
or loosening permanent worker EPL) is typical, albeit normally not as dramatic as in the
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Spanish case. For example, Germany, another country with strict EPL, liberalized atypical
employment as an attempt to mitigate unemployment, legalizing temporary work agencies
under the Loan Worker Employment Act (1972) and relaxing restrictions on fixed term
employment in 1985. In 2000, the government tried to reverse course with the “Act of
Part-time and Fixed Term Employment,” which gave workers the right to switch to part-
time work, required temp work to be used only for specific tasks, and limited the renewal
of fixed term contracts to three years. In 2003, the Hartz Laws completed the reversal,
increasing protections for atypical workers, forcing employers to pay health insurance and
pension contributions for part-time workers (charging them an additional 2% wage tax),
and promoting temporary work agencies as a transition to regular employment. As such,
in Germany, as in Spain, there was a u-turn in policies, first promoting a two-tier system
of employment as a solution to unemployment, and then attempting to equalize the two
classes.
The second outlier in atypical employment is Greece, with 35% of its workforce self
employed. Partly, the high self employment rate stems from the fact that the average firm
size is only 2 employees compared to 6 in the EU (Mihail, 2003). Given that at least
one worker in each small business is self employed, the predominance of small businesses
should increase the proportion of self employed. In addition, Greece has strict EPL with
high severance costs (higher for white collar than blue collar workers), strong minimum
wage laws, and industry-wide collective agreements that all business owners in an industry
must comply with regardless of whether they participated in negotiations (OECD, 2007;
Kufidu and Mihail, 1999). This level of strict EPL and union power has been shown to
encourage self employment (Cazes and Nesporova, 2003; Robson, 2003; OECD, 1999). In
Greece, firms cannot circumvent strict EPL by using other forms of atypical employment
since regulations on part-time, temporary, and fixed term work are also strict (Miaouli,
1998); self employment is the only way around the constraints. One caveat is that in prac-
tice small firms are able to circumvent EPL on overtime hours, dismissal policies, and to
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negotiate pay and bonuses individually, in defiance of union contracts (Mihail, 2003; Ku-
fidu and Mihail, 1999). Thus, these small firms do not need to resort to “dependent self
employment.”
For more than half of the period covered by this study, self employed workers were
entirely free of the regulations governing both permanent and other atypical workers in
Greece. This changed in August 1998 when the Law on Industrial Relations required that
agreements between self employed persons and companies be reported to the ministry of la-
bor within 15 days of the contract. If the contract is not registered, the relationship becomes
that of regular employment in the eyes of the law (Kouzis, 2002). The goal of this initiative
is to provide better estimates of how many self employed are actually self employed, as the
self employment numbers prior to this law were exaggerated by employees masquerading
as self employed. Since 1998 the courts have also enforced a more general definition of
“employment.” Currently, an employee is a worker who is subordinate, does not direct his
or her work, does not determine his or her place of work or hours, and does not control
his or her own performance. This new definition has been applied to reclassify dependent
contractors as employees, giving them more protections, and thus equalizing their position
with other workers. The full implications of reclassifying employees is elaborated on in the
conclusion of this paper. There have been other moves towards closing the gap for contract
workers. In March 2007, the Mediation and Arbitration Service demanded that any worker
placed in a position of legal subordination to the employer has the right to be covered by
the union contract. However, the relevant employer organization sought the reversal of this
decision, which was not resolved at the time this paper was written. In sum, in the period
covered by this study, free lance self employed workers were the only way around strict
EPL although there have been recent attempts to remove this loophole.
There are several other factors contributing to Greece’s high self employment rate.
First, Greece has relatively high unemployment rates (around ten percent) and there is
substantial evidence that self employment is positively correlated to unemployment, al-
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though the direction of causality is contested (Rissman, 2003; Blanchflower, 2000; Au-
dretsch et al., 2006). In addition, tourism, an important economic sector for Mediterranean
countries, might present more opportunities for self employment. For example, Italy, rec-
ognizing tourism as a source of self employment opportunities, passed Act 236 in 1993,
offering individuals financial aid and technical assistance to start their own tourism firms
(OECD, 2000). The combination of EPL favoring self employment, relatively high un-
employment, and a strong tourism sector all contribute to Greece’s high incidence of self
employment. The quantitative analysis will capture two of these three elements, missing
tourism’s possible contribution.
The third outlier is the Netherlands, which has an extremely high part-time employ-
ment rate, almost ten percentage points more than the next highest country, Australia. A
full 66% of working women in the Netherlands work part-time compared with 30% in
most EU countries; and the median employed woman works only 16 to 23 hours per week
(Doorne-Huiskes, 2004). The high part-time employment rates seem to result from a com-
bination of values, prosperity, and insufficient child care. In the Netherlands both men and
women with children are more likely to reduce their working hours than other Europeans
though married, less educated women with young children are the most likely to do so
(Wel and Knijen, 2006). Further, part-time work is encouraged by legislation improving
its standing relative to full-time work. In 1993 laws extended minimum wages and paid
holidays to part-time workers working more than one-third normal hours, and in 1996 the
provision was expanded to force full equality between all part-time and full-time work
with prorated pay and benefits. Finally, in 2000, legislation allowed all workers to request
the right to move between full and part-time work, requiring firms to accommodate these
requests and to justify rejections. The government initially introduced legislation support-
ing part-time work when the country was experiencing high growth and needed to attract
additional workers into the labor market (Plantenga, 1996). Unions supported the legis-
lation to prevent part-time workers from becoming a cheap substitute (Rasmussen et al.,
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2004). Further, child care is scarce and was not addressed by the government until the mid
2000’s (Euwals, 2007), leaving part-time work as the primary option for working moth-
ers. Surveys find that employed Dutch women actually prefer part-time employment, and
more educated women prefer part-time work for both themselves and their partners (Wel
and Knijen, 2006). Consequently, the Netherlands has one of the lowest involuntary part-
time employment rates in Europe (Doorne-Huiskes, 2004). In sum, Dutch women prefer
part-time work and the government encourages that preference through guaranteeing equal
rights for part-time workers and by not putting a strong emphasis on child care needs.
The quantitative analysis will find the relationship between the proportion of women in
the marketplace and the high level of part-time work, the relationship between legislation
and part-time work, and will suggest a weak negative relationship between economic con-
straints and part-time work, but will ignore both the importance of child care and cultural
preferences.
For fixed term employment in Spain, self employment in Greece, and part-time em-
ployment in the Netherlands, it is clear that economic, legal, and cultural motivations are
all at play. In Spain, fixed term work is primarily a legacy of legislative changes originally
designed to combat high unemployment in the 1980’s. In Greece, self employment is the
result of the combination of high unemployment, strict EPL for both regular and atypical
employment, and a strong tourism sector. Finally, in the Netherlands, part-time employ-
ment is the result of workers’ preferences to balance family and work, economic prosperity,
legal protections for part-time workers, and a limited supply of child care.
2.4 Research design
This study uses a series of predictors for atypical employment designed to capture the three
hypotheses: “free-market seeking,” “constrained individual,” and “entrepreneurial spirit.”
The study also controls for the proportion of women in the labor force, a well-proven factor
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in part-time employment rates, and possibly a factor in other atypical employment rates.
Data are drawn from a variety of sources (see the appendix) but primarily rely on OECD,
ILO, and Eurostat statistics.
The first two variables related to the “free market seeking” hypothesis measure the
proportion of the workforce belonging to a union (union density) (Checchi and Lucifora,
2003; OECD, 1990-2008) and the total number of strikes and lockouts per 100,000 popu-
lation (ILO, 2004; UN, 2007). Many studies also use union coverage (how many workers
are affected by collective agreements) because in some countries, like France, many more
workers are covered by contracts than belong to unions. The second union measure, the
number of strikes and lockouts, is not as well standardized as union membership.3 Union
density ranges from 8 to 88% of the workforce in the OECD countries and has declined over
time. Strikes and lockouts range from 0 to 25 per 100,000 population, with no discernable
time trend. Most countries have few incidents (Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Esto-
nia, Hungary, Japan, Netherlands, Romania, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, US) or infrequent
activity (Belgium, Cyprus, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, New Zealand, Norway,
Portugal, and Spain). Only Denmark, Iceland, and Poland had high strike rates during the
1995-2006 period while Denmark had more activity during the 1998 general strike, and
again in 2002 when the public sector contracts were renegotiated. Strong unions could
have various effects on atypical employment. On one hand, unions impose constraints that
firms seek to avoid through atypical employment (thus increasing atypical employment)
but on the other hand, union negotiations often include clauses explicitly limiting atypi-
cal employment. This point is revisited in the policy section, where some recent trends in
collective bargaining and atypical employment are summarized.
3A description can be found at http://laborsta.ilo.org/applv8/data/c9e.html. The
ILO data comes from a variety of sources including employers, conciliation services, and newspapers. The
method for counting strikes and lockouts is inconsistent across countries with some countries counting in-
cidents by disputes and others by affected employers. Some countries also include definitions of minimum
countable incidents. For example, Denmark does not count incidents lasting less than 10 days and has no min-
imum number of workers per incident while the US does not count events involving less than 1,000 workers
and lasting less than one full shift (before 1982 the minimum was 6 employees). Portugal, with a middling
level of strikes and lockouts, has no minimum rules for counting a strike or lockout.
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The next set of variables related to the free-market seeking hypothesis are two EPL
indices published by OECD (1990-2008). The first index ranges from 0 to 6 and codes
rules for dismissal notice and procedures, severance pay, and probationary hiring periods.
A second index also ranging from 0 to 6 measures EPL for fixed term workers including:
when fixed term work is allowed, the maximum number of contract renewals, and the max-
imum cumulative duration of renewed contracts. A third variable (which, of course, can
only be used concurrently with 1 of the 2 EPL indices) takes the difference between these
two indices and should capture the relative advantage of using atypical workers. According
to these three variables, regular EPL is most liberal in the US, UK, and Switzerland, while
it is strictest in Portugal, Sweden, and the Netherlands. Regular EPL is relatively con-
stant over time, with the few countries that altered their laws generally liberalizing (Spain,
Portugal, Finland, and Austria). EPL for fixed term workers varies more and is stricter in
Belgium, Greece, Italy, Spain, and Portugal while more liberal in the US, UK, Canada, and
Switzerland. Belgium, Italy, Sweden, Portugal, Spain, Germany, Norway, Netherlands and
Denmark all liberalized their policies between 1990 and 2006. By 2006 most countries had
relatively liberal policies with the exception of Italy, Spain, Portugal, and France. EPL can
also vary by occupation; Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Greece, France, and Italy all have
stricter protections for white collar workers while Germany and Spain recently equalized
such disparities.4
In the past several years two EU directives on atypical employment have passed and a
third was proposed. In 1997, Directive 97/81/EC outlawed discrimination against part-time
workers, mandated pro-rated pay, required the elimination of laws limiting part-time work,
and encouraged firms to hear requests to move from full to part-time work (or vice versa).
In 1999, Directive 99/70/EC outlawed discrimination against fixed term workers, required
employers to inform fixed term workers about permanent opportunities, and mandated that
national governments pass legislation doing one or more of the following: 1) specifying the
4For other indices and discussion please see Deakin et al. (2007); Botero et al. (2004); WorldBank (2007).
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circumstances under which fixed term contracts are permitted, 2) specifying the maximum
total duration of renewed fixed term contracts and 3) limiting the number of permitted con-
tract renewals. Finally, in 2002, Directive 0072 was proposed to prohibit discrimination
against temp workers; to ensure temp workers have access to all workplace facilities, to
require temp firms to pay workers for time between assignments; to ensure that temp work-
ers receive overtime, breaks, and paid holidays; to require agencies to inform temp workers
about permanent openings; to prohibit temp agencies from charging workers fees; and to
encourage unions to negotiate on behalf of temp workers along with permanent employ-
ees. This directive never passed. The EU directives affect several countries in this analysis,
although some argue that they (or at least the part time directive) are too weak and not
specific enough to have an impact anyhow (Jefferey, 1998). Different implementations of
the directives are considered in the policy section of the paper.
The final variable related to the free market seeking hypothesis is non-compensation
costs, the proportion of the firm’s cost of hiring an employee beyond wages (BLS, 2007b;
ILO, 2002).5 In practice, the variable captures different aspects of labor policy in different
countries. The variable was originally included to capture the United State’s employer-
based health insurance system, a costly component of regular employees’ compensation
and consequently a widely cited reason for US firms to use atypical contracts. Despite
high health insurance costs, the US does not have extremely high non-compensation costs
compared to other OECD countries since firms’ payroll taxes6 are relatively low. “Non-
compensation costs” is actually a grouping of many types legally required and optional
benefits such as life insurance, retirement, disability, income guarantees, sick leave, acci-
dent insurance, and family allowances. The various benefits under this title only share the
fact that they are non wage costs paid by the employer. Between low non-compensation
5Two sources were used for this variable, one using all workers and the other using only production
workers (values were almost identical for those countries covered by both sources).
6The term “payroll tax” generally refers to both taxes withheld from employees’ paychecks for programs
such as social security and taxes (such as unemployment insurance) paid by employers that are directly linked
to employing a worker. Of course, here we refer to those payroll taxes paid by the employer, not the worker.
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costs and high health care costs, American non-compensation costs are a middling 20 per-
cent of wages. Countries with the lowest non-compensation costs are New Zealand and
Denmark, while Belgium, France, Italy, and Sweden all have high non-compensation costs.
Most countries have stable non-compensation costs over time with the exception of Poland
which dramatically reduced them in the mid-1990’s. Non-compensation costs measure
both incentives for individuals to stay in regular employment when benefits are tied to
the worker-employer relationship (e.g. health insurance in the US) or incentives to take
atypical jobs when benefits are not contingent on the worker-employer relationship (social
security). Thus, the hypothesized overall effect of non-compensation costs is unclear.
There are three variables related to the second hypothesis, constrained individual choices.
The first, unemployment rates, measures whether difficult labor market conditions might
force workers into atypical jobs.7 Unemployment rates vary widely within and between
countries. Countries with relatively constant unemployment rates over time include Switzer-
land, the United States, Luxembourg, Norway and Austria, while Finland, Spain, Sweden,
and Ireland all had high unemployment in the 1990’s followed by a later recovery. The
Eastern European countries showed a steady increase in unemployment rates over the en-
tire period.
The second variable related to “constrained individual choices” is a measure of real
wages which was constructed using mean manufacturing wages (BLS, 2007b) and adjust-
ing them using PPP exchange rates (WorldBank, 1990-2005) and the CPI-U inflation index
(BLS, 2007a) to convert them to real manufacturing wages in 2006 dollars. Real wages
are stable across time for all countries with slow steady growth. The only exception to this
is Norway, which shows some fluctuations in the late 1990’s.8 Theoretically, as workers’
real wages increase, they should be able to withstand longer periods of unemployment and
7OECD data, standardized using ILO guidelines
8According to Johansen et al. (2007) Norway’s manufacturing wages fluctuated based on the interaction
between political party competition and the centralized wage bargaining institutions. The hypothesis is sup-
ported by the fact that the odd fluctuations in Norway’s manufacturing wages correspond to a labor coalition’s
control of parliament from 1990 to 1997, 2000 to 2001, and in 2005.
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be less pressed to accept atypical employment arrangements. On the other hand, as the
Netherlands narrative demonstrated, individuals might be more eager to take flexible jobs
in a more secure economic environment.
The final variable related to “individual constraints” is unemployment insurance re-
placement rates, averaging replacement rates across several unemployment scenarios.9
Denmark and the Netherlands have the highest unemployment insurance replacement rates
while the US and the UK have the lowest. Unemployment replacement rates changed in
several countries during this period: Italy increased benefits as did Switzerland and Ireland
to a lesser extent, while Denmark first increased and then decreased them. This variable
should measure whether workers are pressured into taking atypical employment or if they
have the luxury of taking their time to look for a permanent job.
The third hypothesis, “entrepreneurial spirit,” is the most difficult to measure. Tradi-
tionally, researchers use self employment, entry into self employment, and the TEA in-
dex (a measure combining self employment stocks and flows) (Gartner and Shane, 1995;
Iversen et al., 2005; Chandler and Lyon, 2001). According to the TEA, the US was
entrepreneurial in the late 1990’s but less so in the 2000’s while Romania and Estonia
show consistent increases, and Sweden, Finland, and Belgium have consistently low en-
trepreneurship. Self employment is the most common measure of entrepreneurship, but
is also a poor one, as it can indicate of a weak, rather than an innovative, economy. A
third measure, the patent application rate, was also tested in this analysis. Unfortunately,
the patent application rate is dominated by corporate, not individual, filings and it includes
foreign innovators seeking protection in the domestic market. In fact, in the United States
about 46% of patent applications are by US corporations while only 13% are individuals
and the remainder are government and foreign applications (USPTO, 2007). Patent ap-
9The measure was calculated by the OECD and is defined as the average of the gross unemployment
benefit replacement rates for a worker with a full record of employment at two earnings levels (67% and
100% of average production worker earnings), in three family situations (single, married with dependent
spouse, married with spouse in work) and for three unemployment spell durations (first year; second and
third year; fourth and fifth year).
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plication rates tend to be low and constant within countries with the exception of Cyprus,
Ireland, Estonia, Luxembourg, and Slovenia, which all grew over the period.
The last independent variables are controls. The first is the proportion of the labor force
that is women. All countries had progressively more women in the labor force from 1995
to 2006. Denmark, Iceland, and Sweden all approached 50% of the labor force by the end
of the period, while Spain and Italy only reached 40%. The gini coefficient was also tested
as a control, as was a dummy for EU membership.
Data are inconsistently available across years and countries. Self employment and part-
time employment come from the OECD while fixed term employment comes from Euro-
stat, and is thus only available for Europe. Table 2.1 shows the availability of the three
dependent variables by country and year. Descriptive statistics for all variables are in table
A.1 in the appendix.
Correlations between independent variables are predominantly unrelated to one another
as illustrated in table 2.2. All correlations take into account the panel data structure and
are calculated as ((βx|y ∗βy|x).5) from two bivariate two-level regressions for each pair of
variables. This is a simple back-door method since β is corxycorx , so the product of the two
beta’s is simply
cor2xy
corx∗cory . Taking the square root gives the correlation coefficient, having
adjusted for within country-correlation in the regression.
The different types of atypical employment have weak correlations, likely because they
have distinct causes; fixed term employment is correlated with part-time and self employ-
ment with a Pearson correlation .15 and .084 respectively, while part-time and self employ-
ment have a .24 correlation. As such, each of the three types of atypical employment are
treated as separate dependent variables.
In pooled time-series data, observations are correlated across years and countries can
also be correlated spatially, violating ordinary least squares (OLS) assumptions. To il-
lustrate this correlation structure, the residuals from three OLS regressions predicting the
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Australia o* o* o* o* o* o* o* o* o o* o* o* o* o* o* o* o*
Austria * * * * * o* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo*
Belgium xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo xo* xo*
Canada o* o* o* o* o* o* o* o o* o o* o* o* o* o* o* o*
Czech o* o* o* o* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo*
Denmark xo xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo xo* xo*
Finland o* o* o* o* o* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo*
France xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo xo* xo*
Germany xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo xo* xo*
Greece xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo xo* xo*
Hungary * * * o* o* xo xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo*
Iceland o* o* o* o* o* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* x* x* x* x*
Ireland xo xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo xo* xo*
Italy xo xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo xo* xo*
Japan o* o* o* o* o* o* o* o* o* o* o* o* o* o* o* o* o*
Lithuania * * * * * x* x* x* x* x* x* x* x* x*
Luxembourg xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo xo* xo*
Netherlands xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo xo* xo*
N Zealand o* o* o* o* o* o* o* o* o* o* o* o* o* o* o* o* o*
Norway o* o* o* o* o* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo*
Poland * * * * * * * xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo*
Portugal xo* xo xo xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo* xo xo* xo*
Romania * * * * * x* x* x* x* x* x* x* x* x* x*
Slovakia o* o* o* o* xo* xo* xo* xo xo* xo xo* xo* xo*
Slovenia * * * x* x* x* x* x* x* x* x* x* x* x*
Spain xo* xo* xo* xo xo xo xo xo xo* xo* xo xo xo* xo* xo xo* xo*
Sweden o* o* o* o* o* xo xo xo xo xo xo* xo* xo xo xo* xo* xo*
Switzerland o* o* o* o* o* o* o* o* o* o* o* o* o* o* o* o* o*
UK xo* xo* xo* xo xo xo xo xo xo xo xo xo xo xo xo xo xo*
US o* o* o* o* o* o* o* o* o* o* o* o* o* o* o* o* o*
x fixed term work
o part-time work
* self employment
Table 2.1: Dependent variable availability
UD SR REPL TEPL DEPL NCC U MW UR I WW
union density 1
strike/lockout rate .073 1
regular EPL .036 .029 1
short EPL .14 .22 .081 1
regular-short EPL .14 .24 .24 .95 1
non-compensation .078 .080 .22 .091 .16 1
unemployment .19 .089 .044 .038 .016 .031 1
manufacturing wage .46 .21 .0042 .22 .20 .24 .21 1
unemploy rep rate .11 .0020 .091 .29 .25 .22 .051 .17 1
innovation .14 .037 .041 0 .0054 .20 0 .27 .073 1
women working .32 0 .27 .41 .31 .0026 .29 .34 .30 .29 1
Table 2.2: Correlations of independent variables
proportion of the workforce in each type of atypical employment were correlated across
pairs of years within countries for each regression. This tested not just for correlation
across adjacent years, but across all temporal lags. The scatter plot in figure 2.3 shows the
correlation between residuals for a pair of years on the x axis (e.g. the correlation between
self employment residuals for 1998 and for 1999) and the difference in years on the y axis
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(1998-1999 = 1). Part-time work has a much stronger time correlation, and is correlated



















Figure 2.3: Correlation between residuals predicting atypical employment
There are several models that adjust for pooled time series correlation structures. First,
there is a fixed effects model which transforms each variable into a comparison between
the country-year and the country-specific mean (which is the equivalent of using country
dummy variables) or in other words uses exclusively within-country variance. In equation
2.1, Yi j is the level of atypical employment in country i in year j, Y i is the average level of
atypical employment in country i over all periods j, Xi j is the set of independent variables
for each country i in year j, and X i is the mean of the independent variable for each country.
The model intercept is β and γ is the vector of parameters weighting the independent vari-
ables. While this model deals with the correlation across time within countries, it ignores
the variance between countries when estimating the parameters. This is a significant loss of
information, particularly for those variables that are relatively static within countries, such
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as unemployment insurance replacement rates.
Yi j−Y i = β + γ(Xi j−X i)+ εi j, (2.1)
In comparison, model 2.2 uses a random error component (εi j), an error component
specific to the country (εi) and a country-specific intercept (βi), while the effects of all the
independent variables X are assumed to be the same for all countries. In this model, εi
and βi are random parameters that are not estimated along with the fixed parameters, but
their variance is estimated along with εi j’s variance. The model reduces the total number
of parameters from the fixed effects model and uses the variation between countries, as
well as within, to estimate parameters. Just as the country-specific error is assumed to be
drawn from a normal distribution (random effects), the country-specific intercepts are also
assumed to follow a normal distribution.
I also tested models with random coefficients for each of the independent variables in
this model. This model assumes that the independent variables’ coefficients vary by coun-
try (again drawn from a normal distribution).10 For the temporary and self employment
models, the simple random intercepts model in equation 2.2 was the best fit.
Yi j = β0 +βi + γX + εi j + εi, (2.2)
While atypical employment levels are correlated by country, it is also possible that they
are correlated by time. For example, there could be a European recession, or perhaps orga-
nizational fads spread simultaneously. If this is the case, years are not only nested within
countries, but countries are also nested within years, and a crossed random effects model
10Both testing random coefficients models, and then for additional confirmation, running individual models
by country, the effects of the independent variables were found to be similar for all countries, and thus the
intercept model was sufficient.
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is necessary.11 This model is illustrated in equation 2.3, where µi and ν j are the random
intercepts for years and countries. The random intercept for a given year is shared by all
countries and the random intercept for an individual country is shared by all time observa-
tions within that country. As in the other models, Xi j indicates the independent variables,
while Yi j indicates the outcome variable, one of the three types of atypical employment.
Yi j = β0 + γXi j + µi +ν j + εi j, (2.3)
2.5 Results
Results from the fixed effects regressions show that the level of fixed term employment in-
creases with union density, higher unemployment benefits, higher wages, and more women
in the workforce. In terms of the hypotheses, this suggests some support for the “free
market seeking” hypothesis, if firms avoid union-imposed constraints through fixed term
contracts. There are interesting results for “individual constraints,” as higher real wages and
unemployment benefits are related to more fixed term contracts—perhaps because individ-
uals are less fearful of facing periods of unemployment between contracts and therefore
more willing to take fixed term jobs. The entrepreneurial variables have weak findings,
which is unsurprising given the measurement problems. In table 2.3 σu and σe show the
standard deviations of the residuals for the mean values for each country, and for the obser-
vations within each country while ρ indicates the fraction of the variance due to the country
specific effect.12
Results from the fixed effects and random effects regressions show that part-time work
11Crossed random effects models were tested and found to be the best model for predicting fixed term
employment. The crossed effects model was compared to the nested model using a likelihood ratio test.
Fixed term employment is the only atypical employment that required the crossed effects model. It could be
that fixed term employment rates result from international organizational trends as it is a relatively new form
of atypical employment.
12Based on a Hausmann test I do not test a simple random effects model for fixed term contracts since the
random effects are correlated with predictors.
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fixed term pt employment self employment
fe fe re fe re
entrepreneurship
patent app rates 6.13 (.856) -6.97 (.650) -13.09 (.393) 21.9 (.049) 27.3 (.016)
self employment .264 (.306) .221 (.055) .121 (.218) - -
employer constraints
union density .232 (.007) .020 (.527) -.029 (.261) .021 (.368) .006 (.772)
strike rates -.124 (.107) -.102 (.019) -.109 (.012) .036 (.253) .029 (.374)
regular EPL -1.30 (.461) .138 (.868) -.664 (.336) 1.97 (.001) 1.87 (.000)
reg-short EPL .799 (.247) -.521 (.105) .045 (.873) .390 (.072) .323 (.122)
non-comp costs -.140 (.500) .111 (.291) -.058 (.522) -.219 (.003) -.140 (.045)
worker constraints
unemployment .012 (.916) -.037 (.518) -.024 (.660) .296 (.000) .276 (.000)
unemp replacement .161 (.007) .028 (.307) .007 (.801) -.038 (.052) -.034 (.085)
median income .651 (.008) .212 (.084) .255 (.028) -.237 (.007) -.352 (.000)
controls
women .588 (.090) 1.15 (.084) .878 (.000) -.410 (.000) -.541 (.000)
constant -44.0 (.068) -45.2 (.000) 24.3 (.008) 37.3 (.000) 45.0 (.000)
σu 11.61 7.43 4.86 7.14 4.61
σe 1.355 .797 .797 .584 .584
ρ .987 .989 .974 .993 .984
() indicates the P value for the coefficient
σu indicates the sd of the estimated residual for mean country predictions
σe indicates the sd of the estimated residual for the within country predictions
ρ indicates the fraction of the variance due to countries
Table 2.3: Fixed and random effects coefficients
increases when there are fewer strikes and lockouts, when real wages are higher, and when
there are more women in the workforce. A higher strike rate probably discourages part-
time employment because hours are normally included in union negotiations. The result for
wages confirms the fixed term employment results; countries with higher mean wages have
more part-time work. Finally, there are tentative effects for self employment being related
to higher part-time employment, perhaps lending some credence to the entrepreneurship
hypothesis. As expected, the proportion of women in the work force plays a significant
role in predicting part-time work. There is little support for the three main hypotheses in
this regression since strikes seem to discourage part-time work and a high income encour-
ages it. Rather, the statistics seem to reinforce the Netherlands’ story: changes in part-time
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employment are not driven by tight economic conditions or firms’ desires to circumvent
union and government regulation, but rather, by a prosperous environment with union rep-
resentation, where women are free to choose part-time work.
Finally, the fixed and random effects regressions for self employment show that patent
rates, stricter EPL, lower non-compensation costs, higher unemployment, lower unemploy-
ment benefits, lower wages, and fewer women in the workforce are all related to more self
employment. This provides clear support for two hypotheses and mixed findings for the
third. For “constrained individual choices,” in a context of economic insecurity with low
benefits and low wages, more individuals are self employed. With respect to the “free-
market seeking hypothesis,” in a context of strict EPL there is more self employment (per-
haps dependent self employed) though non-compensation costs (conceived of as a con-
straint on employers) actually decrease self employment. This could be because higher
non-compensation costs fund a more secure safety net for workers, measuring something
akin to the unemployment benefits variable. In part, they also measure the amount of bene-
fits a worker receives from an employer, which should encourage workers to prefer regular
employment. While the patent application rate effect might lend additional support to the
entrepreneurial hypothesis, we consider the results tentative given the measure’s aforemen-
tioned faults and the weakly significant results.13
While random and fixed effects are two of the most common methods to deal with
pooled time series data, there could also be correlations between countries by year or pre-
dictors could have different slopes for different countries, two possibilities ignored up to
this point. Table 2.4 shows in the first column a crossed effects regression with all variables
for each type of atypical employment. The second column illustrates the “best” model;
these are not necessarily the “best” in a strict hierarchy of statistical tests. Because data
13Several models were run that are not presented here. These include several crossed effects models, inter-
actions between EPL and unemployment, running the model with logit transforms of the atypical employment
rates (because they vary between 0 and 1), and running effects by country groupings (Mediterranean vs. An-
glo Saxon for example). Multiple diagnostics such as plots of quantiles of varname against quantiles of
normal distributions, tests of the normality assumptions, and plots of predictions and residuals were run. The
results are available upon request.
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availability varied by variables, the most limited (like strikes and lockouts) were removed.
Then several models were run with restricted samples including all remaining variables.
These models were compared using a likelihood ratio test and once the significant variables
were found, the model was rerun with the largest possible sample, omitting non-significant
variables as necessary, to increase sample size by including observations for which the
omitted variable was not available. Models tested include both crossed effects and nested
models with various combinations of controls including an interaction term between EPL
and unemployment rates, designed to capture the effect of concurrent firm demand for atyp-
ical workers along with individual willingness to accept atypical employment. (This is not
displayed because it was not significant.) Crossed effects were found unnecessary for the
part-time and self employment models as the two models’ coefficients were almost identi-
cal and the change in log likelihood was negligible. In contrast, the regressions for fixed
term employment improved dramatically using crossed effects.14
For self employment and fixed term employment, the crossed effects and best models’
findings mirror the results from the fixed and random effects models except that the gap
between regular and temporary EPL seemed to slightly decrease self employment in the
crossed model. The regressions for part-time employment do not contradict the fixed effects
and random effects regressions, but removing some insignificant variables that limited the
sample size brought formerly insignificant predictors into the significant range.
The “entrepreneurial spirit” hypothesis fares surprisingly well in these analyses. Patent
rates are positively and significantly associated with self employment, as expected, but
negatively associated with part-time work. Self employment is positively related to both
fixed term and part-time work, as expected. Patent application rates might be associated
with lower levels of part-time work because patent applications inadvertently measure the
14The random effects for the self employment equation were not normally distributed. Rerunning the
model using a transformed dependent variable, ln( proportionsel f employedproportionnotsel f employed ), still yields non normal random
effects, as tested by the skewness kurtosis test, Shapiro-Wilk test, and plots of the random effect against the
normal distribution. Thus the last column of the table, the best self employment model, uses Stata’s glamm
commands using country level effects and robust standard errors.
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fixed term pt employment self employment
full best full best full best
countries/observations 14/123 15/234 20/181 21/330 10/183 24/369
Fixed Part
entrepreneurship
patent app rates -2.24 - -11.99 -59.37∗∗∗ 25.05∗ 59.17∗∗
self employment .38∗ - .15 .32∗∗∗ - -
employer constraints
union density .12∗ .20∗∗∗ -.02 -.082∗∗∗ .01 -
strike rates -.12 - -.11∗∗ - .03 -
regular EPL -1.94 -1.0 -.52 -2.12∗∗∗ 1.91∗∗∗ 2.22∗∗∗
reg-short EPL .91 .51 ∗ -.084 .15 .36 -.69∗∗
non-comp costs -.04 -.43∗∗∗ -.017 -.13∗ -.18∗∗ -.05
worker constraints
unemployment -.02 .13∗∗ -.025 -.05 .28∗∗∗ .19∗∗∗
unemp replacement .15∗∗ .042 .01 .038 -.036 -
median income .44∗ - .24∗ .48∗∗∗ -.30∗∗∗ -
controls
women .3943 -.1851 .9486∗∗∗ .8750∗∗∗ -.4781∗∗∗ -1.2968∗∗∗
EU member 3.70 - -.76 - .43 -
Random Part
country(sd cons) 8.07 9.02 5.93 5.53 6.83 13.65
year .00035 1.52 .00025 - .044 -
residual variability sd 1.31 1.25 .776 1.09 .58 2.87
Log Likelihood -248.21 -458.02 -273.45 -559.68 -274.22 -764.22
*** P= .001, ** P =.01, * P =.05
Table 2.4: Crossed effects and best regression coefficients
strength of certain economic sectors that hire more full-time workers. Also economies with
high levels of self employment are found to have higher levels of part-time or fixed term
employment. Presumably, this measures the cultural-entrepreneurship hypothesis.
There was mixed evidence for the “free-market seeking” hypothesis. First, union strength
is related to more fixed term employment but to less part-time employment. This could re-
sult because working hours are included in union contracts (traditionally the case) but fixed
term employment is not. This has changed in recent years; in the early 2000’s union con-
tracts began to limit fixed term employment, mandate fixed term workers’ benefit levels,
and even include clauses automatically converting fixed term workers to permanent posi-
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tions (Campbell, 2005). As such, firms used to be able to escape union pressures through
fixed term work but have never been able to do this through part-time employment. EPL,
a more clear cut measure of the “free-market seeking” hypothesis, has the anticipated ef-
fect of increasing self employment and a wide gap between EPL for regular and fixed
term workers is associated with more fixed term employment and less self-employment, as
shown in the regular versus short term EPL gap row of table 2.4. Surprisingly, stricter EPL
is associated with less part-time employment which makes sense when part-time work-
ers are covered by regular EPL, as in the case of the Netherlands or following 1997 EU
directive guaranteeing part-time workers the same rights as full-time workers.15 Overall,
it seems that firms in countries with strict EPL and unions use both self and fixed term
employment to avoid constraints, while part-time workers are prevented from playing the
same role by union contract provisions and recently added legal protections.
Higher non-compensation costs are consistently and strongly linked with less atypical
employment. Originally, this variable was included to measure constraints on firms, but
it also measures the general strength of the safety net including those employer-provided
benefits that might tie workers to regular jobs. (Non-wage compensation costs can include
insurance, pension, health insurance, occupation injury insurance, unemployment insur-
ance, and family allowances.) In sum, the variable measures two opposing effects simulta-
neously: one binding workers to regular employment (e.g. health insurance in the US) and
one offering a safety net that might make atypical work more feasible (e.g. unemployment
insurance).
The most robust findings were for the “constrained individual choices” hypothesis.
High unemployment rates are related to higher levels of fixed term and self employment
while generous unemployment benefits also encourage fixed term employment, presum-
ably because workers can bridge between assignments with public benefits. I hypothesized
15The negative relationship between EPL and part-time work is consistent over time, not increasing after
the 1997 directive, when we test sub-periods. In addition, EPL’s relationship to part-time work is not driven
by the part-time outlier, the Netherlands, as the results hold excluding the Netherlands.
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that an economy with high wages would have less of all forms of atypical employment,
but in fact, wages are related to more fixed term and part-time employment. This is the
relationship anticipated by the Netherlands story, where workers (particularly women) in
a prosperous economy, willingly choose part-time work. In contrast, results show that in
a more robust economy workers are less likely to become self employed. This confirms
the literature we referred to at the beginning, showing that self employment is often em-
ployment of last resort, and that prosperous economies consequently have less self employ-
ment. Regressions over shorter time periods (not shown here) suggest that the relationship
between a weak labor market and self employment strengthened in the post-2000 period.
Finally, I confirmed the literature, finding that the proportion of workers in part-time
employment increases with more women in the workforce and that the proportion of women
in the workforce is negatively correlated with self employment rates.
Figure 2.4 shows the time trends for predicted and actual levels of atypical work in a
few countries. Overall the models do a relatively good job of predicting trends. For the
most part, smaller fluctuations are captured by the model, although it misses the recent
decline and then partial rebound of self employment in Greece as well as the US’s level of
part-time work.
Figure 2.5 breaks down the predictions for two countries for each type of atypical em-
ployment in 2006, focusing on the three outliers examined in the qualitative narrative. In
the figure each coefficient from the “best” model column in table 2.4 are used in combi-
nation with the original data for each country in 2006 (i.e. the percent of women in the
labor market etc). This represents a decomposition of some of prediction points in fig-
ure 2.4. The horizontal line indicates the sum of all components, leading to the overall
prediction. Thus the model predicted for France that patent rates would contribute .-36,
self employment 2.85, unions -.68, EPL -5.3, the difference in temp vs. regular EPL -
.165, non-compensation costs -4.05 and so on, summing to a total prediction of 12.17%
part-time employment. The number at the bottom of each bar indicates the actual atypi-
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cal employment level; in this case, 13.6% of French employment in 2006 was part-time.
While the model overall does a good job of predicting atypical employment, the random
country effects are a big part of that prediction. While the variables of interest are sta-
tistically significant, they contribute significantly less than the predicted country random
effects. From the narrative we might have expected the Netherlands’ part-time prediction
to be more driven by the women in the labor market and the high income, but, in fact,
the women and income variables play a very similar role in predicting France’s part-time
employment rate. For fixed term employment, EPL plays a slightly larger role in predict-
ing Spain’s fixed term employment rate than the UK’s, but fails to capture the dramatic
roll we would expect. For self employment there is no visible difference between the two
cases displayed beyond the country effects and the proportion of women in the labor force.
This graphic draws our attention to how we need to look beyond the model’s statistical
significance. While the model has statistically significant effects in the expected directions
and accurately predicts the countries’ trends, it largely does so through countries’ random
effects, and very little through the explanatory variables of interest. While the magnitude
of the fixed part of the regressions’ effects is not large, it was still statistically significant.
In this sense, the quantitative analysis did find significant results, but at the same time, our
predictions suggest that the model did not capture the same information as our historical
narratives of Spain, the Netherlands, and Greece.
2.6 Atypical employment policy
The OECD’s EPL index used in the analysis focuses on dismissal and job protection, but
there are many ways beyond job security that atypical workers are disadvantaged. For ex-
ample, they are often not part of unions, have weaker worker safety protections, no overtime
pay, and sometimes no minimum wage. This situation is being addressed by governments
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Figure 2.5: Decomposing predicted atypical employment for 6 cases in 2006
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proving their status through legislation, the courts, or unions. This section starts with a
comparison of diverse legislative, judicial, and union approaches to regulating atypical em-
ployment and concludes with a comparison of the different approaches.
In the United States several protections such as the US Fair Standards Labor Act (guar-
anteeing minimum wage and basic workers’ rights) or OSHA (Occupational Safety and
Health) apply to all “employees.” The Fair Standards Labor Act covers temps, fixed term,
and part-time workers, but can exclude independent contractors. The exclusion of indepen-
dent contractors is addressed through the courts which determine whether a worker should
have the status of “employee” (covered in detail in the next section). Atypical workers
who are “employees” still do not qualify for some other protections and benefits. For ex-
ample, the Family and Medical Leave Act only applies to employers over some threshold
in size and requires workers to have worked for the employer 1250 hours in the last 12
months; thus many atypical workers do not qualify. Similarly, unemployment insurance
has varying eligibility requirements (by state) in terms of hours worked under an employer
and minimum earnings to be covered, so atypical workers are, again, less likely to be cov-
ered. Furthermore, only laid off workers are eligible for unemployment insurance and in
many states workers finishing a fixed term contract or in between temp assignments are not
considered to be “laid off.” In sum, atypical workers miss out on the greater portion of the
social safety net that was designed with a traditional employee-employer relationship in
mind (Stone, 2006). Which workers are left out of which social scheme varies across coun-
tries, depending on whether the benefit is issued through the employer, state, or unions,
the worker’s relationship to those parties (status as employee or as union member), and
on eligibility requirements. There are currently three broad approaches to improving work
conditions for atypical workers: legislative, judicial, and unions.
The first legislative approach to improving atypical workers’ rights is often called the
“flexicurity” model. This approach de-links workers’ benefits and the safety net from the
employee-employer relationship and replaces it with benefits and a safety net coming di-
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rectly from the government. While analysts discuss the “Danish flexicurity model” as a
unified approach of weak limits on firms and extensive worker protections, it is actually
not one clear or consistent policy and Denmark has had several changes in their policies
in the past few years (Zhou, 2007). Today Denmark has a low payroll tax burden on busi-
nesses, meaning that only 10.3% (2005) of firms’ compensation costs were not wages com-
pared to 22.7% in Finland or 31.2% in France (BLS, 2007b).16 While there is no “at will”
employment, as in the US, dismissal notices are significantly shorter than in much of Eu-
rope, reaching a maximum of 6 months notice. Workers also receive generous unemploy-
ment benefits with replacement rates on average 50% of prior salary, as measured by the
OECD.17 This is the highest unemployment insurance replacement rate among the OECD
countries (with the exception of the Netherlands) with 53%; the next highest countries,
Belgium and Portugal, have much lower rates around 42 and 41%. The generous Dan-
ish program has actually become more restricted in recent years, reducing unemployment
insurance maximum benefit periods from 5 to 4 years, and requiring unemployment insur-
ance recipients to accept job offers or to enter retraining schemes. Denmark also spends
significantly more per person on retraining. The downside of the Danish system is that it
is expensive. In 2004 before a recent tax cut, average income tax rates could reach 59.1%,
among the highest in Europe (Denmark, 2004). The positive side of a high and progressive
income tax and strong safety net is that Denmark is very equal, with a gini coefficient of
only .24 in 2005.
This “flexicurity” model is currently a popular one among analysts because the Danish
labor market is doing extremely well with an unemployment rate under 5% and some of the
highest salaries in Europe at $26 per hour (2006 PPP); only workers in Belgium, Austria,
Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, and Norway earn equivalent or better wages. However,
16These numbers might not be exact- the ILO reports 6.3% in 1999, the same year that the BLS reports
7.5%. Regardless, according to all sources, the tax burden is low.
17This is the average of the gross unemployment benefit replacement rates for a worker with a full record
of employment at two earnings levels (67% and 100% of average production worker earnings), three family
situations (single, married with dependent spouse, married with spouse in work) and three unemployment
spell durations (first year; second and third year; fourth and fifth year.)
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the causal relationship between flexicurity and Danish success is uncertain; there are many
alternative explanations for the high wages, such as 74% union membership (OECD, 2003)
and 82% union coverage (both in 2000) (ILO, 2004). Further, the flexicurity system does
not entirely remove incentives for atypical employment. In 2005 Denmark still had 18%
of its workforce in part-time jobs, 9% in fixed term, 9% self employed, and 6.5% in temp
work (OECD, 1990-2008; Eurostat, 2007).
The second legislative approach is to patch the leaks in the current social safety net
that are breached by atypical employment contracts. The European Union as a whole has
taken this approach, in particular with the two aforementioned directives regarding part-
time and fixed term work. Directive 1999/70/EC on fixed term employment did not set
forth specific requirements for countries, but developed a framework that countries could
use to limit fixed term work. The directive requires countries to specify who is covered by
a law limiting fixed term contracts (i.e. individuals in apprenticeships might be excluded),
to specify whether employers must justify fixed term contracts (i.e. to replace a specific
individual on leave), to specify the maximum number of contract renewals possible and
the total maximum duration of those contracts, and possibly the total period (including
the time in the fixed term contract) that must pass before a worker could be rehired in the
same fixed term position. All EU states responded to the directive (including several appli-
cant countries) with diverse implementations. Table 2.5 lists implementation by country.
Several countries excluded public sector workers or trainees from the limitations on fixed
term contracts while others, like Italy, have seemingly arbitrary exclusions like workers in
catering. Many countries also exempted workers from the law as long as the contract is
justified. This strips the law of its power insofar as firms can always find plausible justifi-
cations to infinitely renew contracts. Similarly, Denmark applied the law only to workers
not under collective agreements. With over 82% of their workforce covered by collec-
tive agreements, this clause makes the law inconsequential. Most of the implementations
are relatively weak, such as Sweden’s limitation to a maximum of three years of contract
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renewals within five years. However, other countries such as Austria took the directive
as an opportunity to implement a strict limit of three months on renewed fixed term con-
tracts. Note that the Netherlands entry (which might be confusing in the table) says that
any series of contracts enduring more than 36 months or renewed more than three times
is reclassified as permanent unless breaks of at least 3 months in length occurred between
contracts. Overall, one might say that the countries followed their legislative inclinations
before the directive; the highly regulated countries limited atypical employment and free
market countries minimized the law’s impact.
Directive 97/81/EC on part-time work had more specific requirements. The directive re-
quired pro rata compensation for part-time workers, a non-discrimination law, and required
that firms facilitate switches to and from part-time work. Few European countries varied
implementation. Some countries like Austria, Belgium, and Greece excluded public work-
ers while Denmark excluded public sector seasonal workers; Finland excluded workers in
tourism, and the UK excluded judicial and armed forces workers. The implementation of
the anti-discrimination clause can vary from a general affirmation of equality to Austria’s
requirement that the employer has the burden of proof when a worker complains about
discrimination. Some of the laws add special provisions such as Austria’s promotion of
part-time work for employees taking care of elderly parents or Belgium’s decision to in-
tegrate it into parental leave and retirement policy. Denmark denied the original law and
refused to guarantee workers a right to part-time work because it is already included in col-
lective agreement negotiations. In France, part-time policy is also a part of family policy,
where requests for part-time work should be justified by family reasons. Finland requires
any new tasks in the organization to be offered to part-time workers before new workers
are hired. Table 2.6 shows for EU countries the adjustment to the baseline directive and for
non-EU countries, their relevant policies for part-time work.
The second means to insure atypical workers’ rights is through unions and collective
bargaining. Atypical workers are difficult to organize because employers often do not have
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scope justification allowed max contract max cumulative
necessary? renewals duration duration
Austria excl. public yes 1 - 3 mo
Belgium all if so, no limit 4 3/6 mo 2/3 yrs
Denmark excl. unionized no 0 - -
Finland excl. public yes court determined “abuse”
France all yes 1 9/18/24 mo 50% contract
length break
Germany excl. public if so, no limit 3 2 yrs 2 yrs
Greece all if so, no limit 3 2 yrs 2 yrs
Ireland excl. training if so, no limit after 4 yrs 4 yrs
3 yrs, 1
Italy many industry by industry 1 3 yrs 3 yrs
exceptions if so, no limit
Luxembourg excl. public, yes 2 2 yrs 2 yrs
edu, & religious
sectors
Netherlands excl. public no unlimited/ 3 mo bet 36 mo/
3 contracts unlimited
Portugal excl. public yes 2 6 yrs 33% contract
& other sectors yes 2 6 yrs length break
Spain all yes no limits if collective agreement
6 mo 12 mo
Sweden excl. managers yes - 3 yrs 5yrs
& family workers
UK excl. training no - 4 yrs 4 yrs
Czech excl. disabled, no - 2 yrs 2 yrs
minors, training
Hungary all yes - 5 yrs 5 yrs
Iceland excl. managers no - 2 yrs 2 yrs
Lithuania all yes unless - 5 yrs 5 yrs
unionized
Poland all if so, no limit 2 - 1 mo break
Slovakia excl. small firms for renewals - 3 yrs 3 yrs
Slovenia all yes - 3 yrs 3 yrs
Details excluded (i.e. Denmark’s weaker restrictions for universities)
source:Commission of the European Communities CEC (2006); EIRO (2005); ILO (2008)
Table 2.5: Fixed term employment legislation
43
scope provisions (beyond EU standard for EU)
Austria excl. public, managers, allows older workers to reduce hours;
homeworkers employer has burden of proof in PT
discrimination case
Belgium all bargaining rights, paid training
leave, workers have the right to
switch PT/FT
Denmark excl. seasonal public union responsible for bargaining
Finland excl. casual workers must offer PT more work when available
France all/ appeals allowed right to leave & vocational training
Germany all right to switch PT/FT
Greece excl. public must inform unions as PT:FT ratio changes
Ireland excl. casual none
Italy all right to training & must inform unions
as PT:FT ratio changes
Luxembourg all PT for parents guaranteed
PT promoted as partial retirement
Netherlands excl. defense workers EU directive only
Portugal public and private EU directive only
Spain excl. skilled & managers access to PT work
Sweden all right to PT work for parents
UK excl. judicial, military EU directive only
Australia < 35 hrs/week pro-rated wage & sick leave, 4 wks holiday
Canada < 40 hrs/week no longer required to offer PT hrs if available
not entitled to paid holiday or vacation
Czech* < 40 hrs/week mothers’ and caretakers’ right to switch to PT
Hungary all EU directive only
Iceland all right to take leave in summer months
Japan all minimum daily wages & proportional leave
Slovakia < 40 hrs/week same protections as FT
Switzerland < 40 hrs/week same protections as FT
US employer-defined OSHA and Fair Standards Labor Act apply,
no anti-discrimination, pro rated
benefits, or right to PT work
*ILOEX contradicts EU source stating that Czech mothers have no right to PT
work, but division 3 section 241 of the Czech legal code at
http://www.mpsv.cz/files/clanky/3221/labour_code.pdf
says Czech women with children under 15 or pregnant have the right to PT work.
Table 2.6: Part-time employment legislation
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the legal obligation to negotiate with them, because they often change positions and em-
ployers, and because their legal employer could be a firm they have never gone to or that
they might not even be aware is their employer. In America, atypical workers’ rights with
respect to unions have vacillated. A 2004 ruling on the National Labor Relations Act in
2004 found that temp workers cannot organize alongside direct hires although they can
organize to negotiate with the temp firm. At the same time, on the ground, temps were
making progress through organizing and the judicial system. In response to an IRS suit,
Microsoft was forced to reclassify their independent contractors. While the ruling’s in-
tent was that the workers be reclassified as employees, Microsoft reacted by reclassifying
many of them as temps. In response, the workers successfully organized the Washing-
ton Alliance of Technology Workers. While Microsoft is not legally obliged to negotiate
with the union, the temps have nevertheless made some headway with respect to wages
and access to facilities, although not with respect to stock options. Microsoft is a special
case where the workers are well educated and remained at the (indirect) employer for an
extended period, making collective action easier. Overall, the courts support atypical work-
ers’ rights to organize but do not usually require the firm to negotiate with them (Jaarsveld,
2006). Consequently, there are many efforts by established unions like the AFL-CIO to
organize atypical workers as well as smaller unions like the LA Service Employees Inter-
national Union which advocates for home workers who are independent contractors, the
Chicago Coalition for the Homeless which advocates for temps and day laborers, and the
Freelancers Union which offers free-lancers insurance and advocacy.
Efforts to unionize atypical workers have made more progress in other countries where
unions have more power. In 1998, in Italy, the three main Italian trade union confed-
erations, Cgil, Cisl and Uil, set up specific workers’ organizations to represent atypical
workers: the New Labor Identities (Nuove Identit di Lavoro), the Association of Atypical
and Temporary Agency workers (Associazione Lavoratori Atipici e Interinali, Alai-Cisl),
and the Committee for Employment (Comitato per L’occupazione). These organizations
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have campaigned for the definition of precise juridical regulations and for a clear definition
of the field of work and rights of workers employed on atypical contracts. In particular,
they ask for rules regulating individual contracts and for the identification of professional
and sectoral profiles, tools to stabilize precarious situations in the labor market, training,
certification, and access to credit, insurance, and supplementary pension. In recent years,
these trade unions bargained at the national, company and local levels. In addition, recently
unions in the UK representing journalists, actors, and construction workers have started to
organize independent contractors (Böheim and Muehlberger, 2006). Union organization is,
in some sense, partly judicial action, as courts must grant them the right to organize before
the next steps can be taken.
The other way courts are engaged in protecting atypical workers’ rights is that they de-
termine whether workers are “employees.” The debate about whether independent contrac-
tors might also be employees has been raging for over forty years since the term “dependent
contractors” was developed (Langille and Davidov, 2000) and has continued to this day in-
cluding the ILO’s 2003 conference on “The Scope of the Employment Relationship.” The
classification of a worker as self employed or an employee controls workers’ access to an
array of rights such as liability for on-the-job accidents and retirement benefits.
In Canada “employees” are protected by the Employment Standards Act (guarantee-
ing paid vacations, equal pay for equal work, parental leave, and a maximum hours of
work), the Labor Relations Acts (right to collective bargaining), and employees have the
right to dismissal notice under common law. Independent contractors have none of these.
The courts use multiple criteria to determine whether a worker is an employee including:
the worker’s “control” over his work, economic independence (risk and chance of profit),
the duration of the employment relationship, reliance on the employer, the exclusivity of
the relationship, the right to use substitutes, ownership of tools, the freedom to reject job
opportunities, fee variation, integration into the organization, the degree of specialization
or skill, and whether more than 80% of the worker’s income comes from a single firm.
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The courts have often reclassified workers (for example, redesignating salesmen working
on commission as employees) although owner-operated trucking has had mixed success
(Langille and Davidov, 2000).
In Belgium, reclassification cases are often pursued by the social security administra-
tion (which loses revenue from misclassification) and have been supported based on the
criterion of: exclusivity of the employment relationship, limitations on competitive activi-
ties, terms of notice that are similar to those in an employment relationship, and obligations
for particular individuals to personally perform the services, and earning profit from oth-
ers’ work. Reclassification takes place for both high and low-skill jobs although in Belgium
high earners are often better off classified as non-employees because their social security
payments to the government are lower than they would be as employees (Engels, 2000).
In Germany, independent contractors (compared to employees) get no sick pay (vs. 6
weeks), no paid holidays (vs. 4-6 weeks), no unjust dismissal protection, and no social
security contributions. Until 1999 Germany used the following criteria to define “employ-
ees”: whether the contractor’s tasks are identical to employees’, control over the time and
place of work, number of clients, and bearing entrepreneurial risk. Meeting one criterion
was not sufficient; for example courts considered those with only one client but able to
set their own hours to be independent contractors. In 1999 a more rigid legislative ap-
proach was tested, classifying workers as employees if two of the following applied: labor
is performed within one individual or family, the contract is regular and for one customer,
tasks are normally performed by employees, and the worker has no direct contact with the
market. This legislation was rapidly revoked, returning to a more flexible court-enforced
approach with a new category of workers: “worker-like persons,” who have the right to
sick and vacation leave and collective bargaining, but not social security. The courts are
often inconsistent in their judgments with one court deeming pharmaceutical representa-
tives “employees” because the number of customers the worker visits is controlled through
reporting, while another court found the same workers to be a independent contractors
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because they could chose their customers (Däubler, 2000).
In Japan the benefits of being an employee rather than a contractor include worker’s
compensation, severance pay, and protection from unfair dismissal. As in Germany, the
courts have developed a new “mixed contract” in which a worker is protected from un-
fair dismissal and can receive workman’s comp. This category has been applied to de-
signers working at a firm who were paid per design rather than per hour. The courts
use a test that rests on the idea of worker subordination and uses the following criteria:
whether the worker can refuse work or bargain, the strength and degree of supervisory di-
rection, whether the worker can substitute another person’s services for his own, whether
the worker owns his own equipment, whether the worker earns more than employees doing
similar work, the exclusivity of the worker-firm relationship, how similar the hiring pro-
cess is to that for employees, disciplinary rules, and the application of provisions regarding
allowances and fringe benefits. Japanese courts are inconsistent in their application of
these rules, finding that owner-operator truck drivers were independent contractors, car-
penters working on-site during standard working hours were reclassified as employees of
a construction firm, scientists working on-site and supervised were also reclassified as em-
ployees, as were teachers, doctors, engineers, and computer scientists (Ramakawa, 2000).
In the Netherlands independent contractors are covered under some of the regular em-
ployee protections like rules about safety and protections, sick and vacation pay, protection
for the equal treatment of women, and probationary work periods, as well as social secu-
rity. However, like in the other countries where independent contractors go to the court to
be reclassified, Dutch workers must pass a “dependency test”. Criteria include: whether
the employer controls work hours and location; whether the worker can substitute another
worker to complete the task; whether the employer is paying wages; and whether the worker
is required to perform the labor during a certain period. While these criteria are similar to
those listed in other countries, in the Netherlands the burden of proof is on the employer. In-
dependent contractors who were awarded employee rights include: club dancers, an Imam
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(versus his mosque), a manufacturing home worker, a shopkeeper working in a laundromat,
and a schoolboy working for a bulb grower. Employer arguments were diverse from the
inability for a secular institution to oversee religious work (the Imam) to the child who was
supposedly not an employee because he could come and go as he pleased. These cases
are primarily brought to court by the National Institute for Social Insurance, which loses
revenue when workers are classified as independent contractors (Peijpe, 2000)
In Sweden the distinction is in part controlled by the courts, the tax agency, and unions.
The label of “employee” determines whether the worker is protected by workman’s com-
pensation, and whether he or she has vacation, employment security, and benefits. Criterion
used by the courts include: a personal duty to perform the work, predetermined work tasks,
the length of the relationship, whether the laborer can work for other parties, whether the
mode of performing work including the time and place of work are controlled, who pro-
vides work equipment, whether the laborer is reimbursed for expenses (like travel), who
bears economic risk, and the relative economic and social condition of the worker and em-
ployees. Again, the case history is very mixed. In two separate cases hairdressers renting
out seats in salons sought to be reclassified as employees. The case of the recently trained
apprentice was reclassified as an “employee,” while that of a more experienced hairdresser
was rejected because the worker brought their own clients. Many of the cases that have
been brought to the courts and reclassified seem almost trivial such as a child taking care of
her parents’ dog, parent volunteers at a nursery (won), and foster parents seeking employee
status (lost). Unlike in the other countries, it seems that multiple agents turn to the courts,
not merely executive agencies seeking lost revenue (Källström, 2000).
Finally, in the United States the self employed worker pays and receives social security,
but is not covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act and does not have health insurance,
vacation time, or sick time. The litmus test in the courts for determining whether a worker
is an “employee” is that of “control” over the worker. The definition of “control” has not
been clearly sorted out, with successful claims for reclassification for shochtim (kosher
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slaughterers) who worked alongside regular workers in a slaughterhouse (the firm claimed
they could not supervise worker working under Jewish religious laws they did not under-
stand) and Microsoft programmers. Unsuccessful claims include: cab drivers (they control
their workplace conditions), grocery store baggers (they have control over whether they
come to work), Mexican mine workers paid daily rates and housed in the mining facili-
ties, individuals installing floors for a flooring company, nude dancers (they just rent floor
space), landscapers, cleaners, waiters for a catering service, and oyster shuckers for a fish-
ing company. While the courts and legislature have been generally supportive of business,
the IRS aggressively sought to reclassify workers since it loses revenue from misclassifi-
cation. However, in response, the legislature passed laws minimizing firm penalties from
IRS reclassification (Linder, 2000).
There are strong similarities across the countries reviewed here. In all cases the courts
have the right to reclassify workers as employees, entitling them to greater workplace pro-
tections. Only in the United States does access to health care hinge on the contract type,
but on the other hand, the self employed have access to social security unlike in many other
countries. In all cases, the courts use similar theoretical criteria to assess whether a worker
is an “employee.” In most countries reclassification cases are pursued by executive agen-
cies (social security or the revenue service) rather than the workers themselves. Finally,
in all countries the rules and subsequent decisions are extremely flexible, creating an envi-
ronment of uncertainty. There are few incentives for workers to pursue legal action which
is expensive, has uncertain outcomes, and could lead to job loss. The aforementioned Mi-
crosoft case is an example of the odd mix of incentives and recourses available to all parties
in this debate. The IRS had the economic incentive to pursue legal action; Microsoft com-
plied, but then had an incentive to use a second form of atypical employment (temp work),
and finally with no success on the legislative or judicial fronts, the workers sought a so-
lution through collective action. It is uncertain how this struggle will end, but presuming
workers win and get the legal status equivalent to that of regular workers, Microsoft may
50
as well hire the workers directly and cut out the cost of a middle man.
2.7 Conclusion
In the quantitative analysis we found some support for the entrepreneurship hypothesis;
countries with high levels of self employment have high levels of both part-time and
fixed term employment, controlling for national constraints on firms’ employment activ-
ities and on economic conditions. We can imagine then, that in a society that values
entrepreneurship, workers use other forms of atypical employment as a means to meet
their entrepreneurial goals. The results from the patent variable were sometimes signifi-
cant in the expected directions, though overall, it was uncertain that the variable captured
entrepreneurship as it is also related to the distribution of firm types in the country and is
affected by exogenous factors such as international firms’ interest in the country’s market.
There were particularly interesting results for the “individual constraints” hypothesis.
For all factors, as a country becomes more prosperous and has more social protections,
there is less self employment. On the other hand, as the society becomes more prosperous
and the social insurance expands, the levels of fixed term and part-time employment rise,
perhaps because workers are more willing to reduce their work effort to take care of chil-
dren or are willing to risk periods of unemployment between fixed term contracts. On the
other hand, social benefits provided by employers through non-compensation costs seem
to discourage atypical employment, encouraging workers to hold permanent regular jobs.
Finally, constraints on the firm, such as union strength and strong EPL, increase self
employment and fixed term employment but discourage part-time work. Most likely, the
early inclusion of part-time work in EPL, and its traditional inclusion in union contracts,
excludes the opportunity for firms to circumvent constraints through part-time contracts.
Atypical employees have lower wages and fewer benefits on average, although there
are small subgroups that occasionally earn more (see papers 2 and 3 (chapters 3 and 4),
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and (Rica, 2004; Mertens and McGinnity, 2003; Booth et al., 2002; Brown and Sessions,
2003, 2005; Davia and Hernanz, 2002; Graaf-Zijl, 2005; Hagen, 2002; Picchio, 2006). As
discussed in the “free-market seeking hypothesis,” public policy is a likely incentive for
atypical employment. However, it is also the primary avenue towards reducing inequality.
As such, worker protections need to be considered in two lights—one as a solution to
inequality and one as a cause of atypical employment contracts.
With respect to policy, we have seen three approaches to atypical employment. The first
method is legislative and can take the form of flexicurity (de-linking worker benefits from
the employer) or by forcing employers to pay benefits for atypical workers (the part-time
example) or by forcing atypical employees into traditional employee status (i.e. limiting the
renewals on fixed term employment). The second approach was the union approach. The
union approach requires that first the courts grant atypical workers the right to organize
and second that firms negotiate with them. Once that right is granted, atypical workers
must organize, despite often not knowing their coworkers (in the case of temp agencies)
and despite rapid turnover. The third approach, through the courts, is primarily used to first
ensure the right to collective bargaining, and second, to reclassify independent contractors.
Having already examined the empirical evidence, here, the three major approaches are
compared from a theoretical viewpoint.
The main question behind the legislative approach is whether to detach protections from
the employment relationship (flexicurity) or to patch the existing system. There are strong
arguments on both sides of the debate. One major critique of the flexicurity approach is that
it assumes social insurance can replace employment protection. This might be a false trade-
off; workers can and should have both. Second, the flexicurity approach takes a somewhat
defeatist stance towards the breaching of employment security by firms even though these
breaches are not an insurmountable problem. Many public systems are regularly breached
and patched, such as the tax system. There have been some successes in the “patching
the dam” approach such as international union advocacy (European Trade Union Confed-
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eration) and the two EU directives on fixed term and part-time work. In some sense, the
breaches in workers rights through atypical work are only the result of earlier misguided
legislation that loosened regulations on some forms of contracts in hopes of increasing em-
ployment. Theoretically, a reversal of that legislation could remove the two tier system,
although in Spain, so far, they have been unable to reverse course. In addition, the flexicu-
rity approach is extremely expensive and therefore often politically infeasible. While it is
theoretically irrelevant whether it is funded by employer or wage taxes, it can be difficult
to pass the appropriate revenue-raising measures on either side.
On the other hand, the flexicurity approach is attractive, in that firms will always find
new ways to circumvent worker protections. Insofar as the firm’s obligations to their work-
ers begin and end with the paycheck (with the government taxing either the business or
individual side of that paycheck) it might be easier to provide worker protections directly
from the government. In comparison, EPL necessarily has complicated rules about contract
types and regulations for different size businesses and will require expensive enforcement
and will inevitably be evaded. Only independent contractors could not be easily covered
under a flexicurity scheme because of the ambiguity between a check for services and for
pay. Further, many in favor of flexicurity cite the negative side effects of strict EPL. While
it is true that past research has found that strict EPL has no effect on unemployment, it has
been shown to slow down the labor market (increasing average job tenure and the length of
unemployment spells), and to increase self employment (though not part-time or fixed term
work) (Cazes and Nesporova, 2003). Those arguing in favor of patching the dam argue
that this is evidence that strict EPL has no negative effect and we may as well expand it
to capture atypical workers. This is, in my opinion, a naive interpretation of these results.
Slow turnover can lead to the deterioration of skills among the unemployed. Slow turnover
also creates a matching problem (Schioppa, 1993) with worse worker-job matches when
the market is stagnant. Further, the EU enabled workers to cross borders for job oppor-
tunities, providing incentive for young workers who can’t break into a slow-moving labor
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market to seek opportunities abroad, inspiring for example, a young Italian brain drain
(Becker et al., 2004). Guaranteeing that firms are not paying less non-compensation costs
for atypical workers and creating equal rules for dismissal, a flexicurity approach should
remove distortions of employer’s hiring and firing decisions. Finally, the flexicurity system
should guarantee that in a dynamic work environment, workers do not bear the brunt of
their employer’s flexibility.
Specific policy proposals taking a flexicurity approach include expanding unemploy-
ment insurance, funding worker retraining programs, flex-insurance, and social drawing
rights. Flex-insurance is a scheme under which employers contribute to a social insur-
ance program in proportion to the flexibility of their contracts. The idea is an extension
of US unemployment insurance contributions, where employers with histories of layoffs
contribute more. Social drawing rights are a scheme where workers contribute to a national
program throughout their lives, accumulating credits (Stone, 2007). These credits can then
be used for retraining, care giving, and insuring against career transitions. Of course, all of
these flex proposals can be combined with policies from the “patching the dam” approach.
While there is a strong theoretical difference between the approaches, practically they need
not be mutually exclusive.
The two non legislative approaches, unions and court enforcement, are a bit too piece-
meal to be effective. Unions are making significant progress incorporating atypical work-
ers, but it is an uphill battle. In a context where unions negotiate at a lower level (unions
bargain at the firm, industry, and overall economy level in different countries where firm-
level bargaining is the “lowest” level) the fast turnover of atypical employees will nega-
tively impact their ability to negotiate. In addition, the union approach requires a second
approach, court action, to underpin it. With respect to the court-reclassification approach,
workers do not have the incentive to take legal action on their own behalf. Thus, court
enforcement only works if another party is granted the right to take action on part of the
workers, thus protecting workers from retaliatory job loss. In addition, in most countries,
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the courts seem to not uniformly enforce a single standard. Perhaps over time one will de-
velop, but currently court enforcement yields inconsistent protections for workers. Finally,
if legal action is taken infrequently, and the cost of a firms’ workers being reclassified by
the courts is low (as is guaranteed by the aforementioned US ruling), then from the firm’s
perspective the expected costs of reclassification are less than the savings from misclassify-
ing workers. Thus, even when workers are regularly reclassified by the courts, it could still
be worth it for firms to misclassify workers, leaving the courts with no deterrence effect.
This paper began with the question of how government policies influence atypical em-
ployment levels. Most of the proposed avenues discussed here will reduce firms’ incentives
to use atypical workers. The flexicurity approach will remove any incentives related to the
difference in non-wage compensation or in dismissal protections. On the other hand, flex-
icurity gives up some protections that many see as unnegotiable. In contrast, while the
dam-patching approach might remove some of the cost-saving incentives to use atypical
workers, it also creates some unusual incentives. Automatic conversions of fixed term
contracts could encourage firms to replace those workers before the limit on their fixed
term status. This puts workers in a weak position in an even weaker one. These types of
rules could also encourage firms to hire fewer women since they would be forced to ac-
cept women’s requests to switch back and forth between part and full time as child care
needs arise. To date, it is uncertain whether unions can organize and protect atypical work-
ers, although the outlook is better for atypical workers that stay in the same arrangement
for an extended period, as at Microsoft. Finally, the courts’ reclassification of workers
should not influence the incentives to hire atypical workers as long as expected penalties
for reclassification are not more costly than the savings from using atypical workers (which
seems to be the case today); court reclassification is seldom pursued by workers; and court
reclassification is enforced inconsistently.
Given that atypical workers persist in having lower compensation, benefits, and less job
security, it seems imperative to design an effective social safety net for atypical workers that
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does not create unintended incentives for employers and does not distort the marketplace.
Many countries have already begun to address these issues through various approaches.
Hopefully, we can find an approach to insure all workers rights that is coherent, clear,
and effective, while minimizing the distortion of the labor market by creating unintended
incentives for all actors.
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Chapter 3
European Labor Institutions and the
Fixed Term Wage Gap
3.1 Introduction
“Fixed term” jobs are jobs that have a fixed end date, compared to permanent work, which is
presumed to last indefinitely. Some countries, such as the US, have “at-will” employment,
meaning there is no substantial difference between fixed term and permanent work beyond
the expectation that the employment relationship will endure. The meaning of fixed term
work is largely defined by the difference between how a country’s legislation treats fixed
term workers compared to regular employees. From the employer’s perspective, relevant
legislation includes: restrictions on firing regular workers that do not apply to fixed term
workers and differences in non-compensation costs (firms’ non-wage costs directly related
to employing a worker) for employing fixed term versus regular employees.
In the past several years, the literature on fixed term employment has greatly expanded.
This is a response to the perception, first that fixed term employment is growing rapidly and
second, that fixed term workers have lower compensation. The combination of these two
factors is hypothesized to lead to a new “underclass” of workers, to explain recent declines
in real wages for low skill workers, or to have put downward pressure on wages and job
security for all workers. Despite the pervasiveness of these views, the first observation, that
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atypical employment is rising, does not have strong empirical support. Figure 3.1 shows
that fixed term employment has been relatively stable over the last decade in most European
countries. The common misperception of these trends is largely a consequence of how the
data are examined. Some studies present growth rates for firms’ use of fixed term workers.
While these growth rates are often high because the starting point was so low, in absolute
terms, the numbers are not so dramatic (Boeri and Garibaldi, 2007; Grip et al., 1997). Also,
my own work in chapter 4 suggests that counting the number of firms that use fixed term
workers shows larger increases than counting the percent of workers. Those studies that
do look at absolute levels (Keller and Seifert, 2005) are often surprised how low the levels
of fixed term employment actually are, given the relatively lighter regulation. Spain is the
only country where fixed term work truly exploded. From the late 1980’s to early 90’s,
fixed term employment jumped from below 10% of employment to almost 30%, though
levels have been stable since 1994. (Dolado et al., 2002). Spain’s unusually high level of
fixed term employment is related to a distinctive and early legislative history of loosening
fixed term employment regulations in an effort to reduce unemployment in the post-Franco
era. (A more lengthy discussion of Spain’s labor market regulation can be found in chapter
2.3.)
In contrast, there is significant support for the second assertion that fixed term jobs are
bad jobs. It has been shown that fixed term jobs have lower pay, less on the job training, and
that workers are less satisfied (Booth et al., 2002; Blanchard and Landier, 2001; Cahuc and
Postel-Vinay, 2002; Appelbaum, 1992; Callaghan and Hartmann, 1991; Kalleberg et al.,
2000a). In addition, Kahn (2007); Hagen (2002); Mertens and McGinnity (2003) show that
the negative aspects of fixed term work are not evenly distributed across the population, but
that more disadvantaged workers (women, immigrants, very young or old workers, or the
less educated) are more likely to be in fixed term jobs. Picchio (2006) expands on this,
showing that the effects of a fixed term contract vary by tenure or experience, with the
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Figure 3.1: Proportion of workers in fixed term contracts
Theoretically, fixed term workers should have have higher wages as compensation for
their lack of job security. In practice this is never the case, as there are many other rea-
sons fixed term jobs should have lower wages such as: less skilled workers are selected
into these positions; lower paying occupations and industries use more fixed term con-
tracts; firms select workers of uncertain skill in fixed term positions and move them into
permanent positions later; or because fixed term workers have less firm-specific knowledge
and training and are consequently less productive (Booth et al., 2002; Brown and Ses-
sions, 2003, 2005; Davia and Hernanz, 2002; Graaf-Zijl, 2005; Hagen, 2002; Mertens and
McGinnity, 2003; Picchio, 2006; Rica, 2004). While there are many theoretical reasons for
the compensation gap and while many of these theories have empirical support, even after
accounting for them, the wage gap persists. This leaves some to classify the unexplained
difference as outright discrimination (Brown and Sessions, 2003, 2005), analogous to the
interpretation of unexplained disparities in gender or racial wage gaps.
Most studies assess relative compensation for fixed term workers using data for indi-
vidual countries. Figure 3.1 shows each of these studies along with the method they used,
the raw wage gap between fixed term and regular workers, and the gap controlling for se-
59
lection. For example, Brown and Sessions show that while fixed term workers in Britain
earn 16% less than permanent workers, controlling for selection they earn only 13% less.
These estimates were not the primary goal of these papers. Several of papers use these
estimates as starting point, going on to estimate differences in career-long wage profiles
for fixed term workers, or to estimate how the wage gap varies by education group. All
studies listed in table 3.1 find significant wage gaps for fixed term workers. Only Booth
et al. (2002) and Brown and Sessions (2005) found instances of positive wage gaps, where
fixed term workers earn more. Estimates are inconsistent, ranging from 6 to 38% wage
gaps after accounting for various controls such as workers’ education, occupation, firm
size, experience, tenure, gender, and marital status. Estimates vary widely because each
studies a different country, in a different time period, and uses a different population (i.e.
age 16-60 versus 25-65). The studies’ estimated gaps are thus incomparable, as the differ-
ences across estimates stem both from differences in the countries being analyzed as well
as sample characteristics.
A cross-national perspective has largely been ignored because there is limited cross na-
tional data available with variables indicating fixed term employment. A first step towards
fixing this gap was taken by Kahn (2007), who found interesting differences in countries’
levels of fixed term employment. Only Brown and Sessions (2005) did a cross-national
comparison of the fixed term wage gap. They used data from the International Social Sur-
vey Programme’s 1997 Work Orientations Survey in ordinary least squares regressions by
country to generate coefficients for the fixed term contract’s effect on wages by country.
The coefficients ranged from negative wage gaps (fixed term workers earning more) in
Japan and Norway, the same wages in the US, Italy, Switzerland and Denmark, and posi-
tive wage gaps from 12 to 25% in Germany, France, Canada, New Zealand, Sweden, and
Portugal with the worst gaps in Germany. This study builds on this Brown and Sessions
paper, estimating the cross country gaps consistently, using methods that should better ac-
count for selection, and weighting the calculation of the wage gap so that it reflects those
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country year method raw controlling
gap selection
Brown & Sessions (2003) Britain 1997 Heckman selection 16% 13%
Booth et al. (2002) Britain 1991-97 OLS -13 to 6% 6 to 17%
Hagen (2002) W Germany 1999 Heckman selection – 23%
Hagen (2002) W Germany 1999 matching – 6 to 10%
Mertens & McGinnity (2003) W Germany 1995-00 OLS 32% 7 to 26%
Davia & Hernanz (2002) Spain 1995 selection 39% 23%
Rica (2004) Spain 1995 selection & FE 34 to 42% ≈ 10%
Graaf-Zijl (2005) Netherlands 1997-98 matching & FE 22% 5.3%
Picchio (2006) Italy 2000-02 RE, FE & IV 12% 12 to 13%
Brown & Sessions (2005) Multiple 1997 OLS 16% 17 to 38%
Table 3.1: Literature on the fixed term wage gap
that are likely to be in fixed term employment. In addition, while the Brown and Sessions
paper devoted a short paragraph to the analysis of cross-country comparisons, this paper
conducts a more thorough analysis and interprets the results in the context of cross-national
institutional differences. From this point forward, this paper proposes some possible theo-
retical explanations for cross-national differences, tests several approaches to consistently
estimating cross-national estimates of fixed term workers’ relative wages in ten countries,
and concludes by outlining a few relevant policy approaches to fixed term employment.
3.1.1 National context, theory, and policy
There are many differences between countries that can influence the gap between fixed term
and permanent workers’ wages including: unemployment rates, real wages, labor market
participation rates, the types of industries that dominate the market, the size distribution
of firms, and the age structure of the population. There are also institutional differences
across countries, including the social security system, tax code, labor relations, and labor
laws. Among the institutional factors, one of the most studied is employment protection
legislation (EPL). Research has found EPL to have a wide array of impacts beyond their
intended role of fostering job security, such as increasing or reducing productivity (Ken-
worthy, 2008; Autor, 2007), slowing turnover (Cazes and Nesporova, 2003; Messina and
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Vallanti, 2007), decreasing employment (Scarpetta, 1996; Nickel, 1997; OECD, 1999), in-
creasing temporary employment (Kahn, 2007), and increasing incentives to invest in human
capital (MacLeod and Nakavachara, 2007). There are several mechanisms through which
EPL might also influence fixed term wage gaps.
The first mechanism through which EPL influences wage gaps is selection. If a firm is
unable to dismiss workers, it might keep new-hires, workers of uncertain ability, or lower
quality workers in fixed term contracts as an extended probation period, leaving the less
experienced and least skilled over-represented in fixed term jobs.1 Selection is probably
the primary mechanism through which EPL influences fixed term wage gaps. But even
after controlling for selection EPL, might still foster fixed term wage gaps.
A change in the fixed term wage gap based on EPL can happen a the result of any inter-
action between an unobserved variable and the EPL climate. For example, there can be an
interaction between firms size and EPL. It has been shown empirically that big firms pay
higher wages, and that big firms use more fixed term workers (Goux and Mourin, 1999).
Big firms might react more strongly to the EPL change (since given the big-firm wage
bonus) since they have more to lose if they can’t fire a worker in a downturn. Thus, when
the a stricter EPL regime is imposed on the two economies, the effect will be different in
the two countries, with the magnitude of the difference depending on the distribution of
workers between big and small firms, the gap between big firm and small firm employ-
ment, and the size of the difference in big and small firms’ reactions to the new laws. EPL
can interact with many unobserved country-level conditions in this way. While the interac-
tions will influence the observed wage gaps in the various countries, they need not actually
change the actual expected wages of a worker. For example, the big firms could switch to
fixed term workers, paying the exact same wages, leading to a perceived smaller wage gap.
In the selection story the overall wage distribution shifts existing low paying jobs into
the fixed term wage category, leaving no effect on the overall wage distribution. In the inter-
1This was confirmed empirically by Kahn (2007).
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action story the fixed term wage gap can change, again with no change in wages. But there
are other scenarios where strict EPL could actually depress fixed term workers’ wages.
Just as with unions (Lindbeck and Snower, 2001), the combination of strict EPL and fixed
term contracts could create an insider-outsider market. Under strict EPL the employer is
vested in long term productive relationships with permanent workers because they cannot
fire them. The firm might consequently pay permanent workers well to maintain job sat-
isfaction and offer raises as incentives. In comparison, unproductive fixed term workers
could be easily fired, and productive fixed term workers could be motivated by the possi-
bility of permanent employment. In contrast to the interaction effects described in the prior
paragraph, this mechanism could truly depress wages for fixed term workers.
There are also several causes for the wage gap that have nothing to do with country
differences. If these mechanisms dominate the wage-gap dynamics, countries should have
uniform wage gaps. For example, fixed term contracts should lead to under-investment
in firm-specific training causing fixed term workers to be less productive, and the wage
gap consequently reflecting a real difference in worker productivity. Similarly, fixed term
workers might be less devoted to their employers and therefore less productive (Guadalupe,
2003). Another hypothesis for the wage gap that does not interact with EPL is the labor
competition hypothesis. If fixed term workers are substitutes for permanent workers, but
with lower wages and lower firing costs, they should put downward pressure on permanent
workers’ wages. If fixed term workers are perfect substitutes, permanent workers should
receive lower wages in compensation for their job stability. It is possible that fixed term
workers are initially an imperfect substitute, but as they become a larger part of the labor
force they become a more perfect substitute. As the two classes of workers become more
similar, wages should converge and thus the wage gap could vary with the proportion of
the labor force in fixed term employment. In this case we might expect Spain, where such
a large proportion of the labor force is fixed term, to have the smallest wage gap.
If wage gaps do vary by EPL, we should see significant differences across countries’
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wage gaps since EPL varies quite widely. Table 3.2 shows some key aspects of countries’
worker dismissal protections as of 2000 (the year of the data used in this paper). Note
that in some countries, white collar and blue collar EPL differs, though these differences
are slowly being eliminated. Overall, Germany and Austria had some of the strictest pro-
tections while Ireland has weaker protections, in line with the Anglo Saxon model. This
is confirmed by the OECD’s EPL index which codes these regulations into a single index
(highlighted in table 3.3). Dismissal protection usually begins after some probation period
and then increases with tenure up to some limit. Probation periods range from 0 months in
Denmark for blue collar workers to 6 months in Germany and 2 years in the UK. This is im-
portant to note since fixed term work is often cast as an extended probation period without
severance costs, even though probation periods and phased in dismissal protections already
exist for regular workers. Of course, there are other EPL considerations besides severance,
like the bureaucratic costs of firing a permanent worker; in those countries with strict dis-
missal protection bureaucratic costs of dismissal can also be very high. For example in
Austria, workers can protest being fired through their unions based on personal hardship,
forcing employers to incur high costs to pursue the dismissal.
Besides the absolute level of EPL, the difference between EPL for regular employees
and for fixed term workers should be a driving factor behind between variation in countries’
wage gaps. EPL for regular employment centers around limitations on severance, which
do not normally apply to fixed term workers. Rather than requiring dismissal notice, EPL
for fixed term employment usually limits the total cumulative duration of fixed term con-
tracts or the number of contract renewals. In 2000, cumulative contracts were limited to 15
months in Italy, 18 in France, 24 in Germany, 30 in Belgium, and 36 in Spain while Aus-
tria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, and Spain all limited
the allowed number of consecutive contract renewals. The OECD used these regulations
to create an EPL index for regular workers, and another for fixed term workers. The two
indices are illustrated in table 3.3. One would would naturally consider the difference be-
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blue collar white collar compensation collective
statutory notice periods when unjustified redundancy
(days notice / time worked) layoff payment
Austria 14 days 6 wks / 2 yrs NA 2-12 months
2 mo / 2-5 yrs wages
3 mo / 5-15 yrs
4 mo / 15-25 yrs
5 mo / >25 yrs
Belgium 7 days / 6 mo 3 mo / 5yrs up to 6 mo depends on
35 days / <20 yrs unemployment
112 days / >20 yrs insurance
Finland 14 days / yr, max 6 mo same 3-24 mo maximum 24
months wages
France 1 mo / 6-24 mo same > 6 mo yes, unspecified
2 mos / > 2 yrs
Germany 4 wks / 2 yrs same <12 mo yes, unspecified
1 mo / 2-5 yrs
2 mo / 5-10 yrs
4 mo / 10-20 yrs
7 mo / >20 yrs
Greece 5-60 days 1-6 mo yes b-collar: 5-105 d
w-collar: 1-24 mo
Ireland 1 to 8 wks same max 104 wks 1/2 wk’s pay per
yr service & 1 wk/
yr after age 41
Italy by collective same 15 mo 1 yr’s wages/13.5
agreement 1.5% pr yr
Netherlands max 6 wks same depends on no
service & age
Spain 30 days same 45 days per 20 days/yr
yr of service service,
up to 42 mo to 12 mos
source: ILO Termination of Employment Digest & OECD Employment Outlook
Table 3.2: EPL for permanent workers
tween the two indices as a measure of the difference between EPL for regular and fixed
term employment. However, in some sense, the regular EPL index measures the difference
between fixed term and regular workers because it measures the protections that regular
workers have that fixed term do not, while the fixed term EPL index measures a separate
topic–time limitations on fixed term contracts. One would expect that those countries with
strict regular EPL would not worry about firms avoiding worker protections through atyp-
ical employment, and thus countries with low regular EPL indices should have low fixed
term indices. However, this only seems to be the case for Ireland, as shown in the table.
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EPL can only influence fixed term wage gaps insofar as it is enforced or there are not
other means of circumventing it such as through the informal sector, self employment,
or part-time employment. This is particularly of concern in the Mediterranean countries
where EPL is strict but there can be poor compliance. For example, in Greece 35% of the
workforce is self employed, many of whom are not actually entrepreneurs, but rather the
underemployed or contractors not subject to EPL. In addition, there is evidence that small
Greek firms often circumvent or defy labor protections and unions contracts (Mihail, 2003;
Kufidu and Mihail, 1999). This is a serious problem given that the average Greek firm
has only 2 employees (compared to the EU’s average 6 (Mihail, 2003)). Similarly, in Italy
firm size is about one half the average firm size in Europe, and EPL for small firms (under
15 employees) is significantly weaker (Boeri and Garibaldi, 2007; Schivardi and Torrini,
2003). Thus, in Greece and Italy, we might expect strict EPL to not impact fixed term
workers’ relative wages given the abundant legal and illegal ways to circumvent regulation.
Fixed term workers’ relative wages should also vary due to other national differences
like unemployment rates and union strength. Union contracts can encourage a larger wage
gap for several reasons. First, union contracts can explicitly limit the quantity and duration
of fixed term employment. This can limit fixed term work to the least qualified, creating
larger wage gaps. Even controlling for selection, unions could still increase the wage gap
by preventing fixed term workers from becoming a widely available substitute that would
eventually depress permanent workers wages to parity. Finally, as fixed term workers are
often not advocated for by unions, there could be an insider-outsider wage system with
fixed term workers on the outside. The overall state of the labor market matters too. When
unemployment rates are high, there should be a higher wage gap. Workers entering a
weak labor market could be forced to start with lower wages. A weak labor market should
encourage a large wage gap assuming that when the labor market takes a downturn workers
in permanent positions are not forced to take a wage cut and assuming the firm hires new
workers through fixed term jobs both to save money on compensation and also because
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they to not want workers with the same contracts having very different wages. When the
labor market improves, fixed workers should be able to negotiate better, permanent jobs.
Table 3.3 illustrates the four factors (in 2000) hypothesized to predict country differ-
ences in the wage gaps. The first column is the OECD Employment Outlook’s EPL index,
a 0-6 point scale measuring how strict a country’s EPL is based on firing notification pro-
cedures, time delay before the firing process can start, length of notice before dismissal,
severance pay, strictness of defining an unfair dismissal, length of probationary periods,
length of compensation following dismissal, and the possibility of reinstatement following
the dismissal. The next column shows the OECD EPL index for fixed term workers which
is based on whether firms must justify fixed term contract, limits on successive contracts,
and limits on the maximum cumulative duration of fixed term contracts. The third and
fourth columns indicate the proportion of workers who belong to unions (density) and the
proportion of workers who are covered by unions in bargaining negotiations. The fifth
column shows the unemployment rate. The last column shows the hypothesized wage gap
given that strict EPL, a wide gap between EPL and fixed term EPL, strong unions, and
high unemployment, should all anticipate larger wage gaps. Most countries’ EPL, union
strength, and unemployment rates predict fixed term wage gaps in opposing directions,
additively predicting neither large nor small wage gaps. In contrast, Germany and Austria
have values for all three variables that consistently anticipate a large wage gap while Ireland
has values that consistently predict a small wage gap. These lead to the primary hypothe-
ses: Austria and Germany should have the largest wage gaps while Ireland should have
the least. One might also speculate that there are smaller wage gaps in the Mediterranean
countries given the abundant ways to circumvent apparently strict EPL.
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EPL FT EPL union union unemploy predicted
index index density coverage rate gap
Austria 2.7 1.8 37 95 6.3 high
Belgium 1.7 2.0 56 90 7.0 medium
Finland 2.2 3.3 76 90 9.8 medium
France 2.4 4.0 10 90 9.6 medium
Germany 2.7 1.8 25 68 7.8 high
Greece 2.3 4.0 27 - 11.2 medium
Ireland 1.6 0 38 - 4.3 low
Italy 1.8 4.3 35 80 10.7 medium
Netherlands 3.1 .8 23 80 2.9 medium
Spain 2.6 3.0 15 80 15.7 high
source: OECD Employment Outlook, Source OECD
Table 3.3: Country conditions & predictions
3.2 Data & methods
3.2.1 Data
This study uses individual level data from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) in 2000
covering 44,508 workers in Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, the Netherlands, and Spain. The countries were chosen because the LIS data in-
cluded an indicator for fixed term employment for these countries. However, there are also
theoretical reasons to include these countries. First, any study on fixed term employment
should include Spain, the country with the most fixed term workers. Second, the study
should have at least one representative Anglo Saxon country to represent looser labor mar-
ket regulation, in this case Ireland. In contrast, Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, and
France represent stricter EPL settings, while Italy and Greece represent the Mediterranean
countries where regulations can be strict but enforcement may be weak. The study could be
improved by including Denmark (the classic “flexicurity” country) and the United States
(the biggest free labor market country). The sample was limited to those workers who were
not disabled, between ages 25 to 65, who reported employment as their primary activity,
who were not in the military and were not self employed. The minimum age of 25 is older
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than that used in most studies, but was chosen because the average age at graduation from
postsecondary studies varies dramatically across countries, reaching as high as 25 or 26
for tertiary education in Germany (OECD, 2006). Self employed workers were excluded
from the study primarily due to Greece. In Greece there are more self employed than in
other European countries and these workers earn significantly less. Including them along
with permanent workers in the baseline group makes fixed term workers look relatively
better off. Presumably, these workers also suffer a form of disadvantaged employment and
therefore are not the proper comparison group. Including the self employed in the baseline
group did not effect the results for any of the countries except Greece.
Descriptive statistics by country are displayed in the appendix. In all countries, the
largest group of workers live with both a partner and children. Living alone is more com-
mon in Germany and the Netherlands while living with parents is more common in the
Mediterranean countries. With respect to education, Belgium and France have the most
educated workers while Italy has the least, although it is worth noting that it is impos-
sible to make exact comparisons, particularly at low levels of education (university and
post-graduate are comparable). The Netherlands has the most workers in professional and
managerial occupations and work the least hours (along with the French) while Spanish and
Greek workers work the most. The Germans and Dutch earn the most while the Mediter-
ranean countries earn the least. There are slightly more male workers in all countries,
except in Finland where women slightly outnumber men in regular employment thought
they are equal when self employment is included. Finally, the proportion of workers in
fixed term contracts varies dramatically across countries. Only 3.61% of the Irish sample
(66 workers) were in fixed term jobs while 21% of the Spanish sample (670 workers) were.
The Spanish data shows significantly fewer workers in fixed term contracts than the Eu-
rostat data (figure 3.1) because part-time workers and those under 25 (both groups more
likely to have fixed term jobs) were excluded.
Table 3.4 shows descriptive statistics by employment status. Fixed term workers are a
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permanent workers fixed term workers
family status
w/ partner & kids (%) 45.54 42.06
w/ partner, no kids (%) 30.97 24.31
no partner & kids (%) 3.41 5.31
alone (%) 13.57 15.69
partner & parents (%) 0.35 0.72
w/ parents (%) 5.82 11.90
education
missing 0.38 0.51
no secondary (%) 17.14 23.53
1st secondary (%) 25.69 23.02
2nd secondary (%) 26.27 20.43
tertiary (%) 10.27 9.19
university (%) 16.75 17.79
post-grad (%) 3.50 5.53
effort
mean hrs/wk 38.11 35.76
wks/yr 50.25 40.46
occupation
agricultural (%) 5.38 6.39
unskilled (%) 9.85 18.70
service (%) 36.96 32.68
skilled trade(%) 21.27 18.21
manager (%) 12.02 5.41
professional (%) 14.52 18.61
other
mean age 42.02 38.09
male (%) 55.57 44.46
gov’t employee (%) 29.23 34.19
supervisor (%) 25.80 10.91
native (%) 90.43 88.24
mean experience (yrs) 24.69 20.21
Table 3.4: Descriptive statistics by employment status
relatively disadvantaged group. They are more likely to be single parents, live alone, live
with both their partner and their parents, and to be single living with their parents. They are
also younger, more likely to be women or immigrants, are less experienced, and work less
hours. Fixed term workers are not clearly disadvantaged with respect to their education and
occupation. Rather, they are over-represented at both extremes of the education spectrum
and are more likely to work in either elementary or professional occupations.
There is a significant wage gap between fixed term and permanent workers before ac-













Table 3.5: Relative wages for fixed term workers by country
women in fixed term jobs only earn 49% of their permanent counterparts compared to 88%
in Ireland. This analysis estimates fixed term workers’ relative wages by country after
controlling for selection, using a matching model and two different regression-based mod-
els. Initially all analyses were done for men and women separately. However, because
the resulting wage gaps did not show significantly different trends for men and women,
all analyses from this point on aggregate the data. Similarly, all analyses were originally
run separately for gross and net wages since Italy and France only report net wages. Re-
sults between the two were similar (gross wage gaps were slightly larger because of the
redistributional effects of the tax system). This paper presents pooled male and female re-
sults and uses gross wages for all countries except Italy and France where net wages were
substituted. Original results are available upon request.
3.2.2 Matching model
The first method is a matching model in which the fixed term contract is considered the
“treatment” and the outcome is wages.2 The matching model compares the log hourly
earnings of each person in a fixed term contract with a comparable individual (or a com-
posite of individuals) was equally likely, given their characteristics, to work in a fixed term
2For a nice introduction to matching that describes the methods used here in more detail, see Harding and
Morgan (2006) or Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985).
71
contract job but did not. Unlike the regression analyses, matching does not yield estimates
for the control characteristics’ effect on wages or for the interactions between the treatment
and characteristics, is less dependent on a model specification and functional form, and is
non-parametric. Finally, as does regression, the model assumes that we have not omitted
any variables relevant to selection into fixed term employment.
There are three standard statistics of interest in matching models: average treatment
effect on the treated (ATT), marginal treatment effect (MTE), and the average treatment
effect (ATE). Here we use the ATT, which measures the average effect of being a fixed
term worker on wages for those who were selected into fixed term work. In comparison,
ATE measures the average effect on all workers, and MTE measures the effect on the
marginal worker drawn into fixed term work, or in other words, the treatment effect on the
next person that would be treated, if treatment were to be expanded 1 person. The ATT
was chosen on theoretical grounds, because in this case, the population of interest is those
workers likely to be selected into fixed term work. The effect of being a fixed term worker
most certainly varies across the population; both my own and others’ research have shown
that high skill workers and those less likely to work in fixed term jobs, suffer lower wage
penalties when they do have fixed term jobs. For the ATE, the weights for individuals who
were unlikely to work fixed term would be equal to those likely to work fixed term and
since high skill fixed term workers generally have a lower wage gap, the ATE should be
lower than the ATT. The ATT was also chosen for pragmatic reasons, as it only requires us
to estimate one counterfactual, the wages of fixed term workers had they been permanent.
Given that most workers are permanent, there is an abundant sample of permanent
workers to use as a counterfactual estimate of the fixed-term workers. The ATT is es-
timated by E[Y (1)|T = 1]−E[Y (0)|T = 1] where T indicates treatment (1 is fixed term
and 0 is permanent). Wages are indicated by Y, where Y (0) is the permanent worker’s
wage and Y (1) is the fixed-term wage. Thus, E[Y (0)|T = 1] is the expected wage for fixed
term workers had they been permanent while E[Y (1)|T = 1] is their observed wages. Of
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course, E[Y (0)|T = 1] does not exist and is instead estimated using the wages for individu-
als who were equally likely to work fixed term, given their characteristics, but were actually
permanently employed. Given the observable characteristics, Xi we can use the mean con-
ditional wages for permanent workers as an estimate for fixed term worker’s wages had
they been permanent, and we set E[Y (0)|T = 1,X ] = E[Y (0)|T = 0,X ]. Thus, if Ti is 1
for the treated, the average treatment effect is the sum of the differences between each
treated person’s wages and the wages of an untreated comparable person, divided by the







TiE[Yi(1)−Yi(0)|Xi]. The ATT estimate assumes
that selection into fixed term employment is based on observable characteristics, that there
is common “support” (or that no individual’s treatment status can be perfectly predicted
(Pr(T = 1|X) < 1, i.e. there is a comparable untreated person for every treated person),
and that individuals are independent observations.3
The first step of the matching model is to estimate the “propensity score, or probability
of fixed term employment for all individuals, PR(Ti = 1|Xi), given their observable char-
acteristics Xi, using a logit model (see Borooah (2001) for a description of a logit model.)
Independent variables predicting fixed term employment include: a dummy for fixed-term
employment, experience and years of experience squared, 5 dummies indicating household
type, 5 dummies indicating education, 5 dummies indicating occupation, and dummies for
gender and public sector employment. Propensity score estimation and matching were done
within country.4 The family predictors were included in the analysis, although they were
insignificant for several of the logit models.5 The predicted probability of being in fixed
term employment was then used in kernel matching6, which matched fixed term workers
3We present the exponential of the ATT (which is the difference in ln wages). This is exp((ln)fixed term-
ln(permanent)) which is equivalent to relative wages: fixed term /permanent.
4While presented results are stratified by country, other models are by country-gender, occupation, edu-
cation, occupation-country, and education-country. All are available upon request from the author.
5See Bryson et al. (2002) and Rubin and Thomas (1996) for discussions of how including insignificant
explanatory variables can influence support, estimates’ variance, and how the inclusion of a predictor can
have different effects depending on its relationship to the outcome variable.
6See Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) for an excellent guide to matching
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to a weighted average of those permanent workers with a propensity score within .06 of
their own. Weights are assigned based on the difference between a fixed term worker’s
propensity score and the permanent workers’ propensity scores within .06 of his/her score.







where p is the propensity score, i and j indicate the treated
and the untreated observations, h is the bandwidth (.06), and K is the epanechnikov kernel,
K(u) = 34(1−u
2). This is basically a smoothing method, comparable to a moving average.
This works particularly well here given that there are so many more untreated than treated.
After treated individuals are matched, the difference between incomes is taken and then
averaged across treated individuals. Presented standard errors are bootstrap estimates7,
although I also calculated the standard errors as defined by Anadie and Imbens (2004);
Lechner (2001).8
3.2.3 Regression analysis
The wage gap estimates, obtained with the matching model, are compared to results from
two regression analyses. It is anticipated that the regression analyses will have slightly
different results based on the heterogenous effect of the fixed term work treatment across
the population. While the ATT finds the effect of fixed term work for those likely to be
in fixed term work (or for, on average, lower skill workers who suffer more wage penal-
ties in fixed term work) regression analysis should find lower wage penalties weighting all
segments of the sample equally. Ideally, for the regression analysis, we would examine
the fixed term wage gap by country with a multilevel model, in which we could estimate
the specific country-level characteristics that influence the wage gap. Unfortunately, with
only ten countries and one of year data, a multilevel model is impossible. As such, two
7i.e. standard errors are calculated through repeated sampling of the data
8This standard error formula assumes independent observations, fixed weights, homoskedastic income
within the fixed term and the permanent workers, and assumes that income’s variance does not depend on the
propensity score: se = 1nt=1 ∗var(Y |t = 1)+
∑(w2j )
(nt=1)2∗var(Y |t=0)
where t = 1 and i indicate a treated observation,
t = 0 and j indicates an untreated observation, nt=1 is the number of treated (presumably matched), w j is the
total weights applied to each untreated observation, and Y is income.
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other regression-based approaches are taken that will allow us to consider whether coun-
tries’ fixed term wage gaps vary significantly by country. We will then use those results to
qualitatively consider what country-level factors promote wage gap.
First, OLS regressions by country were estimated. This model independently estimates
the slope for fixed term employment by country, as illustrated in equation 3.1. In this model,
the dependent variable, ln(W ), is the natural log of hourly wages. Independent variables
include a dummy for fixed-term employment X , experience (E and E2), 5 dummies in-
dicating household type (F), 5 dummies indicating education (S), 5 dummies indicating
occupation (O), and dummies for gender (G) and public sector employment (P). This
model allows the effects of all of the independent variables to vary by country and avoids
the country-correlated observations we would have pooling countries. However, the model
also does not use the information from the variability between countries when estimating
the individual parameters. The model also assumes that there are no omitted variables and
that all worker characteristics relevant to the fixed term wage gap are included.
ln(Wi j) = Ci +βiEi j + γiE2i j +σ iFij +λ iSij +ζ iOij+ξiGi j +ψiPi j +αiXi j + εi j (3.1)
The second model (illustrated in equation 3.2) pools countries and estimates random
intercepts by country and random slopes for fixed term work by country. In this model,
countries are still indicated by i and the workers by j, so that individual j in country i
has wages Wi j. The intercept has two parts, a general part (C) and a country-specific part
(Ki). The effect of a fixed term contract on wages is estimated by two parameters, the
overall mean part (α), and the country-specific addition (γi). This joint effect, exp(α + γi),
indicate the relative wages for fixed term employment based on an overall effect plus the
country-specific effect. The exponent of exp(α + γi) indicates the relative wages. In this
equation fixed term contracts are still represented by X but all other variables have been
shortened into a single vector, Z with the accompanying vector of parameters, β . The
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country-specific intercepts are mean that each country has its own mean wage. The random
parameters Ki and αi, are not estimated along with the fixed parameters, but their variance is
estimated along with εi j’s variance. The model uses variation between countries to estimate
the parameters, assuming that they are drawn from a bivariate normal distribution with zero
mean. We then consider the empirical Bayes prediction of the random intercepts and slopes
as the outcomes of interest.
ln(Wi j) = (C +Ki)+(α + γi)Xi j +βZij + εi j (3.2)
3.3 Results
3.3.1 Matching
The first step of the matching analysis was to estimate 10 logit models predicting the odds
that a worker was in fixed term employment in each of the 10 countries. For all logit
models all the predictors were significant at the .05 level for all countries with the excep-
tion of most of the household status variables (living with partner and children vs. single,
etc.) for most countries and some of the educational variables for just Belgium and Greece.
The models were all significant improvements in explanatory power with psuedo R-squares
ranging from .04 to .1. As expected, those with less experience, living in alternative fam-
ily situations (with parents, as single parent, or with both spouse and parents), or those
working in the public sector, with less education, or the two extremes of the occupational
distribution (elementary or skilled trades and professional) were more likely to be in fixed
term positions. Managers with a university education living with their spouse and children
were the least likely to work in fixed term employment.
The matching diagnostics were good, though not perfect. All observations in the occu-
pational and educational matching fell within support, meaning that everyone was match-
able (with the exception of two individuals: one in Belgium and one in Austria). The dis-
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tribution of propensity scores between the treated and untreated groups generally showed
similarly shaped distributions, although, by definition, the treated had higher propensity
scores. Finally, the treated versus the untreated mean characteristics were compared and
the balance of the sample pre and post matching was calculated. Generally there was a
significant difference between the treated and the untreated on all characteristics before
matching. After matching, most significant differences disappeared although even post-
match permanent workers still had more education on average, were more likely to work
as managers, and had more work experience. The observations were balanced with re-
spect to tertiary and secondary education, skilled jobs, and some family characteristics
like living alone.9 Several patterns emerge across variables and countries. First, Finland
and Germany had the most significant differences between fixed term and regular workers
post-match. In Finland, there were significant differences between fixed term and regular
workers in higher education and the higher ranked occupations. In Germany there were sig-
nificant differences for a variety of variables including work experience, family condition,
post graduate training, and managerial professions. The best balance between fixed term
and regular workers was achieved for Spain, likely due to the wide array of workers in fixed
term work. The fact that the countries with the largest wage gaps (Germany and Finland)
were also those with the worst matches could mean that selection is not well-controlled in
this analysis for these countries. However, it also could mean that there is stricter sorting of
low-skill workers into fixed term jobs in these countries – which is supported by the logistic
regressions used in the propensity score analysis where Germany and Finland were better
predicted than those countries with better post-match balances like Greece or Ireland.
Figure 3.2 shows the result of the matching analysis for relative fixed term wages by
country. The left hand panel shows the relative wages of fixed term workers before match-
ing and the right hand panel shows it after matching (the exponential of the difference in
ln wages, or the percent of permanent workers’ wages earned by fixed term workers.) The
9Diagnostics for all matches are available upon request.
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bars’s breadth indicates the 95% confidence interval for the estimate and the bars are or-
dered from the greatest difference between fixed term and permanent wages to the least.
Italy and France are in bold, indicating that net (not gross) income was used. The most re-
markable aspect of these findings is how large the relative wage gap is. Fixed term workers
earn between 55 to 75% of their permanent counterparts’ hourly wages. The confidence
intervals are quite wide for some countries like Ireland, where there were few fixed term
workers.
The shift between between the left hand and right hand panels is the change due to
controlling for selection through matching. For some countries, like Greece, Belgium, and
Spain, this is a significant shift while for other countries, like Germany, it makes almost no
difference. Fixed term contracts play a larger role as a sorting mechanism in those countries
with a greater shift.
There seems to be a significant difference across countries, with the first group of coun-
tries (Germany, Netherlands, Italy, Finland, and France) having significantly lower wages
for fixed term workers than the other countries (Austria, Spain, Greece, Belgium, and Ire-
land). One should note that in the separate analyses of men and women, the same trends
held but since men and women had similar patterns, the analyses were merged with the
intent of reducing the standard errors, particularly for Ireland. As anticipated, Ireland (with
less EPL, less union control, and a strong economy) and Greece (with many avenues to cir-
cumvent EPL) have higher relative wages while countries with strong EPL like Germany
have lower relative wages. Austria has a surprisingly small wage gap given its strict EPL.
3.3.2 Regression analysis
If we recall from the discussion of methods, it is anticipated that the regression analyses
will have slightly different results based on the proven heterogenous effect of the fixed term
work treatment across the population. The matching should have found the effect of fixed
term work for those likely to be in fixed term work (more low-skill workers who gener-
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Figure 3.2: ATT by country
ally suffer worse fixed term wage penalties) while the regression analysis should weight
all workers equally, finding a smaller wage penalty. Surprisingly this is not the case. Re-
gression results confirmed the matching results, showing that fixed term workers in Ger-
many and the Netherlands are significantly more disadvantage than fixed term workers in
Ireland, Greece, and Belgium. The first panel in figure 3.3 shows the exponential of the co-
efficients for the dummy variable indicating fixed term employment in the country-specific
OLS regressions. The bars illustrate the 95% confidence interval. The graphic shows that
in Germany fixed term workers earn about 56% of the hourly wage that their fixed term
counterparts do, while in Belgium they earn about 73%.
The second panel of figure 3.3 shows results from the random slopes model. The points
are the exponential of the fixed term dummy plus the exponential of the country-specific
random slope for fixed term employment, again indicating the percent of permanent work-
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ers’ hourly wages earned by fixed term workers. These results confirm that in Germany
fixed term workers have the lowest relative wages while in Ireland, Greece, and Belgium
fixed term workers are relatively less disadvantaged. Due to the overall fixed term employ-
ment coefficient being much larger than the country effects, most countries’ confidence
intervals overlap with the only significant contrast being between the two extremes.
OLS by country random fixed term slopes by country






















.5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
Figure 3.3: Relative wages for fixed term workers predicted by regression analyses
The regression analyses, unlike matching, also yield estimates of the controls’ influ-
ence on wages for all workers. OLS coefficients (effects controlling for all other vari-
ables) indicate that a year of work experience can increase wages anywhere from 2 to 4.6%
(the highest returns are in Spain) and that returns to experience slow down more quickly
in Greece. Public employment largely increases earnings, except in Finland. Education
increases income in all countries, although Belgium has by far the best returns to post-
graduate education followed by Finland and the Netherlands. Going up the occupational
ladder, salaries grow too, though the Finns seem to get the best returns to managerial posi-
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tions followed by the French and the Spanish. The Finns and the Greeks have the highest
returns to professional occupations. Men earn more everywhere.
The random slopes regression does not allow the effects of the other independent vari-
ables to vary across countries but it did estimate overall regression coefficients. With about
10 years of experience, an additional year of experience yields about a 3% increase in
salary, men earn about 28% more than women, and public sector jobs pay about 7% more.
Wages also increase with more education such that post graduates earned 43% more than
those with less than a secondary education. Occupational returns increase and then de-
crease slightly for professionals. All controls were significant at the .001 level.
Surprisingly, the regression and the matching results have very similar results. The
correlation between the relative effects from ATT and from the OLS coefficients for fixed
term work equal to .9664 (for only 10 countries, of course). The correlation between the
relative wages found using the ATT and that found using the random slopes coefficients
(plus the fixed term dummy) was .8204, while the correlation between the two regressions’
effects was .8911. Ranking the ten countries by ATT and the OLS coefficients, the top five
countries with the worst wage penalties rank in the same order: Germany, Netherlands,
Italy, Finland, and then France. The ordering changes a bit in those countries with lower
wage penalties, with Austria and Spain alternatingly placed as 6 and 7, and then Greece,
Belgium, and Ireland being the countries with the lowest wage gap. The random slopes
model shows generally the same pattern although Italy has a smaller wage gap in this
analysis, putting it alongside Austria and Spain.
3.3.3 Relative wages and institutional differences
Originally, we conjectured that those countries with strong union coverage, high unem-
ployment rates, and strict EPL would have the largest wage gaps. While we cannot test
this statistically with only 10 countries, looking at the scatter plots in figure 3.4 it seems
that strict EPL is the only one of the country characteristics that strongly correlates with
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wage gaps. It is worth noting, that those countries with weak enforcement of strict EPL like
Italy and Greece (and possibly Spain) should probably be shifted a bit left on the EPL axis
since in practice there is a freer labor market than we would anticipate based on legislation.
Italy and France probably slightly over-estimate relative wages, as net wages, rather than
gross, were used. Looking at the plot, it seems like there are very strong results at both
extremes of the predictions. Ireland, Belgium, and Greece have weaker EPL and also high
relative wages, while strict countries like Germany and the Netherlands have lower relative
wages and middling countries like France and Finland are in the middle. Italy is the only
country that definitively defies the trend. Even if we were to hypothesize that our mea-
surements might be wrong in Italy (an underestimation of the gap due to using net wages
or an overestimation of EPL due to ignoring enforcement), the adjustments would move
even further away from the hypothesized trend. The second outlier is that given its strict
EPL, we might have anticipated that Austria would have somewhat lower relative wages.
Regardless, the EPL index can explain more than a quarter of the variation in the relative
wage gaps between countries (compared to a baseline of 10% for a random variable).
The other hypotheses failed. The difference in fixed term and regular EPL is entirely
unrelated to the wage gap and is therefore not displayed. This is not an unequivocal re-
jection of the theory, but could result from the fact that even though the two indices are
on the same scale and both measure EPL, the underlying policies are incomparable. Other
theorized predictors like union density and the unemployment rate look equally unrelated.
Excluding Finland, it seems union density might actually decrease the wage gap, though
further analysis with more countries or years of data are necessary to confirm this.
One of the most interesting panels in figure 3.4 illustrates the relationship between the
ATT and the proportion of workers that are in fixed term jobs. Independent of Spain, those
countries with more people in fixed term work have much worse wage penalties for fixed
term workers. If we recall, we would anticipate that as more people are in fixed term work,
and those workers are more perfect low-cost substitutes, wages should equalize. Perhaps
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this process does occur, but not linearly. Fixed term workers are still a relatively small
minority of the labor force in all countries except Spain. Perhaps the other countries have
not reached high enough levels of fixed term work for wages to equalize. Spain, which has
a significant level of fixed term work, does not follow the pattern of other countries and
rather shows a small wage gap, given the high number of fixed term workers. To truly test
this hypothesis we would need to use longitudinal data (following the wage gap as fixed
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Figure 3.4: ATT by country characteristics
In sum, the regression analysis confirmed that fixed term workers in Germany and the
Netherlands do significantly worse compared to their permanent peers than do fixed term
workers in Greece, Belgium, and Ireland. When the labor market is freer either through the
implementation of the Anglo Saxon model (Ireland), or through EPL avoidance (Greece),
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fixed term workers are at less of an economic disadvantage. Other country-level variables,
including the difference between permanent and fixed term EPL seem to be unrelated to
wage gaps or are at least inconclusive.
While EPL effects are the major finding, we cannot be sure which mechanism is driving
the gap. If we recall, there are several hypothesized mechanisms. The first hypothesis was
the selection of lower skill workers into fixed term work under strict EPL. The matching
model and control variables in the regression were designed to control for this selection.
The second possible mechanism was another sort of selection story, in which firm and in-
dustry distributions interact with EPL strictness. The third possible mechanism was that
strict EPL creates an insider-outsider regime where fixed term workers are paid less. Since
the actual mechanism is uncertain, we cannot definitively say that strict EPL causes more
inequality through fixed term contracts. However, assuming that this study properly ac-
counted for selection, and assuming the third hypothesis plays at least some role, it very
well might be that EPL generates more inequality than would exist otherwise.
3.4 Fixed term employment policy
EPL seems to generate a two tier system of permanent workers with job security, union
coverage, and higher compensation compared to atypical workers with none of those ben-
efits. This leads us to two questions. First, what is the best approach to equalizing the
disparity between these two types of work and second, is there a general solution applica-
ble to all countries? Of course, the idea of different solutions for different countries makes
sense; each country has its own unique conditions. That said, the EU has an increasingly
integrated labor market. There is already evidence that some countries, like Italy, are losing
many of their young educated workers to other countries. Given that fixed term workers are
disproportionately young it seems likely that unequal EPL could contribute to this problem.
Given the free flow of workers across Europe, a uniform solution, at least for Europe, might
84
be desirable.
The first oft-proposed solution to the two tier problem is encouraging transitions from
fixed term work to permanent work, as in Spain where there are incentive payments for
firms converting fixed term contracts to permanent, or through automatic transitions af-
ter a period of fixed term work. This is the strategy proposed by the EU in the 1999 EU
Directive 99/70/EC. The directive followed the form of pre-existing legislation in some
member states. The directive required countries to specify who is covered by the law,
whether fixed-term work must be justified by employers, the maximum number of con-
secutive fixed term contract renewals allowed, the maximum length of each contract, and
the maximum cumulative duration of successive contracts. Country implementations vary
dramatically (Ireland’s Protection of Employees Act 2003, Spain’s Reforma Liberal 2006,
England’s Fixed-Term Employees (Prevention of Less Favourable Treatment) Regulations
2002, Germany’s Gesetz über Teilzeitarbeit und befristete Arbeitsverträge, and the Nether-
lands’ 1999 “Flexicurity” law to name a few). Some countries, like Denmark, chose to
circumvent the law by excluding any workers represented by unions (the vast majority of
Danish workers). Other countries, like Austria, took an extreme approach, limiting fixed
term contracts to three months. Still others, like Italy, drafted simply inexplicable laws, ex-
cluding specific industries like agriculture, tourism, and catering from the legislation. By
far the most common approach was to limit the total cumulative duration of contracts to
around 2 to 3 years.
The results of this study suggest that this is the wrong approach since wage gaps seem
to be more related to permanent EPL than fixed term EPL. Further, the directive’s approach
of limiting fixed term work has been criticized as inadvertently encouraging firms to fire
those workers approaching their time limits rather than hiring them as permanent workers,
consequently increasing worker turnover (Blanchard and Landier, 2001). To counteract
these possible perverse incentives, Spain offers the aforementioned contract conversion in-
centives, though this is also prone to abuse, as it encourages firms to initiate all employment
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in fixed term contracts. Perhaps the clearest critique of the EU approach is voiced by Eich-
horst and Konle-Seidl (2006) who argue that as long as any EPL gap between the two types
of workers remains, fixed term jobs will be bad jobs.
Another oft-discussed solution is flexicurity (see paper 1 (chapter 2) for a longer overview).
There are three main aspects of flexicurity. First is the removal of EPL protecting workers
from dismissal. Second is the implementation of a general social safety net including pri-
marily generous unemployment insurance but any shift of non-salary compensation costs
from the firm to the state (health insurance, pensions, and so forth). The third key compo-
nent of flexicurity is worker retraining and continued learning. This includes programs that
offer education while workers are still employed as well as after separation. Theoretically,
the flexicurity approach would have no legal separation of workers by contract type, and
all workers would be bargained for by the same unions. There are several challenges to the
implementation of this approach. First, many fear that the idea of flexicurity can be manip-
ulated to deprive workers of their protections (the first aspect) while never granting them
the increased safety net (the second aspect). Another challenge is that the implementation
of training (the third aspect) is organizationally difficult and requires responsive workers
who are willing to actively participate. Finally, many argue that this approach works better
with a homogenous population that supports high taxes and redistribution (as in Denmark).
While the EU approach and the flexicurity approach are the most often discussed meth-
ods to counteract the two tier system, there are others. One is simply creating a slow pro-
gression of worker protections. Most countries already have this to some extent; workers
beginning their careers have less protections than workers ten years into their careers.
Also, simply removing the possibility of a fixed term work contract is a seldom dis-
cussed, but clearly feasible, option. Presumably this solution is avoided because there are
instances in which firms legitimately prefer fixed term contracts, for example during unan-
ticipated periods of activity. Another approach is to simply remove permanent workers’
protections moving to a free Anglo Saxon type labor market. Some countries have already
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begun to slowly reduce permanent workers’ protections moving toward more uniform con-
tracts (i.e. Germany’s Hart Reforms) although many countries are loath to remove workers’
protections.
Others propose policies more specific to fixed term employment like “flexsurance,”
which works like the US’s unemployment insurance system in which employers with regu-
lar layoffs pay more. In this case, firms using more flexible contracts pay more into a social
fund that insures fixed term workers against periods of unemployment. Another proposal
is modeled on Austria’s 2002 new severance pay. Under this scheme, severance payments
are slowly built up as firms regularly pay 1.53% of gross wages per month into a severance
payment account. Consequently, at the time of dismissal there’s no distortion of firms’
choice of whether or not to dismiss a worker. Upon dismissal, the worker can access the
fund while looking for a new job. At the end of the worker’s career, the fund becomes part
of his retirement and he/she can cash it out or take it as an annuity. While this seems inno-
vative, it is not actually a new program. Increasing social security payments by 1.53% and
allowing workers to access these funds upon dismissal would accomplish the same goal. A
disadvantage of this model is that it gives high skilled workers yet one more advantage. The
less skilled are more likely to be laid off and have longer spells before finding their next
job, meaning that the program amounts to simply more retirement funding for the well-off.
In sum, there are various approaches each with their advantages and disadvantages. The
flexicurity approach is, justifiably, a much-discussed option.
3.5 Conclusion
This paper is the first consistent cross-national estimation of the fixed term wage gap. The
first finding is that there is a significant disadvantage for fixed term workers in all countries.
Because the results cannot clearly determine the mechanism of this wage gap and because
some selection might not have been accounted for, we cannot definitively prove that these
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same workers would be better off in permanent employment. However, the results are
suggestive of the idea that unequal contract types might be an important cause of labor
market inequality. The second finding of this paper was that the extent of the fixed-term
disadvantage differs by institutional regime and that a more liberal EPL regime seems to
minimize the wage gap. Thus, it may be wise to develop consistent EPL that does not
generate a two-tier system and to find a consistent solution for the whole European labor
market.
Future research should follow up on this analysis, adding comparisons with Denmark
and the US, as data become available and should examine the impact of the new imple-
mentations of the EU directive, as these changes will certainly alter the incentive structure
around fixed term work and possibly alter wage gaps. Finally, in many countries like the
US, wages are only a small portion of the disadvantages faced by fixed term workers,
dwarfed by the differences in non-wage compensation like health insurance. Future work
should expand to examine the size of non-wage compensation gaps. Despite the future
work that needs to be done, this was an important first look at international variation in
fixed term workers’ relative wages.
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Chapter 4
Employment Intermediaries: A model of
firm incentives
4.1 Introduction
Temporary or or contingent work has supposedly spread in recent years (Clinton, 1997;
Kalleberg et al., 2000b; Kalleberg, 2000a; Mangum et al., 1985) raising concerns about
their effect on social stratification, as these workers have lower pay, fewer benefits, less
on-the-job training, and less job satisfaction (Booth et al., 2002; Kalleberg et al., 2000b;
Houseman et al., 2003). “Temp work” or outsourced work means that a firm hires a worker
through a second firm. The second firm remains the worker’s legal employer, although
the worker physically works at the firm that purchased his or her services. (Throughout
this paper I refer to these workers as “indirect employees.”) Empirically, temp work can
be difficult to distinguish from direct employment at firms that provide services to other
firms (such as accounting) but where the worker still physically comes to work at the direct
employer’s. In the US economy, the purchase of labor services, temp work and otherwise,
is growing rapidly. In the past decade, firms increased their purchases of services more
than they increased direct hires, with the consequence that business services grew at a
rate of 5.8% every year from 1988 to 1997, twice the rate of the rest of the economy
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(Clinton, 1997).1 The fastest increasing sub-sector within the business services category is
the temporary help industry, which grew 11% annually from 1979 to 1995, five times more
quickly than all other non-farm employment (Autor, 2000).
This paper presents an agent based model (ABM) of job search and job-worker match-
ing in a labor market with intermediaries.2 The general term “intermediaries” is used here
to refer to both “temp agencies” and “contractors” because the functional difference be-
tween contracting labor through a firm like a temp agency and simply outsourcing is diffi-
cult to distinguish; the difference largely has to do with the implicit length of the contract,
the worker’s skill, and the level of integration into the primary firm. The model describes
how firms might adjust their use of intermediaries in response to (dis)incentives such as
intermediaries’ better ability to match workers with jobs and tests whether these hypoth-
esized incentives could be one explanation for the patterns of intermediary use in today’s
US labor market. It further examines how these incentives function differently in differ-
ent occupational labor markets. This model does not look at wage gaps as an outcome
of organizational decisions (only as a determinant) and (like most simulations in the so-
cial sciences) does not provide proof that the tested scenarios are necessarily the definitive
explanation, but rather, that they are one feasible explanation. Finally, it includes several
important assumptions about indirect hiring that will become clear in the explanation of the
model.
The model’s results suggest that intermediaries can provide a valuable service to firms
by increasing the firm’s capacity for searching for new workers. The model also finds that
incentives to use intermediaries differ depending on the skill variability of workers in the
occupational labor market. In addition, organizational ecology is very important in firms’
1“Business Services” is a Bureau of Labor Statistics category including: advertising and public relations
services; computer system design and related services; employment services; management, scientific, and
technical consulting services; and scientific research and development services.
2Those unfamiliar with ABM might see Macy and Willer (2002) for an introduction. ABM is a simulation
composed of interacting agents that follow micro rules, generating macro system behavior. In this article, the
micro agents are firms, jobs, and workers (the basic elements of a labor market) and macro system properties
are employment rates, vacancy rates, and other aggregate labor market indicators.
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decision to use intermediaries and finally, in an environment where firms pay a percentage
of salaries as a fee to intermediaries, lower-skilled jobs are sorted into indirect employment.
4.2 Background
One of the primary concerns about atypical employment is that these workers have lower
compensation (Booth et al., 2002; Segal and Sullivan, 1997; OECD, 1999). Figure 4.1
shows the annual wage-gap between direct and indirect workers for four occupations in
the US using the March Current Population Survey (CPS).3 The figure shows that while
indirectly employed janitors and clericals are consistently paid lower wages, indirect pro-
grammers and accountants earned lower wages only until the mid 1990’s, after which they
fluctuate around the same level as regular workers. Plotting total income rather than wage
income (not depicted here), indirect programmers and accountants consistently earn more
income than their direct-hire counterparts. This could be because these workers have sec-
ondary income sources such as independent contracting. Indirect hires in all occupations
are consistently less likely to receive health insurance from their employers as illustrated
in figure 4.1, where the line indicates the difference between the proportion of regular and
indirect workers with employer-provided health insurance. Note that some of the workers
that are counted as “uninsured,” actually have insurance through a secondary source such
as a spouse’s employer-provided health-insurance scheme. Insurance through a spouse is
more likely for high-skill workers who are both more likely to be married and more likely
to be married to a partner who has health insurance benefits. To date, evidence suggests that
differences between direct hire’s and indirect hires’ individual characteristics (work effort,
education, residential location, age, and gender) do not fully explain the compensation gap.
In fact, CPS data suggest that indirect clerical workers should have higher compensation
3There is a discontinuity in coding in 1992 and 2002. Indirect workers are identified by matching indus-
try and occupational codes for workers so that a secretary working for a clerical services firm is assumed
to be an indirect employee. This method captures some temp workers, some workers employed through
intermediaries, and some workers simply working at service firms.
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than their direct-hire counterparts, given that they have more education and reside in more
urban areas, two characteristics normally correlated with higher wages. Because of indirect
employment’s significantly lower wages, many researchers assume that the firm’s primary
incentive to use intermediaries for firms is to save money on compensation, particularly in
low-skill occupations (Houseman et al., 2003; Kalleberg et al., 2000a).



































    
    
    






























    
















Figure 4.1: Indirect hires’ relative compensation (King et al., 1983-2006)
There are many hypothesized incentives for firms to use intermediaries. In contrast to
those arguing that intermediaries are about reducing compensation, some researchers argue
that firms underpay direct-hires in the high-skill labor market, using indirect employees as
a temporary substitute while searching for permanent employees willing to accept lower
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wages (Houseman et al., 2003).4 Another potential benefit is that intermediaries could
match workers and jobs more efficiently (Katz et al., 1999), decreasing the firm’s human
resources expenses. Other hypothesized incentives include: maintaining a flexible labor
force, testing low-quality or risky workers, hiring specialized workers for short periods, in-
creasing employee-job match quality, and focusing on firms’ core competencies (Deavers,
1997; Gramm and Schnell, 2001; Abraham, 1990; Mangum et al., 1985; Mayall and Nel-
son, 1982; Young and MacNeil, 2000; Davis-Blake and Uzzi, 1993; Osterman, 1999; Pf-
effer and Baron, 1988). In addition, in high-skill positions, indirect hires might be more
productive working at the intermediary than with their occupational peers (for example a
programmer employed at a firm customizing software, rather than the firm using the cus-
tomized software). On the other hand, there are also many hypothesized disincentives to
using intermediaries including the importance of firm-specific skills, intermediaries’ fees,
large firms’ ability to internally smooth labor consumption, and union regulations prohibit-
ing hiring workers through intermediaries.
The most cited incentive in the US context is primarily that intermediaries allow firms
to reduce compensation costs, though not primarily through wages but rather by cutting
health insurance costs. In the United States, this incentive is embedded in the tax structure:
there are federal tax incentives for businesses to provide equal health benefits to all their
employees. Firms can qualify for these tax incentives, despite denying part of their work-
force health insurance, if they purchase services instead of labor, using only direct-hires
(who all have health insurance) in the tax calculation.5 From the employee side, some re-
4While researchers claim that the incentive is saving on compensation, firms themselves disagree. The
National Organizations Survey directly asked firms’ human resources officers why they hire through interme-
diaries. HR departments responded that their firm does it primarily because of work fluctuations and because
contractors’ have specialized skills. Most responded that it does not lower costs.
5The US tax code offers businesses tax deductions for health insurance and pension expenditures. How-
ever, these tax deductions are only available if these benefits are not provided in a way that favors high skill
workers. US Code Title 26, subtitle A, Chapter1, Subchapter D, PartI, Subpart A, Section 401 a(4) states that
deductions are granted:
if the contributions or benefits provided under the plan do not discriminate in favor of highly
compensated employees (within the meaning of section414(q)). For the purposes of this para-
graph, there shall be excluded from consideration employees described in section 410(b)(3)(A)
and (C).
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searchers find that high-skill indirect hires receive the same total compensation in the form
of fewer benefits but higher wages; presumably workers with spousal benefits might seek
contract work to cash out their benefits (which is illegal in regular employment contracts)
(Houseman et al., 2003). While from the worker’s perspective, it seems clear that firms
save money on compensation, there is actually mixed evidence whether, including the cost
of intermediaries, firms actually save money (Benson, 1999; Young and MacNeil, 2000;
Mayall and Nelson, 1982; Mangum et al., 1985; Deavers, 1997; Davis-Blake and Uzzi,
1993). However, studies do find that those firms with higher wages are more likely to con-
tract out work (Abraham, 1990; Gramm and Schnell, 2001), presumably because indirect
employees do not receive those higher wages.
This paper uses a micro-simulation (an agent based model) of the labor market to study
the question of which firm incentives could motivate the use of intermediaries. The sim-
ulation first matches worker and jobs in a free labor market, looking at the resulting labor
market dynamics like unemployment and vacancy rates. The model then introduces inter-
mediaries, tests different incentive theories, and looks at the subsequent overall levels of
intermediary use. The mechanism that matches jobs to workers in this artificial labor mar-
ket is based on the Gale-Shapely marriage matching algorithm (Gale and Shapely, 1962).
In this algorithm, men and women rank each other as possible mates. Then, men propose
to their highest ranked woman. If they are rejected, they propose to their second choice,
and so on. Woman accept proposals if they do not already have a partner or if the new
offer is preferable to their current partner. Their prior (jilted) partner must then propose
to the next highest ranked woman on his list. Given an equal number of men and women,
this algorithm is proven to find a stable solution where everyone is matched and no man
and woman would rather be with each other than their current partner (Gale and Shapely,
1962). The solution is optimal for men, leaving them matched to their highest-ranked fea-
The definition of “highly compensated” is regularly updated and was changed twice while this paper was
written. It is defined, generally, as employees earning over some threshold or constituting some top percent
of the firm’s workforce. The consequent penalty is that firm expenditures on pensions, health insurance, and
life insurance are taxed 15%.
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sible partner. In the simulation, companies are equivalent to men making offers to workers,
instead of to women. The model was implemented with firms playing the male role because
I assume that workers generally apply to a broad array of jobs while firms make proposals
to individuals chosen from large applicant pools.
There are several labor market models using similar simulation methods. The most
similar is Stovel and Fountain (2003), which explores Granovetter’s “strength of weak
ties” theory (Granovetter, 1973), testing whether workers are more likely to be matched to
their jobs through their close friends or through their acquaintances (“weak ties”). Stovel
and Fountain test how the shape of a social network limits information in the labor mar-
ket and affects the quality of worker-job matches. Tesfastion (2001) uses an extension of
Gale-Shapely in an agent-based model, testing whether the ratio of jobs to workers or of
firms to workers is more important in allocating negotiating power. Tassier and Menczer
(2001, 2005) used social networks in a job matching model similar to Stovel and Foun-
tain’s, first examining how networks evolve through job matching, and second assessing
how employment rates vary between social groups as a function of their network structure.
Other models use job matching algorithms to examine frictional unemployment rates (Ho-
sios, 1990), many-to-one matching (Echenique and Yenmez, 2005), or matching in wage
posting games (Montgomery, 1991; Peters, 1991; Shi, 1998). Other abms matching work-
ers and jobs include (?Neugart and Storrie, 2006; Richiardi, 2003) To date, there is no
implementation of these methods examining the role of labor market intermediaries.
4.3 Model
The model describes the spread of intermediaries, focusing on four labor market scenarios.
The model is laid out on a 2-D grid with four types of objects on the grid: firms, jobs,
workers, and contractors. Firms and workers stay in fixed locations for the duration of a
simulation, while jobs and contractors appear and disappear. Two sets of experiments vary
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a total of seven parameters, with the parameters related to hypotheses about tradeoffs be-
tween incentives and disincentives to use intermediaries. The parameters are listed in the
appendix and control the following (dis)incentives: 1) intermediaries’ better screening ca-
pabilities 2) intermediaries’ fees 3) compensation differentials and 4) workload variability.
The decision to use an intermediary for the next vacancy is based on a utility function that
firms regularly update, measuring whether they have had greater utility from past direct or
indirect hires. The primary model output is the level of intermediary use under each sce-
nario, though the model also measures the unemployment rate, vacancy rate, firm utility,
and job and vacancy duration, most of which are used to qualitatively tune the model using
empirical data. The model has several underlying assumptions, which are detailed after a
description of the model’s algorithm.6
The model’s algorithm is illustrated in Figure 4.2. The broad overview is: first work-
ers, firms, and jobs are created; then, workers are matched to jobs using a variation of the
Gale-Shapely algorithm; next, workers and jobs suffer separations; and finally, contrac-
tor arrangements are updated. Then the model starts the process again starting with the
matching step.
In each run, there are 1000 workers and 138 firms. Jobs are assigned to firms in a
skewed distribution with most jobs at a few firms but no firm having more than 10% of the
jobs.7 Workers are created with skill levels sampled from four empirical distributions of
occupational educational attainment (general, minimum wage, programmers, and accoun-
tants) and are assigned a skill floor (a random uniform deviation below their skill level,
indicating the worst job they would accept). Distributions come from BLS and CPS data,
and are depicted in figure 4.3. Jobs are assigned skill levels and floors using the same
methods as for workers, but for jobs the skill floor indicates the worst worker the job would
accept. Workers have a location on the grid, an employment status, an employer and job
6The model was programmed using Java with the Repast library. Code is available.
7The function assigning jobs to firms (C.1 in the appendix) determines the ratio of the number of jobs to
the number of firms. Since the model should start with approximately 1,000 jobs (to match the workers), the








1. Unemployed workers apply to jobs probabilistically 
based on geographic distance (scaled by their skill).
2. Firms rank applicants based on job-worker skill match.
Repeat the following 4 times:
    3. Firms make offers to top- ranked applicants that 
    have not yet rejected them.
    4.  Workers accept offer if unemployed or the offer
     is better than a prior offer.
1. A worker decides to look for a new job depending on:
 Inherent job mobility (time invariant)
 Skills mismatch with current job
              Plus a random factor (time variant)
2. Firms eliminate jobs when there are random shocks. 
 First they remove vacant jobs
 Second they fire indirect hires
 Third they fire direct hires
MATCH
SEPARATIONS
1. Contractors are born if:
 There is a high job vacancy rate 
  and/or
 Many jobs are already outsourced.
2. Firms outsource a job if:
 They have a persistently vacant job and/or
 They have a vacant job 
  and
  Indirect hires have been better than direct.
4. Indirect jobs become direct if their contractor dies.
CONTRACTOR UPDATES
3. Contractors die if they have insufficient business.




Figure 4.2: Program structure
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(when employed), a contractor (if using one), the date they were last employed (if they are
unemployed), a random inherent tendency to quit that is time-invariant, and their relative
wages when hired through an intermediary. Relative indirect wages is the average percent
of a direct hire’s wages that indirect hires get, ranging from 90 to 110%. These relative
wages are reassigned to a worker each time the worker is hired through a contractor. Firms
have locations, jobs (vacant and filled), a contractor (if they are using an intermediary),
employees, and a history of their current and past utilities from their direct and indirect
jobs. Jobs have skill levels and floors, a firm, an employee (when they are filled), and dates
marking the last time they were filled or vacated. Contractors have assigned jobs, workers,
























Figure 4.3: Workers’ educational distributions
When the model is initialized, all workers are unemployed, all jobs are vacant, and there
are no contractors. Workers sort through vacant jobs, calculate the distance to each job, and
apply to closer jobs with a higher probability. Workers ignore the match between their skill
and the job’s skill when sending out applications. This is an unrealistic assumption in those
8All equations, variables, and parameters are listed in the appendix.
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simulations testing the overall labor market but is a realistic assumption in those testing
occupational labor markets. Because the workers apply to so many jobs, this assumption
does not make the matching in the overall labor market simulations ineffective; workers
still apply for a significant number of jobs they will be considered for. The advantage that
contractors have is that workers perceive those jobs hiring through contractors to be closer,
and are thus more likely to apply. This distance effect should not be taken at face value,
but rather proxies for contractors’ better human resources capabilities; they advertise more
widely and screen through more applicants. High-skill workers also search in a broader
radius than low-skill workers. The formulae are specified in detail in the appendix but the
general magnitude of the effect is such that all workers apply to adjacent direct-hire jobs
with a 100% probability; a graduate-level worker applies to direct-hire jobs at the furthest
possible distance across the grid with a 7.7% probability, while the high-school graduate
applies to the most distant job with a .09% probability.
Next, firms rank applicants based on the match between the vacant job’s skill and the
prospective employee’s skill, and then offer the job to their top applicant. Workers accept
jobs “tentatively,” meaning that they accept with the option of taking another offer during
the same matching round, just as women in the Gale-Shapely algorithm can dump a suitor.
Firms have four chances to make offers in a single matching round. When a round ends,
workers must stay with their last job. The limitation of four offers prevents perfect match-
ing, thus maintaining unemployment and vacancies. If the stock of jobs were not constantly
changing, there were no skill floors, the offer process were iterated until matches were sta-
ble, and there were equal numbers of workers and jobs, there would be no unemployment
or vacancies. While workers are forced to make binding commitments at the end of each
round, the “tentative” jobs give them a chance to “think over” an offer or wait for another
offer to come in before deciding. This is more realistic than the standard model which
forces workers to accept their first offer.
After workers and jobs are matched, there are quits and fires. The quit function (again,
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in the appendix) is the sum of three effects. Workers are more likely to quit if they are
poorly matched to their jobs, have a high inherent tendency to quit (a time-invariant trait
drawn from a normal distribution that could be considered analogous to marital status,
age, etc), and if they receive a random shock (a time-variant trait drawn from a random
distribution). When a worker “quits,” he or she might be matched with the job they just
left, since both re-enter the matching pool. As such, “quitting” includes on-the-job search.
Direct and indirect hires quit using the same algorithm. Firms fire workers when they
suffer random workload shocks (adding or removing jobs) which are proportional to firm
size. Shocks are not correlated across firms (economic downturns) but because of the
skewed firm size distribution, a negative shock to a big employer strongly influences the
overall unemployment rate. When firms fire workers they first remove vacant jobs, then
fire indirect hires, and finally fire direct-hires. Firms fire without respect to tenure or match
quality.
After matching and separations, the model updates contractor dynamics. Up to two new
contractors can be born in a single model step. The first is born if there is a high vacancy
rate and the second is born if there is high demand for existing contractors. This represents
a continual low level of contractors randomly placed on the grid. The new contractors are
allowed to survive for less than 1% of the model duration (presumably on startup capital)
before they are forced to meet a revenue threshold. Revenue is calculated as the sum of fee
rates times their worker skills divided by the total number of workers they are assigned. If
a contractor is earning, on average, less than 10% of the average worker’s skill per assigned
worker, they are removed from the model. Thus a contractor’s health depends on both their
ability to match workers and their fee rate. Because contractors are continually born and
each has a different number of clients, the number of contractors is not representative of
contracting trends but is representative of the service availability because of the way firms
100
find intermediaries.9
Firms decide to use intermediaries the first time when they have a persistently vacant
job. This is the trigger that introduces intermediaries into the model. Without this element
there is no basis for firms to manage future decisions to use intermediaries. However, using
only this motivation almost no firms use intermediaries in the simulation. This really just
serves to introduce the use of intermediaries into the model, so that firms can calculate a
preference between indirect and direct hires. The first time a firm looks for an intermedi-
ary they look within a local radius, choosing the one that has the best job-worker match
rate. Firms ignore the quality of the contractors’ matches and their fees when choosing an
intermediary, but do consider it in their utility equation, which is later used to determine
whether the firm will use an intermediary for another job. Once a firm has experience with
an intermediary, they turn over the next open job to an intermediary when their past utility
from indirect hires is greater than their past utility from direct hires. Utility is specified
two ways, both outlined in detail in the appendix. In both cases the firm assesses its utility
using a weighted history function, weighing its more recent hires more heavily than the
older. In the first experiment half of the utility is match quality. Match quality measures
the distance between the job’s skill and the worker’s skill. The optimal match is when the
two skill levels are equal. Dissatisfaction is asymmetrical such that the firm would rather
have an overqualified worker than an equally under-qualified one. The second half of utility
is related to the cost of using an intermediary, or the match fees, which are measured as
a percent of the worker’s skill. The second experiment uses the same concept where half
the utility is related to cost and half is related to match quality. However, in the second
experiment costs includes not only fees, but an adjustment for the indirect worker either
having a higher or lower salary. Fees are charged on the adjusted salary.
Firms use the same contractors until they either bring their last indirect job in-house
9Contractors are designed as simply as possible with exogenous fee rates, no contractor profit maxi-
mization, and so forth, as the model is not measuring contract agency dynamics, but rather the growth of
the contracting relationship. For a mathematical model with more realistic intermediaries see Neugart and
Storrie (2006).
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or the contractor goes out of business. When the contractor goes out of business, the firm
finds a new contractor the same way they found the first one, and continues to use the
utility from the prior contractor in historical utility calculations. If the firm cannot find a
contractor, they hire directly. Finally, indirect hires that have been at the same firm for
more than four periods automatically become direct hires.
The algorithm description included several underlying assumptions in the model’s me-
chanics, some of which are varied in the following experiments. The first assumption is that
firms are more likely to fire indirect hires than direct. This setting is premised on the fact
that research finds that atypical workers are more likely to transition to unemployment than
traditional hires (Corsini and Guerrazzi, 2007; Amuedo-Dorantes et al., 2006; Garcia-Perez
and Munoz-Bullon, 2005) and that most OECD countries have stronger limitations on dis-
missing permanent employees than indirect or short term employees (OECD, 1999, 2003).
According to the national organizations survey, firms also report using indirect workers as
an adjustable labor force, firing them when demand declines. The second assumption is
that when indirect workers are not fired, after some period they must become permanent
employees. Temp workers are usually sent to a new assignment, or if they stay on at the
same firm, they are hired permanently. For this reason, temp contracts often have clauses
specifying a fee the firm will pay the temp agency if they hire the worker. This model
is designed to reflect that temp workers cannot remain in the same job as a temp worker
indefinitely. They must switch jobs or become permanent hires. The third assumption is
that high-skill workers conduct a broader job search than low-skill workers.This assump-
tion is supported by evidence showing that the longer a worker is unemployed (generally
less skilled workers), the less likely he/she is to relocate for a job (Herzog et al., 1993)
and is also the premise of the spatial mismatch literature that argues that poor inner city
workers do not search for or find employment in the suburban ring (Kain, 2004). Further,
low-skill workers are generally found to move less for jobs. Fourth, throughout all exper-
iments the utility calculation assumes that firms value match quality, and like to pay less
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for their workers, both in fees and wages. Finally, in terms of match quality, the model
assumes that both workers and firms prefer to find a job/worker that is a perfect match, but
that a worker would rather be somewhat under-qualified for his job (this assumes some sort
of ambition on the part of the worker), while the firm would prefer a slightly over-qualified
worker.10 The assumptions listed here are not tested, as they are based on a combination of
the sociological literature and common sense.
4.4 Experiment One: Fees vs match quality
The first experiment examines a trade-off that firms face between intermediaries’ ability to
better sort through workers and the fees they charge for their services. The experiment finds
that non-wage incentives can be sufficient to encourage the use of intermediaries. There
are two parameters controlling these dynamics. One parameter controls intermediaries’
ability to screen more workers. This parameter makes intermediaries’ jobs appear closer to
workers, thus more workers apply to these jobs, and the intermediaries are more likely to
make better matches. The parameter ranges from 1.0 to .1 (10 settings), where the worker
sees a contract job with the same probability as a regular jobs at 1.0 and where the contract
job appears twice as close at .5. To avoid confusion, the reader should be reminded here that
this distance effect is a proxy for the breadth of the worker’s job search and that contractors’
ability to “shorten” the distance measures their ability to sort through more applicants. The
differences between a broad skill distribution like the “minimum wage” distribution and a
narrow one like “accountants” captures the importance of credentialing in an occupational
labor market, since it narrows the skill distribution. The second parameter sets contractors’
fees, ranging from 5 to 35% of the employee’s skill level (7 settings). All combinations
10Note that the firms’ preference for over rather than under-qualified workers also enters the firm’s utility
function. Firms’ utilities (though not their hiring decisions) are also influenced by wages. Wages are based
on the worker’s skill (rather than the job’s or an average of the two). This means that when the firm hires
someone, it just wants a perfect match and prefers the over-skilled to the under-skilled, but when they cal-
culate their future decisions to use intermediaries, they still value match quality the same way, but are also
happier with lower skill (cheaper) workers.
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of the parameters were run (70 combinations) 20 times each. The consequent transition to
using intermediaries under three parameter settings is illustrated in Figure 4.4 and the final
proportion of jobs filled through intermediaries at all parameter settings is illustrated in
figure 4.5. Considering standard error (not depicted in figure 4.4) the levels are statistically
different for the displayed runs after the 100th tick (a model’s “time” element). Figure 4.4,
shows that the transition to using intermediaries is rather abrupt; as soon as intermediaries
are available, firms rapidly adopt. When intermediaries are most appealing (with lower fee
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time
(model ticks)
largest search effect, lowest fees
medium search effect, medium fees
no search effect, high fees
Figure 4.4: Transition to using intermediaries, mean of 20 runs per scenario
The contour plot, figure 4.5, illustrates the final proportion of jobs matched through in-
termediaries at all parameter levels. Higher fees discourage firms from using intermediaries
while their ability to screen more applicants increases it. Even when there is a low search
radius effect and high average fees, firms still use intermediaries over 25% of the time in
the first experiment. This comes about for two reasons. First, fees are assigned from a dis-
tribution. This means that even if on average fees are high, there are some intermediaries
that are cheap. Second, firms base their current decisions on their personal utility histories.
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Even with no systematic advantage, intermediaries will create better matches 50% of the
time. Thus, even when the overall model settings are not advantageous to intermediaries,
individual firms can have positive experiences with intermediaries. This is realistic in that
firms often make myopic decisions based on their experiences and even though a service
might, on average, not be advantageous. Figure 4.5 suggests that the level of workers hired
indirectly at the end of the model decreases steadily as intermediaries’ fees go up and in-
creases as intermediaries’ search ability increases. As parameter settings move towards
the most attractive intermediary scenarios (with low fees and good matching) there are two
pockets of higher levels of indirect hires and a small pocket of low levels, though overall the
relationship is monotonic with the pockets not deviating more than 1.5 percentage points
from the surrounding area.




































Figure 4.5: End of run proportion of jobs matched through intermediaries
Other model outputs behave as anticipated. Firms’ average utility increases when they
use intermediaries, increasing 37% with medium search enhancement and medium fees or
100% with the lowest fees and highest search enhancement. Utility gains are not mono-
tonically related to parameter settings, with a contour plot (not illustrated here) showing
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some discontinuities in utilities when radius enhancements are low but fees are in the mid-
dle range. Using intermediaries is also associated with lower unemployment, primarily
because they give hard-to-match jobs and workers a better chance to find a match. An
OLS regression predicting the simulations’ unemployment rates suggests that the effect is
significant though small: when there is a nine point increase in the percent of jobs filled
through intermediaries, unemployment declines almost a full percentage point. With re-
spect to skill, contractors are more likely to match slightly less skilled workers, although
the model design suggests that intermediaries should match workers at either extreme of
the distribution, as both will have trouble finding a good match.
There were several important findings from this experiment. First, when intermedi-
aries have better matching capabilities, they improve firms’ utilities and reduce frictional
unemployment. Second, match quality is a sufficient incentive, in the face of significant
intermediary fees, for firms to use intermediaries.
4.5 Experiment Two: Occupation-specific incentives
While the first experiment focused on firms’ decisions to use contractors in the absence of
compensation incentives, the second experiment looks at how incentives could vary across
occupations. This experiment leaves the contractors’ fees constant, and instead allows
salaries through contractors to be higher or lower. This form allows the firm to save money
through intermediaries.
This model was run with seventy-two permutations of parameter settings, with each
setting run 20 times each, for a total of 1,440 simulations. The other parameters such as
the grid size and the number of agents are the same as in experiment one. Four cases repre-
senting four of the 72 experiments are highlighted in table 4.1. These four are highlighted,
as they are hypothesized to approximate the empirical situation in four occupational labor
markets.
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The first parameter that was varied is the skill distribution of the workers and the jobs
in their labor market. This had four settings, all taken from the Bureau of Labor Statistics
and CPS data for programmers, accountants, minimum wage workers, and the overall labor
market. The second parameter indicates the wage premium (or penalty) for an indirect hire
and is based on the empirical wage gap between indirectly and directly hired workers. It
has three settings: higher, lower, or the same wages. The third parameter that is varied is
the variance of the wage premium which also has three settings. Empirically, the standard
deviation of wages is highest for high-skill occupations and lowest for low-skill. This
is because the labor market is far-right skewed. College graduates can earn average or
extremely high wages, while high school graduates are concentrated on the narrower lower
portion of the wage spectrum. Because of the skewed shape of the wage distribution, we
would expect the standard deviation of log wages to be about the same for the two groups,
though in CPS data the low skill workers had a slightly higher standard deviation, possibly
due to top-coding the highest wages. The last parameter, work variability, was tested at just
two levels: high and low. Less skilled occupations have more variable work hours on an
individual level (i.e. low skill workers can work 20 or 50 hours a week), while high-skill
jobs have consistent individual hours (a little over 40 hours per week) (BLS, 1988-2004).
parameters outcome
hypothesized experimental
skill intermediary variance firm work level of percent
distribution premium (3) of premium (3) shocks (2) indirect hires indirect
minimum wage negative low normal ++++ 39.6%
all labor none high normal +++ 41.5%
programmers positive medium normal ++ 32.7%
accountants none high low + 28.0%
Table 4.1: Model predictions and outcomes
Hypotheses and experimental results for 4 of the 72 simulations are highlighted in table
4.1. I hypothesize that workers in the “minimum wage” scenario (with the minimum wage
educational distribution, lower indirect compensation, and more firm shocks) are the most
likely to be hired through intermediaries because first, the model is set such that firms
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save more on the compensation of indirect hires; second, a wide skill distribution among
these workers means that there are more opportunities for intermediaries to improve match
quality; and third, there might be a high variability in firms’ demands for these workers
(high firm work shocks). In contrast, firms hiring accountants might use intermediaries
less since there is less of a difference between indirect and direct hires’ wages; there is
a narrower skills-distribution, so firms are capable of finding a good match without an
intermediary; and there might be a relatively constant demand for accountants. Generally,
firms should realize greater utility gains from intermediaries in professions with wider skill
distributions, larger wage gaps, and more firm work shocks. The last column of the table
shows the mean proportion of the labor force that was employed through an intermediary
at the end of the 20 runs for each of the four combinations of parameter settings. While the
reader might disagree with the hypothetical scenarios displayed in table 4.1, every possible
scenario was run 20 times, and the relationships between variables are assessed for all runs



























Figure 4.6: The experimental spread of indirect hiring under four scenarios
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The simulations’ predicted levels of indirect hires for these four scenarios, depicted in
figure 4.6, bear out the theoretical expectations. The model finds that firms transition to
using intermediaries more quickly for low-skilled occupations. While standard deviations
are not depicted in figure 4.6, there is not a significant difference between the overall labor
market scenario and the minimum wage scenario except from approximately tick 100 to
200. There is a significant difference between the 2 scenarios using more intermediaries
(all labor market and minimum wage) and the 2 least scenarios using fewer intermediaries
(programmers and accountants) throughout the entire run. Programmers and accountants
have almost significantly different rates of intermediary use throughout the model (signifi-
cant at .10) with programmers being hired through intermediaries more, probably because
accountants are set with a narrower skills distribution and less workload variability. In ad-
dition, it is more expensive to use intermediaries for accountants because they have slightly
higher skill-levels so intermediary fees are higher. As in the first experiment, firms rapidly
adopt intermediaries and then hover around a final stable level of indirect hires, past the
600 time ticks shown here. Across all scenarios, the proportion of workers hired through
intermediaries ranges from 20% to 52%.
parameter β standardized β min max
intercept -.027 - 1 1
relative comp .1701∗∗∗ .1239 .9 1.1
var of above .1420∗∗ .0517 .05 .15
work shocks .925∗∗∗ .2063 .05 .1
ticks .0004∗∗∗ .6789 25 575
skill distribution
min wage -.0298∗∗∗ -.1153 0 1
programmer -.0916∗∗∗ -.3541 0 1
accountant -.1147∗∗∗ -.4432 0 1
all labor baseline
OLS regression, observations are model runs
864 observations (72 settings, 12 intervals)
R-square .69
Table 4.2: How do ABM parameters influence indirect hiring?
A simple multivariate analysis predicting the proportion of jobs filled through interme-
diaries across all runs of the simulation shows that all the parameters except the compensa-
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tion variability are significant at the .001 level, while compensation variability is significant
at the .01 level. Excluding the predictive power of “time” (ticks) in the model, these param-
eters of interest explain only 22% of the experimental variance; with “time” they explain
69%. Figure 4.2 shows the OLS regular and standardized coefficients for a multivariate
regression predicting the proportion of indirectly employed workers based on the experi-
ment’s parameter settings. Of course model time has the most impact; and is followed by
the skill distributions, then workload fluctuations, then cost, and finally cost variance. Most
of the results make intuitive sense. The more heterogeneous skill distributions promote in-
termediary use while more narrow distributions like accountant limit it. When workloads
fluctuate there is more turnover both giving firms more opportunities to hire through in-
termediaries, and preventing indirect hires from moving into full-time positions. The only
unexpected result is that higher wages for indirect workers (“relative comp” increase the
proportion of workers hired indirectly. While this seems odd from the perspective of the
firm’s utility equation, it makes sense when we consider the role of organizational ecology
and the fact that intermediaries have to make a profit to offer their services.
Organizational ecology matters because when workers hired through intermediaries
earn more money, so do the intermediaries. At lower costs firms might want to use in-
termediaries, but cannot find them. The intermediaries’ profits are driven by an interaction
between the worker’s skill and the compensation differential, with them earning the most
from a high-skill worker with a contract wage premium and the least from a low-skill
worker with a contract wage penalty. If we recall, intermediaries are forced out of business
if their revenues per assigned job are less than 10% of the average skill level in the model.
In a run of minimum wage workers, where many workers have a high school education, the
average contractor who matches all of his clients under a wage penalty scenario, can still
expect to earn about 17% of the average skill level in that occupation, well above the mini-
mum requirement. But if the intermediary sets a slightly lower fee rate (remember fee rates
are set by a random distribution around an average level), or their workers draw slightly
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worse penalties, or if they fail to match some jobs, they go out of business. When they go
out of business, the firms working with them have to look for another local contractor and if
none is available, they hire workers directly. Thus, the firms don’t use intermediaries sim-
ply because they are cheaper, but also when they are expensive enough to sustain a healthy
organizational ecology.
As in the first experiment, the model also produces other experimental labor market
statistics including: unemployment rates, vacancy rates, job duration, and vacancy dura-
tion. These measures are used to verify that the model is a reasonable approximation of the
labor market. The model has unemployment and vacancies fluctuating around 5% regard-
less of parameter settings or the time in the model run. Since most jobs are at a few firms,
this means that the overall unemployment and vacancy rates are autocorrelated, and gener-
ally resemble a real-world labor market having business cycles of high unemployment and
low unemployment rather than random noise in the unemployment rate.
In terms of skill level, the experiments find that unemployed workers are consistently
the least educated, then indirect hires, and then direct hires are the best educated. In the
model, one might expect the mean skill level of indirect hires would not differ from that of
direct hires since firms should use intermediaries at both extremes of the skill distribution
since the least-skilled workers should receive fewer job offers and the most educated should
be the least likely to receive an offer filling their minimum requirements. Thus, both the
most and least educated should be the hardest to match. On average, these characteristics
should balance out leaving no difference between direct hires and indirect hires. While
the differences in figure 4.7 look small; they are statistically significant, with indirect hires
having significantly less skills, and direct hires having more. This is the second unexpected
and interesting finding: intermediaries encourage firms to sort workers, keeping the best
inside the firm.
A multivariate regression comparing the different parameters’ effects on the skills gap
between indirect and direct hires suggests that when indirect employees are paid more
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Figure 4.7: Deviations from the average worker’s skill
relative to direct hires, the skill gap increases. Second, the regression finds that when firms
have more workload shocks there is a lower skill gap (a low rate of shocks increases the
skills gap by about 1 degree level or the difference between an MA and a BA). This occurs
because the low-skill workers who would stay on and transition into direct hires (thus
diminishing the skill difference) are the first to be fired in a volatile market. Third, using
the all labor market distribution results in the smallest skill gap, while accountants have the
highest skill gap. This is unexpected because, of course, accountants have the narrowest
distribution of skills among workers.
Firm utility is one of the most important measures, as it motivates all the model’s dy-
namics. Utility ranges from 0 to 1, with the experiments including contractors increasing
utility on average .05 points compared to a baseline model with no contractors. A multi-
variate regression predicting utility levels based on parameter settings suggests that high
contract premiums and more workload shocks increase firms’ utilities as does using the
programmer or accountant skill distributions (because they are narrower). The premium’s
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role is attributable to the aforementioned organizational ecology effect. Workload shocks
increase utility because they increase turnover, which in turn increases the chance the firm
makes a better match and better matches are more likely to survive since the worker is less
likely to quit. Thus, turnover is good for a firm in the simulation since the model ignores the
importance of on the job training and firm-specific skills. It is surprising that the narrower
skill distribution increases utility since utility should improve through intermediaries more
in the broader skill distributions. Other model output includes the unemployment rate, va-
cancy rate, average vacancy duration, and average unemployment duration. All roughly
matched the labor market, with unemployment hovering around 5% and most unemploy-
ment spells being short, but with a few chronically unemployed.
The model’s primary limitation is that as a model, it excludes many incentives and
makes many assumptions. This model focuses on the trade-off between the cost of using
intermediaries and their better matching ability, omitting dynamics like firm-specific skills
and worker substitutability. The model showed that there are strong incentives for firms to
use intermediaries even in the absence of wage premiums; that wage premiums and fees
can have unexpected effects because of organizational ecology; that firms are more likely
to use intermediaries to fill their least-skilled jobs (stratifying workers by contact type);
and that even when, in expectation, intermediaries are not advantageous, some firms will
persist in using them, misinterpreting natural variability as a systematic advantage.
4.6 Empirical trends and model verification
A significant amount of research has measured the number of outsourced workers (presum-
ably indirect-hires), the types of firms most likely to outsource, and the number and size
of firms offering job-matching services. Generally, studies using employer data estimate
higher growth rates for atypical employment than those using employee data. I examine
three measurements of the trend of using indirect hires in the US economy, and use one to
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verify the model.
The Economic Census is a survey of businesses conducted by the US Census Bureau
every five years. It collects information on firms’ industries and employment. Figure 4.8
shows that between 1997 and 2002, employment at companies providing contract services
grew more rapidly than the rest of the economy. (This measure includes direct hires at the
service companies, but assuming administrative costs are a constant proportion of staff, this
does not effect the data.) It is somewhat ambiguous whether the workers at these firms are
actually indirect hires. At a janitorial services firm it is very likely that the workers perform
their duties at clients’ sites while in accounting firms it is less likely. This data also does
not provide information about the total number of workers in an occupation and only has
information for two periods. Thus, we can only estimate rate of employment growth for
the workers at the service firms, not the growth rate for the proportion of an occupation that
is hired through intermediaries. As such, the data is relevant to the model, but not directly
comparable.
There are two measurements approaching the question from employee-side data that
could be used for verification. The first technique uses the March Current Population Sur-
vey (CPS) to construct a time series of the proportion of an occupation that is indirect
hires. Indirect workers are identified by matching occupational and industry codes, posi-
tively identifying any worker in an occupation working for a firm specializing in providing
that same occupational service. Figure 4.8 shows the proportion of workers in a given
occupation who are indirect employees using this method.11 In contrast to the employer
side data, this data suggests a much slower growth pattern, and even a slight decline in the
clerical sector in recent years. This method is superior because it incorporates the general
growth rate of an occupation and can estimate the proportion of the occupation hired indi-
rectly. The method is limited in that it can only identify indirect workers when there are
matching codes for occupations and industries (i.e. clerical workers and clerical services)
11CPS occupational and industrial codes changed in 1992 and 2002, leaving a slight discontinuity.
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Figure 4.8: Empirical measures of indirect hiring.
and that it misidentifies direct-hires working at an intermediary in the same occupation
that they rent out labor in (i.e. an accountant working in an accounting firm). As with
the employer-side data, the method is likely to misidentify high-skill workers who actually
work at the contractor’s site.
The third technique uses the CPS Contingent Worker Supplement (February 1995, 97,
99, 2001, and 2005) which directly asks workers about their employment status. This
method counts temporary workers, on-call, casual laborers, day laborers, or any worker
reporting that their employer leases out their services. Figure 4.8 shows that for program-
mers, accountants, janitors, and clericals, this method suggests the opposite trend as the
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two prior techniques, suggesting employment through intermediaries has actually declined
since 1997.
Why do the estimates vary? Theoretically, the method using the Contingent Work Sup-
plement should be the most accurate since there is no proxy measurement; the survey di-
rectly asks the workers about their employment status rather than inferring it. However,
individuals often misreport the firm they commute to as their employer rather than the
intermediary, who is actually their legal employer (Bjelland et al., 2006). This bias is
confirmed by examining a single question from the same survey. Early in the survey, the
worker is asked to report his or her employer. Later, the respondent is asked whether they
were paid by their employer or a temporary help agency. If they were paid by a tempo-
rary help agency, the interviewer then asks them whether their reported employer was the
agency or the agency’s client. Surprisingly, the majority of respondents report the client as
their employer. Figure 4.9 shows that this bias has gotten worse over time. This distorts
measurements using both the inferred and direct CPS estimates since the indirect method





















Figure 4.9: Proportion of indirect workers misreporting indirect employers as primary em-
ployers (King et al., 1995-2005).
The empirical evidence on intermediary use is of mixed quality (figure 4.8). Neverthe-
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less, the data from the CPS was compared to the experimental data. The first 200 ticks (or
time periods in the model) were discarded as “burn in.”12 Across all the models the average
level of workers hired through intermediaries, as of the end of the model, was 36%. This
far exceeds the level found in the empirical data, indicating that incentives are set too high,
or important disincentives are omitted. The difference in occupations found in the model
is different than the empirical data. In the model the low skilled workers in wider skill dis-
tributions seems to be more likely to work in indirect employment while in the empirical
data programmers and accountants seem to. I would speculate that this mismatch is largely
driven by miscalculation in the empirical data. The empirical data calculation includes,
for high skill jobs, a large portion of workers who have regular jobs at service firms (i.e.
accountants at accounting firms). In sum, the overestimation in the model is probably due
to the omission of more indirect hiring disincentives than incentives while the mis-ordering
of occupations is likely due to the empirical measurement problems.
While the predicted levels of indirect hiring do not exactly predict reality, it is first,
unlikely to do so in a simple model and second, could easily be remedied by adjusting
the magnitude of the effects of tested incentives and disincentives on firms’ utilities. It is
perhaps more important that the model generally functions like a real labor market. One
way to test that is using the unemployment and vacancy rates in the model. In the model,
across simulations the mean unemployment rate is 5.3% while vacancies are 5.2%. These
are relatively realistic values; unemployment in the US was 5.5% as of May, 2008.
Another way to compare this simulated market to the real market is using the relation-
ship between unemployment and vacancies (Fagiolo et al., 2004). Unemployment rates and
vacancy rates are hypothesized to follow the “Beveridge Curve,” named after the English
12Originally, the diffusion of intermediary use in the model from tick 200 on was fit to the time series from
the CPS data from 1983 to 2005, with the assumption that hiring through intermediaries really began in the
1980’s. The fits are not presented here primarily because the fitting of the time axis (linking tick 200 to 1983
and the last tick to 2005) was arbitrary. The experimental and empirical data matched for some experiments
such as the prediction of programmers’ indirect hire rates using those experiments with the programmers’
skill distribution, no indirect hire wage premium, a low variance of the wage premium, and few firm shocks.
Nevertheless, the same experiment fits the growth in indirect employment for clerical workers and janitors
well too.
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Economist William Beveridge. The Beveridge curve is a curve relating unemployment
rates (x-axis) and vacancy rates (y axis) that has a negative first derivative and a positive
second, so that it is concave, with vacancies approaching zero as unemployment increases
and unemployment approaching zero as vacancies increase. Empirically we never know
the exact shape of the curve, as it slowly migrates in towards the origin and away from the
origin as worker-job matching becomes more and less efficient, respectively. Nevertheless,
the curve is shown to exist as employment and vacancy rates move in a counterclockwise
fashion following the theorized concave curve. During the 1990s and 2000’s the Beveridge
curve wandered inward towards the origin, in the general range of unemployment around 4
to 8 % and vacancies around 2 to 4% (Valletta, 2005).
Unlike using real data, the ABM can generate full Beveridge curves because multiple
experiments are run under each regime. Using data from all experiments, at each combi-
nation of parameter settings, at multiple time points (ticks), for those observations beyond
the 200th tick, we can generate Beveridge curves from the ABM. In figure 4.10 we see
in the lower left hand corner, the plot of the natural log of unemployment versus vacancy
from the experiments, suggesting that the natural log of unemployment might be a good
fit to predict vacancies, a functional form that naturally fits the Beveridge curve. Next,
a model of v = c + αln(u) + βX (where u is unemployment, v is the vacancy rate, X is
the vector of experimental conditions, and c is a constant) was fit, finding the significant
coefficient of -.0359 for ln(unemployment) with an R-square of .82. (The R-square just
using ln(unemployment) is .20) Among the experimental conditions, the skill distribution
and the firm shocks also change the prediction. The upper panel of figure 4.10 shows the
ABM’s combinations of vacancy and unemployment rates and the predicted values. Even
though ID’s were omitted from this diagram for clarity, it is clear that the experimental
and predicted values mirror each other. The bottom right hand plot shows this by plotting
residual against the predicted vacancy rates- showing a good fit. The most efficient mar-
kets (with a Beveridge curve closest to the origin) in the simulation are those simulations
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with the accountants’ skill distribution and more firm shocks. This makes sense because it
is easier to match workers and jobs in a market. It also suggests that the market is more
efficient in a more fluid labor market where firms are often hiring and firing people. The
least efficient simulations are those using the all labor market distribution and fewer firm
shocks- the polar opposite scenario.
What this exercise shows, is that the simulated labor market is more or less functioning
as a normal labor market does. Unemployment and vacancies are not related linearly, but
in a concave curve in the shape of the Beveridge curve. In sum, both the absolute levels of
unemployment and vacancies, and their relationship, in the simulation, mirror that which
we see in the real world, suggesting that the model does a reasonable job of copying the
real labor market.
While the estimates of intermediary use in the model do not match the empirical data,
more importantly, its other characteristics such as employment and vacancies resemble a
real labor market.
4.7 Conclusion
The agent based model had several important findings. The first finding is that independent
of compensation differentials, intermediaries’ better ability to match workers and jobs is a
sufficient incentive for firms to use intermediaries. The second finding is that organizational
ecology matters, and consequently higher intermediary fees can increase firms’propensity
to use intermediaries by sustaining an organizational ecology of contractors. Another find-
ing is that a percentage fee structure turns indirect employment into a sorting mechanism,
where firms hire their less skilled workers through intermediaries. Finally, the model found
that in occupations with more heterogeneity among workers, firms are more likely to use
intermediaries.
The empirical data suffers many flaws, but did suggest some conclusions and directions
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Figure 4.10: ABM Beveridge curves
for further research. First, using intermediaries is not necessarily an exploding trend; this
could be a misperception based on using employer-side data. Second, the data suggests that
the major transition has most likely already happened and that intermediary use seems to
have stabilized in the 1990s. Finally, it is difficult to make empirical conclusions because
the definition of an indirect hire is unclear (particularly for high-skilled jobs) and because
workers in these arrangements misreport their employers.
This paper was limited in that it did not explore the role of other incentives to hire
through intermediaries, like firm-specific skills and tested a context with legal limitations
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on indirect employment duration. Finally, the model used compensation gaps calculated
from a simple method of taking the difference between indirect workers’ wages and direct
workers wages rather than controlling for selection on basic worker characteristics like age,
race, education, and location, as in the second paper of this dissertation on fixed term wage
gaps. As such, the simulation may benefit from a better measure of the compensation gap.
Atypical employment is an important area of research. If there are trends towards us-
ing intermediaries with strong repercussions for compensation gaps, and these trends sort
workers by ability, we are moving towards a two-tier system of employment with one
group of workers enjoying the benefits of direct employment and another group suffer-
ing the penalties of indirect employment. Many European countries have moved towards
guaranteeing these types of workers equal compensation and union negotiating power in
an attempt to combat this labor market segmentation. This same question is equally if not
more important in the United States, where employer-provided health benefits are at stake.
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Chapter 5
Academic Employment Networks &
Departmental Prestige
5.1 Introduction
Sociology departments’academic rankings incorporate both “‘objective” measures of de-
partment quality (such as citation rates and funding patterns) and “subjective” measures
(such as faculty perceptions of graduate school quality). While we might expect that de-
partments could improve their rankings when objective measures are used while they might
be unable to improve their positions when reputational measures are used. Yet, regardless
of the measure used, academic rankings are relatively constant over time, with the top
schools swapping the top positions (Graham and Diamond, 1997). Several rankings for so-
ciology graduate programs from 1925 to 2005 are illustrated in table 5.1. Four institutions
have been in the top 10 since 1925 while 8 others have since 1982. These rankings find re-
markably consistent results despite their significantly different methodologies. The oldest
type of formula is a reputational rank, which was pioneered by Raymond M Hughes. In his
1925 report, Hughes surveyed 20 to 60 faculty members in each field, asking them to rank
institutions based on “esteem at present time for graduate work in your subject.” The much
critiqued US News and World Report rankings build on this formula, basing ranks on a peer
assessment surveys (50% response rate) sent to academic department heads and directors
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of graduate study in sociology.1 The National Research Council’s (NRC) 1995 rankings
are more complicated; they also use reputational measures (also with about a 50% response
rate) but augment it with data for about 17 program characteristics such as: size, private vs
public university, total research and development (R&D) expenditures , federal R&D, li-
brary expenditures, enrollment, total faculty, percent full time faculty, percent faculty with
research support, percent full professors, faculty awards, citations per faculty, faculty char-
acteristics, and student characteristics. The NRC found that the reputational measures are
consistent with the objective measures. Critics of the NRC rankings argued there was too
much emphasis on research-related variables and too little on doctoral training, though the
next version of the ratings will incorporate more training-related variables.
The analysis here is done twice, once using the NRC’s sociology rankings. Unfortu-
nately this rank does not include foreign institutions. Thus the analysis was done again
using the US News and World Report international rankings, which are not specific to so-
ciology.2 The Newsweek score includes measures of citations, publications, international
faculty, international students, faculty:student ratios, and library holdings. While the two
rankings were developed using different metrics and only one focused on sociology, the
rankings correlate at .625 for those US schools where both ranks were available. The
primary difference between the ranks is that the NRC sociology rankings exclude tech-
nical/science schools like MIT and Caltech, while these schools are near the top of the
general international ranking.
Some researchers suggest the stagnant rankings indicate a closed system where depart-
ments find it difficult to move up the rankings and where well-established programs can
reinforce their dominance. This organizational situation could be considered analogous to
individual-level stratification in a “closed system” where intergenerational transmission of
advantage trumps equal opportunity (Lipset et al., 1955). Ideally, stratification should func-
1For an excellent critique of the US News rankings see Ehrenberg 2002.
2I tested the Shanghai rankings as well, but because there was little difference those results are not pre-
sented here.
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1925∗ 1982+ 1995∗∗ 1995+ 2005∗∗
Chicago Chicago Chicago Chicago Wisconsin
Columbia Wisconsin Wisconsin(2/3) Wisconsin Berkeley
Wisconsin Berkeley Berkeley(2/3) Berkeley Michigan (3/4)
Minnesota Michigan Michigan(4/5) Michigan Chicago (3/4)
Michigan Harvard Chapel Hill(4/5) UCLA Chapel Hill
Harvard Chapel Hill Harvard(6/7) Chapel Hill Princeton (6/7)
Missouri Stanford UCLA(6/7) Harvard Stanford (6/7)
Columbia Stanford Stanford Harvard (8/9)
UCLA Northwestern(9/10) Northwestern UCLA (8/9)
Arizona Princeton(9/10) Washington UPenn
∗ Hughes (1925)
+ National Research Council (1982, 1995)
∗∗ US News and World Report (1995,2005)
Table 5.1: Sociology department ranks
tion as an incentive for individuals to work harder or to acquire more human capital (Davis
and Moore, 1945), or for organizations to innovate and improve their product. However,
too much stratification might indicate that either individuals can propagate their advantage
through their current assets or analogously, an organization can sell more of their product
not based on their current effort, but on their brand name or reputational inheritance.
There are two ways sociology departments may maintain their advantages in the rank-
ings. First, it might be that respondents to the reputational survey are rather ill informed,
basing their evaluation of doctoral programs not on the programs’ actual merit but on what
respondents have heard about departments (although the correlation between NRC’s ob-
jective and subjective measures speaks against this). If this is the case, once a program
is highly ranked, it will remain there, as professors perpetuate the reputation without ob-
jectively examining it. More likely, once a program is highly ranked, it has the ability
to perpetuate its rank by attracting faculty and resources. The simple preference for fac-
ulty to move to or between higher ranked schools can cement departments’ rank. Depart-
ments’ consequent central positions in the academic hiring network can further enhance
departmental prestige through many mechanisms such as research collaborations or know-
ing about upcoming trends in the field. While this paper does not explore the specific
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mechanisms linking hiring network centrality and prestige, it does confirm the existence
of the correlation between centrality and prestige, independent of training and department
size–possible spurious causes not previously considered.
There is significant non-network research testing how the institutional prestige of PhD grant-
ing institutions influences first job placement. This literature finds that the most prestigious
universities hire each other’s graduates, over-valuing the institutional prestige of appli-
cants’ training institution over other characteristics that might be more predictive of long-
term success, such as the time it took to complete the PhD (Bair, 2003; Baldi, 1995; Bur-
ris, 2004; Burke, 1988; Hargens and Hagstrom, 1966; McGinnis and Long, 1988; Reskin,
1979; Smelser and Content, 1980).
In contrast, there are only four papers testing whether academic departments’ positions
in academic hiring networks are linked to academic rank. Burris (2004); Wiggins et al.
(2006) and Fowler et al. (2007) create networks linking professors to their current employ-
ers and their PhD granting institutions, generating a network of institutions with weighted,
directed edges indicating the number of PhDs trained at one department and currently em-
ployed in another. These studies analyze computer science, information schools (formerly
called schools of library science), sociology, and political science departments and find
a significant relationship between network centrality and rank. Their choice of centrality
measures vary, though they all use recursive network measures (based on the adjacency
matrix’s dominant eigenvector) that measure a node’s prestige based on the prestige of
those nodes it is connected to. Centrality measures used include: eigenvector centrality
(Bonacich, 1972), PageRank (Page et al., 1999), and hub and authority centrality scores
(Kleinberg, 1998), used by Burris (2004), Wiggins et al. (2006), and Fowler et al. (2007)
respectively. Fowler et al. (2007) uses hubs and authorities, making a distinction between
prestige from placing students in prestigious departments and hiring professors from pres-
tigious departments. All three studies ignore the link between the department where an
academic got their PhD and the department of their first job (the traditional question in
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non-network studies) and all ignore placements taking place between the professor’s cur-
rent job and his or her training. The Grannis (2005) approach is slightly different, looking
at UCLA’s ego network of its faculty trades with other departments. These articles then
use centrality scores as a predictor of departmental prestige (Burris, 2004; Fowler et al.,
2007) and interpret the relationship as confirming institutional stratification (Burris, 2004)
or in the hubs and authorities case showing that placing students in prestigious schools is
more relevant to prestige than hiring professors from prestigious schools (Fowler et al.,
2007).3 Ultimately, it is difficult to parse out the relationship since there is a circle of
causality—productive researchers increase a school’s prestige, but prestigious schools also
attract productive researchers.
This paper expands on the current body of research in two ways. First, it considers
the impact of prestigious schools training many more PhDs than there are openings in
the entire field (henceforth referred to as “overtraining”), and second, it considers that
the relationship between between hiring network centrality and academic rank might be
spurious, driven by department size which is a reliable predictor of both. In addition, this
paper uses a more robust methodological procedure considering the effect of sample bias,
bipartite graph reduction, and the choice of network centrality measures.
Currently, most of the literature ignores that centrality and prestige are both strongly
influenced by department size (National Research Council, 1982, 1995). Department size
indirectly influences the rankings insofar as there are more former employees and students
from the largest schools and insofar as those individuals rank their previous affiliations
higher than those departments they were never affiliated with. Department size also in-
creases centrality directly because bigger departments have more edges. Consequently,
centrality and prestige should be correlated by virtue of department size even if location
in the network is unrelated to prestige. This is well illustrated in one of the four existing
3Using the natural log of eigenvector centrality as a predictor of academic rank in regressions,Burris
finds coefficients around 1.3 in sociology, history, and political science. Using PageRank, Wiggins finds a
correlation between centrality and rank of .81. while Fowler et. al. find correlations as high as .82 between
network centrality and prestige rank.
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studies. Fowler et al. (2007) shows that ranks can change when we control for department
size, particularly for boutique programs with focused research areas. It should be noted
that, theoretically, department size might play a valid role in determining prestige since
bigger departments have more depth and thus more opportunities for graduate students and
researchers to expand their skills. The size distribution of sociology departments included
in this study are shown in figure 5.1. The bars indicate actual department size while the
line is just a smoothed estimate. The distribution is more concentrated around faculties of
about 20, rapidly petering out. Wisconsin has an extreme number of faculty, presumably
























Figure 5.1: Department size
Overtraining can also account for part of the relationship between centrality scores
and academic rankings. The current research creates edges between professors and their
training departments and their current employers. If the most prestigious and largest de-
partments train a much larger percentage of the job market than they hire, and train more
than the less prestigious schools, they will be more central. Figure 5.2 shows two lines
illustrating first where professors at the top ten schools were trained and second where pro-
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fessors at the average school were trained. The dark grey section shows the proportion of
professors currently employed at the top ten schools who were also trained at the top ten
schools slowly incrementing from those trained at the top school to those trained at the
10th school. We see at the origin, that over 10 percent of the faculty at top ten schools
were trained by the University of Chicago and about 20% were trained at Wisconsin and
Chicago combined. Bumps in the graph show that University of Michigan and particularly
Harvard trained more of the faculty at top schools. By the end of the chart, we see that over
70% of the professors at top ten schools were also trained in the top 10 schools. The lower
line and light grey section of the graph shows where the professors at the average school
were trained (including professors from every fifth school in the rankings from 5 to 95).
The training school of all faculty at every fifth school was collected as a sample indicative
of the training of the average school. The percentage measures the percent of total faculty,
not the average percent at each school. This is an important difference because it weights
the bigger (and usually better) schools more and is ultimately representative of the mean in
the labor market, not the mean school. This line shows the same pattern as that for the top
ten schools, with close to half of all professors being trained at the top ten schools. The
American Sociological Association (ASA) reports there are 598 new PhDs every year and
a stock of only 4,227 tenure and tenure track positions in the US. This means that enough
students graduate to replace the entire profession every 7 years. At this level of production,
all universities can hire from the top schools, while the graduates from the other schools
must simply leave the market. This places highly ranked schools at the center of the hiring
network. This analysis tests whether the association between hiring network centrality and
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Figure 5.2: Where professors were trained
5.2 Data and methods
Two separate data sets were collected by choosing sociology departments and using current
permanent faculty’s CV’s to code edges between faculty and the departments and organiza-
tions they had been affiliated with. The first data set collected faculty from prestigious (ac-
cording to the NRC rankings) departments (Wisconsin, University of Michigan, Harvard,
Berkeley, UCLA, University of Chicago, Brown, Stanford, and University of Arizona).
The second sample was collected with the intention to test the effect of having sampled
the most prestigious institutions in the first data set. This second group includes Yale, Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania, Northwestern, Princeton, Johns Hopkins, and NYU. The second
group still represents exceptional schools; the comparison between these two networks al-
lows us to test whether sampled schools automatically become the most central schools.
Edges between individuals and institutions were coded as “PhD training”, “tenure-track,”
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and “non-tenure track.” Non-tenure track jobs include lectureships, post-doctoral positions,
non-academic, and visiting appointments. Approximately 7% of the sample did not have
their CV’s posted on-line. For these cases, edges were coded to the faculty’s current institu-
tion and their PhD granting institution (which were normally listed). Including these CV’s
will place the departments that train more students at the center of the network. The edges
will drop out for those graphs were training edges were excluded. Thus, including this 7 %
should sharpen the difference between the findings using graphs with and without training
edges. The two samples included 193 and 241 institutions, 99 and 89 institutions that were
ranked by the NRC, and a total of 886 and 882 links for samples one and two, respectively.
All network measures used in this analysis were generated using the full graphs including
non-academic institutions although the secondary regression analyses use the sub-sample
of academic departments with prestige rankings.
Twelve different graphs (differing by sample choice (2), edges included (3), and graph
reduction (2)) were used to test whether the relationship between centrality and prestige is
robust to graph specification. The graphs either included all three types of edges, excluded
non-tenure track edges, or excluded training edges. The first sample was reduced to 99
institutions when non-tenure track edges were excluded and to 178 institutions when stu-
dent edges were excluded, while the second sample was reduced to 89 and 237 institutions.
Each of the 6 graphs was first analyzed as a full bipartite graph with both individuals and in-
stitutions and then then analyzed as a reduced graph including only institutions, weighting
the edges between institutions by the number of faculty they had in common.
There are 4 main methodological challenges using this data. First, any sampling method
biases the graph, enhancing the sampled institutions’ centrality. One solution to this prob-
lem is to start with seed institutions, and then to sample from the other institutions that enter
the analysis, ultimately excluding the original seed institutions from the network analysis.
Instead, I include these biased observations, but use two different seeds, concluding that
if the results are similar using the two seeds, the conclusions are robust to sample bias.
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Second, the data includes both end-of-career and beginning of career professors. This bi-
ases the data insofar as older professors with a longer history of institutional connections
are more likely to be at more prestigious universities. Other studies have similar prob-
lems, for example, coding the edges between a department that trained a professor and
their first job the same as their emeritus job (Burris, 2004; Wiggins et al., 2006; Fowler
et al., 2007). Third, academia is not an isolated network, which can bias network statis-
tics like transitivity, degree distribution, and clustering (Grannis, 2005) as well as mean
degree (Kossinets, 2006). The final difficulty is that the graph is bipartite with two types
of nodes (professors and departments) linked by edges (employment relations). Bipartite
graphs are also called “affiliation networks.” Most centrality measures are designed for
one-mode graphs (Borgatti and Everett, 1997) but can easily be adjusted for use with bi-
partite graphs, or the original centrality measures can be used on the reduced form of the
bipartite graph. Centrality measures (defined in the following section) differ based on the
approach taken. Figure 5.3 shows two graphs that are different in their bipartite forms but
identical in their reduced forms. In the figure, node size indicates degree. Graph 1 could
illustrate three professors who have had very mobile careers, while graph 2 could illustrate
19 professors, each of whom is only affiliated with their training institution and their cur-
rent employer. In the reduced versions of the graphs D and H are the most important nodes,
while they are more important in bipartite graph one than in bipartite graph two. Calculat-
ing the nodes’ centralities, D and H have similar eigenvector centralities in all three graphs.
However, D and H have much higher standardized degrees and closeness centralities in
graph 1 and the reduced graphs than in the bipartite graph two.4 Because of these dif-
ferences, I analyze the graphs both as bipartite and reduced, using the bipartite centrality
measures proposed by Borgatti and Everett (1997) and illustrated in Robins and Alexander
(2003) (although eigenvector centrality does not need to be adjusted for the bipartite graph
4Centrality scores for D in bipartite graph 1 are: .377 (eig), .667 (degree), .889 (closeness); in bipartite


































































Figure 5.3: Reducing two different bipartite graphs into one reduced graph
Three different centrality measures were calculated: closeness centrality, standardized
degree, and eigenvector centrality. Eigenvector centrality was chosen as the recursive mea-
sure, closeness centrality chosen as a distance measure (related to how quickly the depart-
ment can access information from peers about funding, new research trends, recruiting,
etc), and degree centrality was chosen as a straw man (it should capture department size
and the experience of the department’s faculty) and should be the most biased by the sam-
ple seed. Most studies focus on using one of the recursive measures of centrality since
these measures indicate how important a node is based on the nodes it is connected to. This
should be more robust to the sampling limitations. A good example of this would be a
prestigious foreign university like Cambridge. While perhaps not many professors in the
US system have worked at Cambridge, those that did should be the ones also connected
to top US universities. A recursive measure would, as such, give Cambridge a high score,
while the standardized degree would not. Surprisingly, as we will see in section 5.3, results
are similar using all three measures.
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Equation 5.1 illustrates the calculation for standardized degree for node i. Standardized
degree measures the percent of all possible connections that an institution has to institutions
in the reduced graph (Dri ) or to professors in the bipartite graph( D
b
i ). In both cases, the
numerator is the degree of department (the number of edges it has) di, and the denominator
is the total possible connections in the graph, np, the number of professors in the bipartite
graph, and nd − 1, the number of departments less the department whose standardized
degree is being calculated in the reduced graph. As such, standardized degree measures









Closeness centrality measures the inverse of the average distance between a given node
(i) and all other nodes (j) and is illustrated as Cri for the reduced graph and C
b
i for the
bipartite graph in equation 5.2. Here, n indicates the number of departments, and and Di j is
the distance from node i to node j. The version of the measure used for the bipartite graph
(Cbi ) multiplies the average inverse distance by 2 to account for the fact that all connections
between institutions are twice as far as in the reduced graph. Thus, closeness centrality














Eigenvector centrality (Bonacich, 1972), is a recursive measure of prestige related to
PageRank (Page et al., 1999), hubs and authorities (Kleinberg, 1998), and SALSA (Lempel
and Moran, 2000). All four are based on the dominant eigenvector of the graph’s adjacency
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matrix and all gauge the importance of a node based on the importance of its neighbors.
Page Rank adds a damping factor to the adjacency matrix (reducing the edges in the ad-
jacency matrix by some small amount and adding uniform random edges from each node
to all other nodes) and then calculates eigenvector centrality. The PageRank adjustment is
necessary when a graph has directed edges leading into a node, but no edges leading out.
Both SALSA and hubs and authorities use the dominant eigenvectors of the adjacency ma-
trix times its transpose (and vice versa) with SALSA using row and column standardized
versions of the adjacency matrix.
For eigenvector centrality, given the adjacency matrix A, where entry Ai j is 1 or 0 in
the bipartite graph, or the number of connections between institutions in the reduced graph,
and where e is the eigenvector pared with A’s largest eigenvalue, λ , the ith entry of vector
e is the eigenvector centrality for the ith node.
Ae = λe (5.3)
In other words, the centrality scores are the principle eigenvector of the adjacency ma-
trix. For the bipartite graph, eigenvector centralities for individuals are simply dropped.5
It is expected that the degree centrality score will be the most influenced by department
size and sampling bias while the recursive measure should be more robust. All the cen-
trality scores are continuous and can be converted into a rank comparable to prestige rank.
Analyses were conducted using both the continuous measures and the rank.
There are three variables exogenous to the networks: the domestic and international
ranks described in the first section of the paper, and department size. For domestic univer-
sities, department size was taken directly from the NRC report when possible, and from
departmental web sites when not. Information was drawn from departmental web sites for
non-US universities.
Two of the twelve networks are depicted in figure 5.4 using the Kamada-Kawai spring
5PageRank and hubs and authorities were also tested, yielding similar results.
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layout algorithm (Kamada and Kawai, 1989). This algorithm places “springs” between
each pair of connected nodes, where the strength of the string is proportional to the strength
of the edge, and places the nodes to minimize the springs’ “energy.” Thus, nodes are
connected in clusters with the nodes they share many connections with. I present just
2 of the 12 graphs for the sake of brevity. The first graph in figure 5.4 is the bipartite
graph from sample one (the prestige sample), including all edges (tenure, non-tenure, and
student). The size of the nodes indicates their degree and the shade indicates whether
they are institutions (grey) or individuals (white). Sampled institutions, of course, have
high degrees and are central while European English-speaking institutions are also central
but with smaller degrees. The halo of small institutions indicates small departments like
UCSF (labeled) or non-profit and public institutions like the Census Bureau. The second
graph in figure 5.4 is sample two’s (the less prestigious sample) reduced graph excluding
non-tenure track edges. The institutions that were part of the first sample remain central,
though less dominant, as they were not the sample’s seed, while sampled institutions like
Yale take a more dominant position. In those analyses excluding non-tenure track edges,
foreign institutions either dropped out of the graph or moved to the periphery. Self-edges
(indicating that an institution had two relationships with the same individual i.e. training
and then employing the same person) become apparent in the second graph because it is
sparser. Removing student edges as well, the prestigious central institutions lose a little
centrality.
Table 5.2 shows the descriptive statistics for all graphs. Average degree indicates the
average number of individuals the organization is associated with in the bipartite graphs
and the average number of organizations sharing connections to professors in the reduced
graphs, weighted by the number of professors they had in common. Note that the average
degree is smaller than the average academic department size because the graphs (particu-
larly those including non-tenure track edges) include peripheral non-academic institutions






























Figure 5.4: Two sample graphs
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age number of jumps to get from one institution to another for the reduced graphs and
institution-individual-institution jumps for bipartite graphs. Finally, diameter measures the
shortest path between the institutions that are the most distant. Comparing the two sam-
ples in table 5.2, the two samples seem similar in at least their descriptive statistics. The
reduced graphs have higher average degrees than the bipartite because departments are
linked to most other departments. The reduced all edges graph from sample 2 (the less
prestigious sample) is more dense than the same graph from sample 1. This is also visible
when we plot the two graphs. The version from sample one looks like a few main depart-
ments have ties to each other, while in the second sample the same graph looks like there
are more small connections throughout the graph. We will see whether this is the case in
a more rigorous test later in the paper. In all networks the diameter is small (equal to 4 in
all cases) because the networks are star shaped with a few central institutions keeping all
organizations closely linked. Removing student edges, average degree decreases because
few nodes drop out but many edges do. Those nodes dropping out in the no student edges
graph would be schools that only one person in the data is affiliated with–this could be, for
example, due to a foreign professor trained abroad but working in the US.
all org avg avg
nodes nodes degree distance diameter
sample 1
bipartite all edges 479 193 4.59 1.92 4
reduced all edges 193 193 9.87 2.30 4
bipartite no non-tenure 386 99 6.57 1.73 4
reduced no non-tenure 99 99 6.55 2.35 4
bipartite no student 457 178 3.56 2.08 4
reduced no student 178 178 8.10 2.45 4
sample 2
bipartite all edges 425 241 3.66 1.98 4
reduced all edges 241 241 21.84 2.28 4
bipartite no non-tenure 273 89 5.79 3.83 4
reduced no non-tenure 89 89 7.44 2.37 4
bipartite no student 421 237 2.95 2.07 4
reduced no student 237 237 12.90 2.35 4
Table 5.2: Descriptive statistics for the 12 graphs
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5.3 Analysis
Generally, the analysis finds that ranks generated from centrality measures are strongly
correlated to prestige, though the strength of the relationship varies by graph. Closeness
centrality changes when the graph is reduced, eigenvector centrality changes when student
edges are removed, and mean degree changes both when the graph is reduced and when
student or non-tenure track edges are removed.6
Using equation 5.4 to calculate the sum square deviations between the predicted and ac-
tual ranks for the top universities, I assessed which graph’s centrality scores best predicted
academic rank. Gs is the graph’s sum of squared errors, u is a university, r is u’s NRC rank,
and e, c, and d are the eigenvector, closeness, and degree centrality ranks, respectively. In
this way, the graphs were assessed by their ability to generate centrality measures predic-
tive of prestige for all three types of centrality scores. One could use the original data in
the appendix to do the same calculation for each centrality score independently. However,
given the high correlation across the three centrality scores illustrated in figure 5.4, it was






[(e− r)2 +(c− r)2 +(d− r)2] (5.4)
The first three columns of table 5.3 show ranks generated from the three centrality
scores for the best graph and the second shows those from the worst graph. The bipartite
graph from sample 1 (the more prestigious sample) excluding non-tenure track edges was
the best predictor of academic rank, while the reduced graph from sample 1 including all
edges was the worst predictor. It is notable that the best and worst graphs have similar
predictions. The primary difference in their predictive values stems from their inconsistent
ranking of UNC Chapel Hill. The graph that is reduced using all edges from sample one
6All the listed changes are significant at a 95% confidence level.
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grossly under-estimates UNC’s prestige rank compared to graphs omitting non-tenure track
edges (not shown here, see appendix). This would make sense if UNC hired fewer post docs
and visiting professors. The last two columns of table 5.3 show the average predicted rank
for each school when we average the eigenvector, closeness, and degree centrality ranks
across all 6 graphs in each of the two samples (the average of 18 predictions). In the table,
the average rank is in bold if the school was part of the sample seed. These two columns
highlight the fact that departments have higher rank by all three centrality scores when they
are part of the seed. Nevertheless, the top schools remain relatively highly ranked even
when left out of the seed. This emphasizes the fact that the sampling bias does influence the
analysis somewhat, though the non-sampled schools are still appropriately ranked. While
not listed in table 5.3, it is important to note that all the graphs excluding student edges
(both sample 1 and 2) were significantly worse predictors of rank. In fact, three of the
four graphs excluding student edges landing are in the bottom four (of 12) predictions.
This lends support to the hypothesis that over-training accounts for a large portion of the
centrality-prestige correlation.
best graph∗ worst graph∗∗ across graphs
NRC eigen closeness degree eigen closeness degree
rank rank rank rank rank rank rank sample 1 sample 2
UChicago 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 2 12
Wisconsin 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 8
Berkeley 3 5 4 5 4 6 5 5 5
UMichigan 4 4 5 4 1 4 2 3 13
UCLA 5 6 6 6 5 2 6 4 14
Chapel Hill 6 15 15 13 55 21 16 15 15
Harvard 7 3 3 3 57 5 4 6 7
Stanford 8 7 7 7 6 7 7 7 9
Northwestern 9 11 10 12 10 12 12 11 4
U of Washington 10 37 28 29 81 35 45 41 23
∗ best = sample 1, bipartite, no non-tenure edges
∗∗ worst = sample 1, reduced graph, all edges
Table 5.3: Centrality rankings for the best and worst graphs
The three centrality measures are highly correlated with one another, as illustrated in
table 5.4. The first column shows the correlation between eigenvector and closeness cen-
139
trality, the second shows the correlation between eigenvector and degree centrality, and the
third column shows the correlation between closeness and degree. The main entries of table
5.4 indicate rank correlation between the centrality score ranks and prestige ranks, while
the numbers in parentheses are the correlations between the continuous centrality scores
(see equations 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3). While the first 12 rows illustrate the correlations within
graphs, the last row is the overall correlation, averaging over all graph specifications. All
the correlations using rank generated from centrality measures are better than those directly
using the continuous centrality measures. The three centrality measures are inconsistent in
the reduced graph from sample one with all edges, the same graph that was the worst pre-
dictor of prestige. This is somewhat surprising since visually inspecting that graph, more
than any other graph in the analysis, this one is heavily centered around the top schools, and
shows strong edges between them. It could be that while this graph is good at predicting
the top schools, it fails to predict the others. The key finding in table 5.4 is that the ranks
generated by the three centrality measures are similar. Researchers generally use the re-
cursive measures because of the aforementioned reasons, such as being robust to sampling
bias. However, all three centrality measures generate the same outcomes, suggesting that
even the simplest measures, like standardized degree, are robust.
All the centrality measures are strongly correlated with academic rank as calculated by
the NRC (domestic) and US News and World Report (international). For domestic rank,
the ranks generated using eigenvector centrality have a .68 rank correlation compared to
.72 using closeness and .73 using degree (calculated across all observations where an ob-
servation is an academic department in one of the 12 graphs). Correlations are slightly
lower (.55, .59, and .59) for foreign international academic rank, because this ranking is
not specific to sociology. Correlations between centrality and prestige varied substantially
across the individual graphs when they are calculated separately. For example, ranks gener-
ated from eigenvector centrality had a correlation with domestic prestige ranging from .39
for sample one’s bipartite graph including all edges to .8 for sample one’s reduced graph
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excluding non-tenure edges. The best predictions tend to come from excluding non-tenure
track edges. This makes sense because non-tenure track edges tend to not follow the gen-
eral hierarchical order in academia. Some individuals work in non-academic jobs at other
institutions, drawing power away from the central academic institutions. Early in their
careers, many individuals who later end up at lower ranked schools spend some time as
post-docs at higher ranked schools. Finally, later in their careers many of those employed
at high ranked schools will visit other schools based on characteristics besides prestige,
like location, perhaps visiting the European University Institute in Florence over Wiscon-
sin. These non-tenure track relationships create links between low and high ranked schools
that do not exist in the regular academic labor market. Of the three types of centrality
scores, closeness rank has the most consistent correlations with domestic prestige, ranging
from .6 to .8 compared to degree rank, which correlates with domestic prestige from .62
to .77. Thus, we might say that the closeness centrality from graphs excluding non-tenure
track relationships are the best predictors of prestige.
graph type eig-close eig-degree close-degree
samp reduce edges
1 yes all .614 (.733) .589 (.888) .889 (.840)
1 yes PhD & ten .915 (.866) .948 (.989) .922 (.878)
1 yes no PhD .929 (.891) .935 (.977) .927 (.870)
1 no all .979 (.759) .865 (.990) .836 (.792)
1 no PhD & ten .983 (.681) .935 (.981) .930 (.732)
1 no no PhD .949 (.648) .787 (.873) .827 (.810)
2 yes all .959 (.828) .931 (.987) .958 (.863)
2 yes PhD & ten .977 (.897) .955 (.944) .969 (.951)
2 yes no PhD .975 (.854) .940 (.924) .955 (.928)
2 no all .985 (.811) .903 (.988) .905 (.817)
2 no PhD & ten .961 (.721) .936 (.974) .952 (.764)
2 no no PhD .908 (.767) .841 (.944) .924 (.696)
overall .877 (.650) .913 (.523) .911 (.795)
entries are rank correlations
(...) are continuous correlations
Table 5.4: Correlations across centrality measures
In terms of biases introduced by using prestigious schools as sample seeds, in sample
one (the more prestigious sample) both eigenvector and closeness centrality under-ranked
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the sampled departments, though closeness centrality did less so. This is the opposite of
what was expected; as explained before, it was anticipated that eigenvector centrality (as
a recursive measure) would be a more resilient estimate of academic prestige. For sample
two, using closeness centrality, seed institutions were ranked on average between 10 and
11 positions higher than their NRC ranks and slightly more than 9 positions too high using
eigenvector centrality. In fact, the mean rank for the sampled institutions in sample 2 was 3-
7 while the NRC mean rank was 13-16 (both 95% confidence intervals). These confidence
intervals do not even overlap, suggesting sample bias. The reason that sample one actually
under-ranked the sampled institutions is that the sampled institutions were the top ranked
ones. As such, it was impossible to over-rank them. However, in the less prestigious
second sample there is the anticipated sample bias, with the recursive centrality measure
surprisingly no more resilient than closeness centrality.
Given the number of students the most prestigious schools train, excluding student
edges should have a significant effect on prestigious schools’ centralities. Surprisingly, this
is not the case for eigenvector and closeness centrality. The mean closeness and eigenvec-
tor centralities for the top ten schools (averaged across all those graphs including all edges)
are statistically indistinguishable from the averages across those graphs excluding student
edges. The top ten schools do, however, have a statistically higher degree centrality in
those including training edges. The effect of including training edges on degree centrality
is inevitable since training more students directly increases departments’ degrees. How-
ever, the findings from the closeness and eigenvector centrality scores suggest that the top
schools are central in a hiring network even ignoring their important role in training.7
Another way to show that the relationship between centrality and prestige holds after
accounting for over-training is illustrated in figure 5.5. To show this, I re-ranked universities
using the average of their closeness centrality ranks from those graphs that either included
all edges or excluded student edges. The newly generated rank excluding student edges
7The same is true in an analysis using top 20 schools.
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is shown on the x-axis while the new rank from all graphs including all edges is on the
y-axis. The correlation (for all observed departments) between the two new rankings is
.878, showing that ranks with and without training edges are similar. The graphic focuses
on the origin of the graph where the more prestigious schools are located. If training future
academics is a key component of prestige, we would expect the most prestigious schools to
lie below the 45 degree line, with higher ranks when we include training edges. However,
this is not the case as most schools lie just along the 45 degree line- only the University of
Chicago follows this pattern. The top schools’ NRC ranks are also shown in parentheses
though there is no particular pattern for these top schools. In conclusion, highly ranked
schools are central to academic hiring networks whether or not we consider their training
role.
Up to this point, it has been shown that the effects of reducing the bipartite graph,
excluding training or non-tenure track edges, sampling prestigious school, and the choice
of centrality measures all have an effect on the relationship between centrality and prestige.
On the other hand, the most important aspect of the analysis to this point (and this will
become even clearer in the regression analysis) is how surprisingly robust the results are
to these choices. While the strength of the relationship between prestige and centrality
can change a little in response to these methodological choices, overall there is a strong
and significant relationship between centrality and prestige that persists regardless of the
approach taken.
We can also test the importance of training using a k-core analysis. A k-core groups
together nodes based on both their clustering and their relative popularity, leaving the high-
est k-core to include the most prestigious departments. First, the graphs are separated into
subgraphs where each node has at least degree k within the subnetwork. The subgraphs
are calculated by recursively pruning those nodes with degree less than k, producing sub-
networks that are interconnected at the same level. The groupings change when training
edges are removed. Among the top ten schools, three schools are in the top k-core more
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Figure 5.5: Closeness centrality ranks by edge inclusion
frequently among those graphs including all edges than among those excluding student
edges. More striking, many more foreign departments enter the top k-core when train-
ing edges are excluded (European University Institute, Cambridge, the London School of
Economics, and Oxford appear in the top k-cores more when training edges are removed).
Foreign institutions are more important when we remove training but include non-tenure
edges because academics tend to visit the same foreign universities and since each of these
visits are short, many professors can visit bringing prestigious foreign institutions into the
center of the graph. Excluding non-tenure track positions, foreign institutions do not enter
the top k-core at all.
Figure 5.6 shows the k-cores for the graph excluding PhD training edges from sample 2,
an exceptional graph in the k-core analysis because it is the only one where the top schools














Figure 5.6: K-core for the reduced sample 2 graph excluding PhD training edges
institutions (LSE, Hebrew University, McGill, Universite of Quebec, Montreal, and Paris,
University of San Paolo, and Oxford) and also included some domestic institutions (NYU
and UCSD). The second highest ranked k-core (grey) includes the traditionally high-ranked
schools. Inspecting the raw bipartite graph (not illustrated here), it is clear that there are
two main clusters. Both clusters have many prestigious individuals and institutions in them,
but one cluster is largely foreign and slightly larger than the second group of traditionally
prestigious schools. In sum, the k-core analysis shows that the top ten schools lose some
of their dominance without training edges, and that the top British institutions are a central
part of the American sociology labor market.
I test the hypothesis of whether department size drives the correlation between aca-
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demic departments’ prestige and labor market centrality by first running bivariate regres-
sion between each of the centrality measure ranks and the actual academic rank. Then
faculty size and the variables related to graph specification are added, showing that faculty
size accounts for very little of the relationship between hiring network centrality and aca-
demic ranks. Finally, all the centrality scores are used as predictors in the same equation
followed by a Wald test of equality between the centrality measures’ coefficients. Results
are illustrated in table 5.5.
The three centrality scores have approximately the same predictive value for prestige
regardless of whether or not we control for faculty size. A one-position increase in cen-
trality rank predicts at least a .5 position increase in NRC or Newsweek academic rank, as
shown by the coefficients in the first three columns for domestic and international rank in
table 5.5. In the first three columns of each entry we see a coefficient in bold. This is the
coefficient for the centrality measure in a bivariate regression without any controls. The
network data used to calculate these regressions is shown in the appendix. The non-bold
entry directly above the bold bivariate coefficient shows the coefficient when controlling
for faculty size and graph specification. For closeness centrality, we see that in a bivariate
regression a one-position improvement in centrality-generate rank is associated with a .584
position increase in prestige rank. After controlling for department size, this drops to .525.
Most interesting, there is a negative coefficient on department size, suggesting that the labor
market position is so important that for two equally sized programs in the same position in
the labor market graph, the smaller department would actually be more prestigious. The last
column of 5.5 shows the results of regressing all three centrality measurements together.
(One should note that this introduces the problem of multicollinearity which increases the
standard errors of coefficients.) In this joint model, eigenvector centrality seems to provide
no information not provided by the other two measures. While we expect that including
training edges would increase predicted prestige for the top schools, it is surprising that in
fact it increases predicted prestige by about .2 positions in rank in the regression including
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all schools.
Going back to the hypothesis that the prestigious schools maintain their positions by
overtraining, we find that running the same regression for only the top 50 schools in the
sample, excluding PhD training edges increases predicted rank at least 2 positions. This is
the opposite of what one might expect if the top schools overtrain and rely on placing fresh
PhD students to increase their standing in the field. Finally, running these same regressions
for all departments, using only those graphs excluding PhD training edges, a one position
increase in eigenvector rank is still correlated with a .42 increase in domestic academic
rank and a one point increase in closeness centrality rank is related to a .45 increase in
prestige. In sum, excluding student relationships slightly weakens the relationship between
graph centrality and prestige (about 20%), but overall the relationship is still strong.8
In sum, the regression analyses allow us to definitively reject the idea that the rela-
tionship between employment network centrality and departmental prestige are driven by
department size and prestigious schools’ dominance in training new PhDs.
5.4 Conclusion
This paper began with two main hypotheses regarding the relationship between the sociol-
ogy academic employment network and academic rankings. First, I suggested that the re-
lationship might be driven by department size and by the dominance of a few departments
training the bulk of sociologists combined with the general over-training of sociologists.
Second, I posited that the relationship could be driven by researchers’ methodological
choices of how to sample academic sociology networks, what sorts of employment rela-
tionships to include, and which centrality measures to use. I found support for the fact that
training does play a definitive role in academic prestige. The initial analyses showed that
8 A Wald test of equality between the centrality scores’ coefficients indicates that for both domestic and
foreign rank the effects of eigenvector centrality is significantly different from both closeness and degree,




eigenvector .481∗∗∗ -.037 .588∗∗∗ -.196∗
.542∗∗∗ .608∗∗∗
closeness .525∗∗∗ .339∗∗∗ .663∗∗∗ .437∗∗
.584∗∗∗ .669∗∗∗
degree .516∗∗∗ .241∗∗∗ .670∗∗∗ .436∗∗∗
.577∗∗∗ .686∗∗∗
faculty size -.492∗∗∗ -.460∗∗∗ -.499∗∗∗ -.466∗∗∗ -.121 -.077 -.067 -.063
all edges .260 .477 .228 .395 .006 .307 .265 .373
no stud edges .233∗ 2.47∗ 1.86 2.29∗ -.891 -.629 -.130 -.202
bipartite .120 .089 .464 .265 .006 .248 .097 .225
sample one .461 .461 .954 .650 -1.27 -1.51 -1.85 -1.73
R2 .514 .571 .560 .583 .253 .312 .319 .330
.426 .493 .469 .239 .293 .314
coefficient βeig = βdegree P:.0013 βeig = βdegree P: .0001
tests βeig = βcloseness P: .0004 βeig = βcloseness P: .0036
βcloseness = βdegree P: .0004 βcloseness = βdegree P: .9789
bold text indicates bivariate regressions
∗∗∗ indicates significance at the .001 level
Table 5.5: OLS regression predicting academic prestige
the top institutions are somewhat less central using a network excluding training edges, and
the regression suggested that network centrality has slightly less predictive power when it
is defined exclusive of training edges. There was no support for the hypothesis that de-
partment size drives results. With respect to methodology, sample seeds certainly biased
predictions (particularly degree centrality), although the results were still more or less ac-
curate. Finally, the decision to analyze the reduced or bipartite graph seems to have no
effect.
The major finding of this paper was that the relationship between academic rank and
centrality in the academic hiring network is very robust. Independent of graph specification
(the centrality measure used, the sample seed, or whether the bipartite or reduced graph is
used) and independent of prestigious departments’ size, or the fact that prestigious schools
train most PhD’s, the prestigious schools are still at the center of the academic labor market.
Other researchers finding a correlation between academic prestige and labor market
position interpret this as an academic “caste system” or infer that training and placement
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consolidate departments’ prestige (Burris, 2004). While I find evidence confirming these
patterns, I hesitate to consider it a “caste system” per se and perhaps would consider it a
case of positive feedback. If faculty moved strictly in castes (prestigious faculty moving be-
tween prestigious institutions and the other faculty moving among other institutions) there
would not be this strong relationship between the hiring network centrality and academic
rank. Rather, there would be two separate cores: lower ranked schools trading faculty with
each other and higher ranked schools trading faculty with each other. Instead, peripheral
schools trade faculty with the most prestigious schools rather than with each other. They
do this first by hiring graduates from the more prestigious schools, and then by passing
their successful professors on to the more prestigious schools. It it is these trades, or aca-
demics’ preferred career paths, that keep the most prestigious schools in the center of the
employment graph (even when training edges are excluded). This pattern of career moves
is advantageous for the institutions that are already prestigious. As such, the pattern of the




This dissertation found three types of stratification. The first type of stratification was
an extension of functional stratification, stratification that serves a purpose in the labor
market and, in this case, might also work to facilitate information flow. The second type of
stratification is simply selection or the sorting of people into different categories based on
their incomes and skills. The third sort of stratification is an actual change in the distribution
of wages and benefits. The first two types of stratification are often mistaken for the third.
The first type of stratification is from a normative perspective at least neutral if not pos-
itive. This type of stratification was evident in the fourth paper (chapter 5) on academic
employment networks. There are two typical types of articles on academic rankings: those
that critique ranking methodologies and those that lament the static system. This is a sym-
pathetic position; it certainly seems unfair that university administrators can invest a lot of
resources into a program but make no progress in the rankings. There are several mecha-
nisms of positive feedback that reinforce highly ranked schools’ status and one could be the
academic labor market. A stratified academic labor market would look like two separate
labor markets: the prestigious and the others, each not trading faculty with the other. But
this is not the case; prestigious schools are at the center of a cohesive labor market. While
good schools’ dominance in training (PhD) and hosting visiting professorships further con-
tribute to this pattern, they are not the whole story. Rather, it seems to possibly be related
to preferences to transition to higher ranked schools or not at all. Departments’ positions
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in the center of the employment network could reinforce prestige through multiple mech-
anisms. First, those with more publications and more possibilities to get funding move to
top ranked schools. This places departments at the center of information in in the field,
a distinct advantage in research. While this sort of stratification might be unfortunate for
departments, for individual academics it serves a functional role both as a natural career
path and it creates a shorter distance across the entire academic field. Thus, it is far from
clear that this sort of stratification should be viewed negatively.
The second sort of stratification is essentially selection. For example, in the third paper
(chapter 4) we found that in an environment with temp agencies charging fees as a percent
of workers’ salaries, lower skilled worker would be sorted into atypical jobs. In the second
paper (chapter 3) we saw that lower skilled workers are sorted into fixed term jobs. Thus,
in the labor market we see that indirectly hired workers (i.e. temp or outsourced workers)
and fixed term workers are paid less. This is a form of stratification; atypical employment
is a mechanism separating low and high skilled workers. However, this stratification is not
necessarily negative if workers earn the same in the atypical positions as they would in
regular positions. The introduction of atypical employment increased stratification in the
sense that the lower skilled are demarcated from the other workers, but does not necessarily
decrease their economic well-being. This type of stratification does not necessarily (though
sometimes, such as in the case of residential segregation) call for policy interventions.
The third sort of stratification is the stratification that in itself creates a more unequal
income distribution. Atypical employment allows firms to create a class of workers with
lower pay and fewer benefits than those same workers would have had in a permanent em-
ployment relationship. This stratification is evident in paper 2 (chapter 3) where we found
that fixed term workers earn less, independent of selection. This type of stratification calls
for policy intervention. Unfortunately, policy is in some sense culpable for this sort of
stratification in the first place. Systems of contracts that allow firms to avoid employment
protections or let them cash in on tax benefits designed to subsidize wide spread employer-
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provided health insurance (even though the firms are not actually providing it) are not in
the public interest. Worse, these arrangement further disadvantage those workers already
in the weakest positions in the labor market. Many of the policies designed to alleviate this
problem actually exacerbate it: bonuses for converting fixed term to permanent contracts
ultimately provide an incentive to firms to hire more workers through fixed term work; spe-
cial savings accounts to insure against unemployed periods for atypical workers ultimately
offer the well-off more retirement funding; time limits on fixed term contracts encourage
atypical workers to be fired; and diverse judicial rulings fail to systematically penalize firms
for misclassifying workers and denying them the benefits of official employment.
Each of these types of stratification is important to understand, though only the third
necessarily calls for intervention. This dissertation has taken the first steps to distinguishing





Chapter Two: National context and
atypical employment
observations mean std dev minimum maximum
self employment 536 18.07 11.11 4.7 62
part-time employment 444 15.17 7.31 1.6 35.7
fixed term employment 351 7.96 5.65 .7 30.4
union density 480 37.51 20.51 8.1 88
strike rate 264 1.69 3.62 0 25.08
temporary EPL 388 1.97 1.35 .3 5.4
regular EPL 388 2.18 .91 .2 4.8
EPL difference 388 .21 1.28 -3.6 3.1
non-compensation costs 407 20.95 7.08 2.6 36.4
unemployment rate 467 7.71 4.11 .5 24.2
PPP manufacturing wage 402 20.43 5.83 7.56 29.77
UI replacement 356 30.18 12.29 3 65
innovation index 198 .38 .20 0 1
patent application rate 552 .030 .078 0 .56
proportion women 561 .44 .041 .34 .49
gini coefficient 470 .29 .043 .207 .41
Table A.1: Descriptive statistics
Data Codebook
• country




The percent of workers that are self-employed (Source: OECD)
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• stermEuro
Percentage of workers who are fixed term (Eurostat)
• tempComp
Percentage of workers who are temps (combined Eurostat and OECD). Not used be-
cause the two input variables did not correlate very well.
• pt_oecd
Percentage of workers who are part time workers (OECD source)
• uDensity
The percentage of workers who are members of a union. Ten years are from the
OECD, every 5 years data is from Checchi and Lucifora. These two data sources
matched. Data post 2000 from Lawrence and Ishikawa were tested, but the numbers
do not match.
• strikesRat
Total strikes and lockouts per 100,000 people. Population is from the World Bank’s
World Development Indicators database. The number of strikes and lockouts are
from the ILO’s Yearbook of Labour Statistics. A strike is a temporary work stop-
page effected by one or more groups of workers with a view to enforcing or resisting
demands or expressing grievances, or supporting other workers in their demands or
grievances. A lockout is a total or partial temporary closure of one or more places
of employment, or the hindering of the normal work activities of employees, with
one or more employers with a view to enforcing or resisting demands or expressing
grievances or supporting other employers in their demands and grievances. Original
data was collected from conciliation services and augmented with newspaper reports,
worker’s organizations, etc. A national strike is considered the same as a small firm-
level strike.
• ftEPL
This is a 0-6 point scale developed by the OECD in the ”Employment Outlook” on
employment protection legislation for fixed term employees. The index includes re-
strictions on types of work for which temp agencies is illegal, restrictions on number
of renewals of contracts, maximum cumulated duration of contracts. The maximum
number of successive contracts ranges from 1 (Netherlands and Belgium) to unlim-
ited (UK, USA) and the maximum contract duration ranges from 12 months in Swe-
den to no limit in many OECD countries.
• regEPL
This is a 0-6 point scale written by the OECD in the ”Employment Outlook” on
employment protection legislation for permanent employees. This index includes
notification procedures, time delay before the firing process can start, length of no-
tice before dismissal, severance pay, strictness of defining an unfair dismissal, length
of probationary period when restrictions do not apply to firing the worker, length of
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compensation following the dismissal, and the possibility of reinstatement following
the dismissal.
• difEPL
The difference between the two EPL indices.
• nonCompCost
This is the percent of average compensation costs that are not wages. These costs
include payroll taxes paid by employers, as well as health insurance and pensions
paid by employers. There are two sources for this data, the BLS and the ILO. The
estimates from the two organizations are almost identical for most years. As such,
they are averaged them together for those years in which there are 2 years of data.
• unemploy
The unemployment rate. This measure is reported by the OECD online database.
They define unemployment using the ILO guidelines. These numbers differ from
national accounts because they attempt to include those who are not registered with
the unemployment office. The number is the unemployed population/civilian labor
force and is seasonally adjusted.
• gini
The country’s post-transfer gini coefficient. This is pieced together from various
sources including the World Development Indicators (World Bank), OECD, Luxem-
bourg Income Study, US Census Bureau, and (Andrew Leigh 2004) for Australia.
Almost all of these were almost identical with the exception of the BLS, which es-
timated much higher inequality than did the other sources. When multiple sources
were available the average was used.
• hWagePPP
The country’s mean manufacturing wage, in 2006 dollars adjusted for PPP. Mean
manufacturing wages come from the BLS Office of Foreign Labor Statistics. The
PPP adjustments come from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database.
• unemplRep
The replacement rate of unemployment benefits, indicating what percentage of his
salary a worker receives on unemployment. This measure was generated by the
OECD and is defined as the average of the gross unemployment benefit replace-
ment rates for a worker with a full record of employment at two earnings levels (67%
and 100% of average production worker earnings), in three family situations (single,
married with dependent spouse, married with spouse in work), and with three differ-
ent unemployment spell durations (first year; second and third year; fourth and fifth
year).
• innovate
This is a 0 to 1 scale measuring the level of innovation in a country. The first com-
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ponent is the total early-stage entrepreneurial activity (TEA index) which measures
the total rate of early-stage entrepreneurial activity among the adult population aged
1864 years, inclusive. This is estimated by the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor.
The second component is the firm birth rate from Eurostat. Each was standardized
on a scale of 0-1 and then the average was used when both were available. The two
measures had a correlation of .343∗∗ for those observations for which I had both
measures. This is not used in presented results.
• patent
The number of patent applications per person (patents from UN Statistical Division,
population from the World Bank).
• women
This is a control indicating the percent of a workforce that is women (World Devel-
opment Indicators)
• Interpolation Note
Linear interpolation was used for gaps between two time periods of data. (i.e. if 1995
and 2000 were available, 1996-9 were interpolated while 90-94 and 2001-6 were left
as missing. Labor policy was also interpolated which is inaccurate since policies
happen at one moment in time, not gradually. However, this is conservative in that
we assume that the policy change did not occur in any particular year.
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Appendix B
Chapter Three: The fixed term wage gap
country
AT BE FI FR DE EL IE IT NL ES
number observations 1,721 1,804 7,817 8,468 8,677 1,892 1,827 5,589 3,593 3,120
fixed term(%) 3.72 6.21 7.71 8.43 6.13 11.21 3.61 8.21 8.77 21.47
family
w/ ptnr & kids (%) 43.46 50.61 48.29 47.96 38.99 46.72 53.91 44.75 45.48 40.22
w/ ptnr, no kids (%) 29.39 22.25 37.42 31.67 30.71 31.2 22.17 29.51 24.86 32.54
no ptnr & kids (%) 3.14 7.98 2.62 3.8 6.45 1.59 2.79 1.4 6.48 1.57
alone (%) 11.27 16.13 10.53 13.13 19.89 10.94 8.65 9.66 22.15 8.78
ptnr & parents (%) 2.27 0.22 0.013 0.071 0.38 1.22 0.33 0.43 0 1.09
w/ parents (%) 11.04 3.27 0.87 3.77 3.28 14.01 12.21 15.05 0.97 17.05
education
no secondary(%) 0.23 5.32 19.00 17.94 2.94 23.2 15.54 41.98 3.30 19.07
1st secondary(%) 13.13 16.57 36.08 8.87 64.56 12.79 25.34 8.36 14.31 24.29
2nd secondary(%) 73.73 32.04 0.08 43.62 5.06 34.57 32.51 34.76 48.17 19.1
tertiary(%) 4.24 5.93 21.21 0.402 12.81 6.45 9.85 1.41 23.21 11.44
university(%) 8.13 25.39 21.95 22.7 14.63 18.66 10.18 13.31 9.91 11.86
postgrad(%) 0.52 14.08 1.69 6.47 - 4.33 6.57 1.79 1.09 14.10
effort
mean hrs/wk 38.16 38.93 - 35.05 39.87 40.54 37.89 38.89 34.03 40.6
wks/yr 49.02 - 49.26 50.17 49.2 48.37 49.32 50.42 49.54 48.1
income
net wage($) 15,003 17,488 - 15,626 - 5,136 15,824 12,373 - 11,269
gross wage($) 18,168 24,789 17,695 - 25,458 3,526 19,110 - 24,784 11,096
occupation
agricultural (%) 11.55 1.97 12.25 4.19 13.9 14.53 18.66 10.59 1.35 19.54
elementary (%) 7.44 3.27 1.23 8.43 2.63 6.57 9.52 32.95 7.06 10.51
service (%) 46.09 48.01 32.03 32.2 39.88 29.68 21.98 27.83 21.57 20.81
skilled (%) 22.28 17.59 21.26 27.09 23.72 24.71 23.84 - 15.12 27.39
manager (%) 7.06 7.93 8.41 19.08 5.48 10.11 10.64 16.15 28.83 7.87
professional (%) 5.58 21.24 14.68 8.99 14.4 14.4 15.36 12.49 26.06 13.88
misc
mean age 40.31 40.24 43.96 41.66 42.03 39.69 41.36 41.92 40.64 38.95
male (%) 56.71 53.21 47.72 53.00 55.64 61.47 54.73 59.42 53.97 61.22
gov’t employ(%) 30.62 37.69 30.24 30.89 27.06 37.84 36.51 28.72 25.69 23.97
supervisor (%) 35.90 33.69 - 23.48 22.00 12.73 34.03 - 28.93 -
native born(%) 80.65 92.63 - 89.67 86.33 96.09 91.84 97.03 - -
Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Finland (FI), France (FR), Germany (DE), Greece (EL), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), Netherlands (NL), Spain (ES)
Currency is 2000 PPP dollars
In Italy blue collar workers were not distinguished by skill. LIS coding for the 12 category variable “pskill” was used as a basis.
In Germany university and post-grad are indistinguishable






The first part of the list includes the parameters which were not tested in their entire pa-
rameter space. The second part of the list includes the 5 parameters that were tested. Many
in the first list (like model length or grid size) are arbitrary and do not influence the model
outcomes (they were not tested rigorously, but were varied in a few trial runs). Some of
these parameters, like the distribution of jobs across firms, are based on specific empiri-
cal US data, while others, like the search radius of a worker, are more loosely based on
empirical research (i.e. studies find that skilled workers look for jobs in a broader radius.)
Skill floors, the continual generation of contractors, and the contractor’s startup grace pe-
riod were tested and found to have no effect on the model’s findings, so the various tested
parameter settings are not shown here.
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Parameter Definition Default Value
stopTicks length of run 600 or 1000
numWorkers number of worker agents 1000
numFirms number of firm agents 142
sizeX sizeY grid size 100
feeRVar variance for contractor fee rates .05
maxCDistance firms’ search radius for contractors .2
ξ exponent distributing jobs across firms 2.1
γ history weighting .75
tPerm contract worker’s transition to direct hire 5
rDeath revenue a contractor must maintain .1
vSContractors vacancy rate generating contractors .04
oSContractors outsourcing rates generating contractors .02
cSTime contractors’ startup period to generate revenue 3
ceiling a ceiling on unemployment and vacancy .15
sSearchRWorker worker’s skill effect on search radius 5
maxWSTolerance maximum deviation for job floor 3
minWSTolerance minimum deviation for job floor 1
maxJSTolerance maximum deviation for worker floor 3
minJSTolerance minimum deviation for worker floor 1
hWeighting weights firm’s utility histories .75
fRFloor a floor on contractors’ fee rates .025
vDisutility disutility for firms for vacancies −.1
settings for tested parameters in those experiments in which they were not varied
fRMean contractors’ mean fee rates .2 (exp 2)
.05 to .35 (exp 1)
cRWorker contractors’ mean search radius .5 (exp 2)
.1 to 1.0 (exp 1)
wSDist workers’ edu distribution all labor (exp 1)
all, accountant, programmer, min wage (exp 2)
jSDist jobs’ edu distribution all labor (exp 1)
same as wsDist (exp 2)
cAlphaMean contracting’s effect on compensation NA (exp 1)
.9 to 1.1 (exp 2)
cAlphaVar variance of above NA (exp 1)
.05 to .15 (exp 2)
wVar firms’ workload fluctuations .05 (exp 1)
.05 to .1 (exp 2)
In the first experiment feeRateMean and contractorRadiusWorker were varied
In the second worker experiment SkillDist, jobSkillDist, contractedAlphaMean,
contractedAlphaVar, and workVar were varied .
Table C.1: Simulation parameters
Classes and their instance variables
• Firms have:
– X and Y locations
– a list of their jobs
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– a list of their vacant jobs
– a list of their employees
– a change in workload (updated each round)
– a pointer to their contractor
– a utility (from contracted and direct hires as well as vacancies)
• Jobs have:
– a pointer to their firm
– a pointer to the contractor
– a skill level
– a skill floor for the least qualified worker they will accept
– a pointer to their worker
– the tick the job was last filled
– the tick the job was last vacated
– a comparator used to sort workers by how well they match the job
– a list of unemployed workers, sorted by how well they match the job
• Workers have:
– x and y locations
– skill levels
– a skill floor for the lowest job that they would accept
– a quit propensity
– the date they were last employed if currently unemployed
– the date they were last hired
– a list of vacant, visible jobs
– their employer
– their job
– an effect on their salaries for a contractor match
• Intermediaries have:
– x and y locations
– a list of the firms employing them
– a list of their assigned jobs
– a fee rate (a percent of the worker’s skill level)
– the percent of assigned jobs they matched in the last round
– revenue (based on their fee rate and their employees’ skills)
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Equations
In the notation below normal(x,y) means a draw from a normal distribution with mean x and
standard deviation y. Similarly, uniform(x,y) is a draw from a uniform distribution ranging
between x and y. The notation uses the following: i indicates indirect hires, d indicates
direct hires, w indexes workers, f indexes firms, j indexes jobs, z indexes intermediaries,
and t indexes time. Equations refer back to the parameter table C.1 as necessary.
• Initial job creation
For each firm f, draw a number of jobs at the firm. If the number of jobs exceeds
10% if the workforce, redraw. In table C.1, ξ is the parameter that distributes jobs
across firms.
nJobs f = [1−uniform(0,1)]
−1
ξ−1 (C.1)
• Probability of worker w quitting in time t
Note that variables with no subscript t are drawn just once, during the model setup.
– Experiment 1
pQuitw,t = .333(ρw,t + τw,t +σw, j,t) (C.2)
– Experiment 2
pQuit = .5∗ (ρw,t +σw, j,t) (C.3)
– For both:
iff pQuit > uniform(0,1), quit
iff pQuit < uniform(0,1), stay
where,
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ρw,t random quits normal(qPw,i, .05)
qPw quit propensity uniform(0, .3)
τw,t tenure effect normal(1-
currentjobsticks
total life ticks ,.05)
σw, j,t match quality normal(ψ ,.05)
ψ if wsw > js j
wsw− js j
wsw




js j job skill
There are four parameters here not listed in the initial table including the vari-
ance of random quits (.05), the variance of the quit propensity (.3), the variance
in match quality (.05), and the variance in tenure effect (.05). All are the vari-
ance of another main parameter and do not strongly effect the model.
• Fluctuation in the number of jobs at firm f in time t
ψ f ,t+1 = ψ f ,t +∆∗ψ f ,t (C.4)
ψ f t = firm f’s number of jobs in time t
∆ = normal(0,wVar)
if unemployment > 15% ∆ = |∆|
if vacancy > 15% ∆ =−1∗ |∆|
Note that wVar was a swept parameter. It is listed in table C.1. Also note that the rules
limiting unemployment and vacancies are a simple proxy for economic dynamics in
the real world that hold unemployment and vacancies in a tolerable range, a fact that
is empirically observable.
• Worker’s and job’s skills
Skill distributions are set based on empirical educational distributions for workers in
different occupations. Skill floors are assigned to workers or firms in the beginning
of the model and remain constant. The skill floor is a uniform deviation from -1 to
-3 plus the worker’s or job’s skill (the education scale ranges from 1 (less than fifth
grade) to 11 (PhD)) to a minimum of 1.
• How firms search for intermediaries
Firms find the intermediary within a static search radius and pick the one who had
the best match rate last round.
• Workers apply to all jobs they “see”




Pw jt = probability of worker w seeing job j in time t
wsw = worker skill level for worker w
dw jt = distance between worker w and job j in time t
ν = sSearchRWorker (skill’s effect on search radius)
δ = if 6= indirect job = 1
if = indirect job = cRWorker
• The cost of contracting
Firm f’s cost of employing worker w in job j though intermediary z in time t is
TCCw, j,z = wsαw ∗ (1+ f Ratez) (C.6)
WCIw, f ,z = worker w’s cost to firm f using intermediary z
wsw = worker w’s skill level
f Ratez = normal(fRMean, .05) (fee rate from firm z)
αw,z = normal(cAlphaMean, cAlphaVar), for an indirect hire
αw,z = 1 for a direct hire
αw,z = 1 in experiment 1
Intermediary z’s fee rate is held constant throughout its life. In experiment 1, the
fee rate is varied, but α is held at one. In experiment 2, the fee rate is held at .2.
value αw,z measures how much relatively more or less the worker gets paid through
an intermediary. This α is redrawn every time a worker is rematched through an
intermediary, although the settings for alpha’s distribution are held constant through
every experiment.





iff ind > normal(.5,.2), use intermediary
iff ind ≤ normal(.5,.2), hire directly
In experiment 1 a standard deviation of .1 was tested while experiment 2 tested a
standard deviation of .2.
β pasti,t = γ ∗β pasti,t−1 +(1− γ)∗βi,t−1
β pastd,t = γ ∗β pastd,t−1 +(1− γ)∗βd,t−1
γ = history weighting
βi = MQi - averagefeecosti
βd = MQd
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The average fee costi is the average fee payment over all workers hired through in-
termediaries (ni is the number of indirect workers) =
∑ f eeratei,z, j∗ws
ni
The match quality from the firm’s perspective for matching worker w with job j,
MQw, j, where js j is job skill for job j and wsw is worker skill for worker w, is:
if the worker is underskilled: 1− js j−wswjs j
if the worker is overskilled: 1− (wsw− js j)
2
ws2w
For experiment two the calculations are the same, except the TCC cost function is
used instead of the simple fee rate times skill. The means here:
βi,t = MQi− .5TCCi is used instead of MQi−average f eecosti
• Utility
Firm utility was calculated as a model output. This is basically the same calculation
as used in the decision of whether or not to use an intermediary, except a small
negative amount is added for vacancies.
U f = Ni, f (MQi− .5TCCi)+Nd, f (MQd − .5TCCd)+(−.1Nv, f ) (C.8)
U utility
Ni, f number indirect hires at firm f
Nd, f number direct hires at firm f
Nv, f number vacancies at firm f
MQi, f average match quality for indirect hires at firm f
MQd,, f average match quality for direct hires at firm f
TCCi, f average total compensation cost indirect hires at firm f
TCCd, f average total compensation cost direct hires at firm f
• Intermediary death
Intermediaries’ economic health is measured by dividing their total revenue by the
number of jobs they have been assigned. If this revenue is less than 10% of the aver-
age worker’s skill (remember that depending on the experiment being run, fee rates
average around 20% of a worker’s skill), the contractor dies. Thus the contractor’s
health depends on their ability to match workers with jobs and their fee rates.
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Appendix D
Chapter Five: Academic employment
networks
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Table D.1: Data from 12 employment networks
edge bi- domestic foreign eigen closeness degree
institution sample inclusion partite prestige prestige rank rank rank
UChicago 1 all edges false 1 20 2 3 3
Wisconsin 1 all edges false 2 28 3 1 1
Berkeley 1 all edges false 3 5 4 6 5
UMichigan 1 all edges false 4 11 1 4 2
UCLA 1 all edges false 5 12 5 2 6
UNC Chapel Hill 1 all edges false 6 41 55 21 16
Harvard 1 all edges false 7 1 57 5 4
Stanford 1 all edges false 8 2 6 7 7
Northwestern 1 all edges false 9 35 10 12 12
U of Washington 1 all edges false 10 22 81 35 45
U of Pennsylvania 1 all edges false 11 13 74 15 17
U Indiana Bloomington 1 all edges false 12 40 19 22
Princeton 1 all edges false 13 15 8 10 10
U of Arizona 1 all edges false 14 9 9 8
Columbia 1 all edges false 15 10 69 13 13
UT Austin 1 all edges false 16 27 53 20 27
Johns Hopkins 1 all edges false 17 24 21 33 34
Penn State 1 all edges false 18 40 32 45 43
Yale 1 all edges false 19 3 12 11 11
Duke 1 all edges false 20 14 52 30 33
NYU 1 all edges false 21 39 23 28 29
UCSD 1 all edges false 22 23 11 23 15
UC Santa Barbara 1 all edges false 23 59 19 25 21
U of Minnesota 1 all edges false 24 30 59 36 40
SUNY Stoneybrook 1 all edges false 25.5 22 31 26
Ohio State U 1 all edges false 25.5 42 37 38
Vanderbilt 1 all edges false 27.5 66 82 82 80
U Illinois Urbana 1 all edges false 29 48 36 34 62
U of Albany 1 all edges false 30 51 49 57
Rutgers 1 all edges false 31 15 22 25
Washington State U 1 all edges false 32 33 43 40 61
U of Maryland 1 all edges false 33 45 56 77 66
SUNY Binghamton 1 all edges false 34 49 44 36
Cornell 1 all edges false 35 19 62 16 19
CUNY 1 all edges false 37 66 59 79
Brown 1 all edges false 38 56 7 8 9
UMass Amherst 1 all edges false 39 99 30 67 74
U of Iowa 1 all edges false 40.5 73 48 30
USC 1 all edges false 40.5 54 63 72 58
Michigan State U 1 all edges false 42 62 14 18 23
U of Florida 1 all edges false 43 79 70 70
Boston U 1 all edges false 44 65 27 38 55
U Illinois Chicago 1 all edges false 45 48 75 46
Notre Dame 1 all edges false 46 46 74 65
U of Virginia 1 all edges false 47.5 80 35 66 78
U of Georgia 1 all edges false 47.5 34 51 28
UConn 1 all edges false 49 31 47 39
U of San Francisco 1 all edges false 50.5 9 64 39 64
UC Santa Cruz 1 all edges false 53 47 73 52
Boston College 1 all edges false 55 54 53 49
U of Oregon 1 all edges false 56.5 33 43 60
Syracuse 1 all edges false 58 60 52 72
Brandeis 1 all edges false 60 24 26 20
Iowa State U 1 all edges false 61.5 68 63 54
U Missouri Columbia 1 all edges false 63 76 68 67
Louisiana State U 1 all edges false 65 44 42 41
Loyola 1 all edges false 68 29 56 35
Tulane 1 all edges false 72 80 76 68
U of Tokyo 1 all edges false 16 78 65 44
U of Amsterdam 1 all edges false 89 50 50 56
U of Bristol 1 all edges false 49 71 69 69
Caltech 1 all edges false 4 38 46 63
Oxford 1 all edges false 8 16 14 14
McGill 1 all edges false 42 77 80 81
U of Vienna 1 all edges false 72 61 81 82
U of Edinburgh 1 all edges false 47 18 32 37
U of Zurich 1 all edges false 46 58 60 76
Uppsala 1 all edges false 88 45 54 47
U of Lund 1 all edges false 76 72 61 42
U of Munich 1 all edges false 63 25 79 77
U of Newcastle 1 all edges false 97 13 64 51
Hong Kong U 1 all edges false 60 26 58 71
Cambridge 1 all edges false 6 20 17 18
Emory 1 all edges false 93 70 57 48
Hebrew U Jerusalem 1 all edges false 82 41 41 59
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edge bi- domestic foreign eigen closeness degree
institution sample inclusion partite prestige prestige rank rank rank
Chinese U Hong Kong 1 all edges false 96 65 55 73
Australian National U 1 all edges false 38 39 29 32
LSE 1 all edges false 34 28 24 24
U College London 1 all edges false 25 67 62 50
U of Queensland 1 all edges false 91 37 71 53
MIT 1 all edges false 7 17 27 31
U of Heidelberg 1 all edges false 90 75 78 75
UChicago 1 all edges true 1 20 3 2 2
Wisconsin 1 all edges true 2 28 1 1 1
Berkeley 1 all edges true 3 5 5 6 5
UMichigan 1 all edges true 4 11 4 4 4
UCLA 1 all edges true 5 12 6 5 6
UNC Chapel Hill 1 all edges true 6 41 13 16 11
Harvard 1 all edges true 7 1 2 3 3
Stanford 1 all edges true 8 2 7 7 7
Northwestern 1 all edges true 9 35 11 11 13
U of Washington 1 all edges true 10 22 36 38 27
U of Pennsylvania 1 all edges true 11 13 15 14 14
U Indiana Bloomington 1 all edges true 12 24 17 19
Princeton 1 all edges true 13 15 8 9 10
U of Arizona 1 all edges true 14 9 10 8
Columbia 1 all edges true 15 10 12 13 12
UT Austin 1 all edges true 16 27 21 19 21
Johns Hopkins 1 all edges true 17 24 28 33 28
Penn State 1 all edges true 18 40 39 41 29
Yale 1 all edges true 19 3 14 12 16
Duke 1 all edges true 20 14 26 30 34
NYU 1 all edges true 21 39 27 27 24
UCSD 1 all edges true 22 23 16 23 17
UC Santa Barbara 1 all edges true 23 59 18 24 20
U of Minnesota 1 all edges true 24 30 38 34 43
Ohio State U 1 all edges true 25.5 45 40 45
SUNY Stoneybrook 1 all edges true 25.5 34 31 31
Vanderbilt 1 all edges true 27.5 66 82 82 66
U Illinois Urbana 1 all edges true 29 48 40 35 32
U of Albany 1 all edges true 30 54 49 61
Rutgers 1 all edges true 31 17 21 25
Washington State U 1 all edges true 32 33 43 36 47
U of Maryland 1 all edges true 33 45 75 80 79
SUNY Binghamton 1 all edges true 34 46 48 36
Cornell 1 all edges true 35 19 22 15 15
CUNY 1 all edges true 37 64 59 75
Brown 1 all edges true 38 56 10 8 9
UMass Amherst 1 all edges true 39 99 60 61 63
USC 1 all edges true 40.5 54 72 72 80
U of Iowa 1 all edges true 40.5 57 55 33
Michigan State U 1 all edges true 42 62 19 18 22
U of Florida 1 all edges true 43 71 70 52
Boston U 1 all edges true 44 65 35 37 42
U Illinois Chicago 1 all edges true 45 74 73 38
Notre Dame 1 all edges true 46 73 74 56
U of Virginia 1 all edges true 47.5 80 62 63 53
U of Georgia 1 all edges true 47.5 32 51 26
UConn 1 all edges true 49 33 47 41
U of San Francisco 1 all edges true 50.5 9 44 39 67
UC Santa Cruz 1 all edges true 53 59 71 44
Boston College 1 all edges true 55 50 54 77
U of Oregon 1 all edges true 56.5 53 42 81
Syracuse 1 all edges true 58 51 53 82
Brandeis 1 all edges true 60 25 25 18
Iowa State U 1 all edges true 61.5 68 66 62
U Missouri Columbia 1 all edges true 63 69 68 57
Louisiana State U 1 all edges true 65 48 44 39
Loyola 1 all edges true 68 42 56 46
Tulane 1 all edges true 72 81 81 55
Uppsala 1 all edges true 88 49 46 74
Chinese U Hong Kong 1 all edges true 96 47 52 54
U of Munich 1 all edges true 63 76 76 73
U of Tokyo 1 all edges true 16 65 67 70
Oxford 1 all edges true 8 23 20 23
U of Zurich 1 all edges true 46 63 60 78
U College London 1 all edges true 25 66 64 64
U of Lund 1 all edges true 76 58 62 50
Cambridge 1 all edges true 6 20 22 35
Hong Kong U 1 all edges true 60 56 57 71
Caltech 1 all edges true 4 41 43 51
U of Heidelberg 1 all edges true 90 79 77 60
U of Vienna 1 all edges true 72 77 79 68
U of Amsterdam 1 all edges true 89 52 50 65
U of Queensland 1 all edges true 91 80 75 69
McGill 1 all edges true 42 78 78 58
Hebrew U Jerusalem 1 all edges true 82 55 45 76
Australian National U 1 all edges true 38 37 29 49
U of Bristol 1 all edges true 49 70 69 59
Emory 1 all edges true 93 61 58 40
U of Newcastle 1 all edges true 97 67 65 72
U of Edinburgh 1 all edges true 47 29 32 48
MIT 1 all edges true 7 30 26 37
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edge bi- domestic foreign eigen closeness degree
institution sample inclusion partite prestige prestige rank rank rank
LSE 1 all edges true 34 31 28 30
UChicago 1 no non-tenure false 1 20 2 3 3
Wisconsin 1 no non-tenure false 2 28 4 1 1
Berkeley 1 no non-tenure false 3 5 5 4 5
UMichigan 1 no non-tenure false 4 11 3 6 4
UCLA 1 no non-tenure false 5 12 6 5 6
UNC Chapel Hill 1 no non-tenure false 6 41 17 17 15
Harvard 1 no non-tenure false 7 1 1 2 2
Stanford 1 no non-tenure false 8 2 7 7 7
Northwestern 1 no non-tenure false 9 35 10 9 10
U of Washington 1 no non-tenure false 10 22 48 27 43
U of Pennsylvania 1 no non-tenure false 11 13 13 14 16
U Indiana Bloomington 1 no non-tenure false 12 20 15 18
Princeton 1 no non-tenure false 13 15 11 10 11
U of Arizona 1 no non-tenure false 14 8 8 8
Columbia 1 no non-tenure false 15 10 12 12 12
UT Austin 1 no non-tenure false 16 27 19 18 20
Johns Hopkins 1 no non-tenure false 17 24 70 45 33
Penn State 1 no non-tenure false 18 40 23 32 25
Yale 1 no non-tenure false 19 3 18 22 17
Duke 1 no non-tenure false 20 14 26 41 37
NYU 1 no non-tenure false 21 39 31 26 36
UCSD 1 no non-tenure false 22 23 14 20 13
UC Santa Barbara 1 no non-tenure false 23 59 22 19 26
U of Minnesota 1 no non-tenure false 24 30 35 28 35
Ohio State U 1 no non-tenure false 25.5 63 63 59
SUNY Stoneybrook 1 no non-tenure false 25.5 21 38 21
Vanderbilt 1 no non-tenure false 27.5 66 61 64 63
U Illinois Urbana 1 no non-tenure false 29 48 25 25 30
U of Albany 1 no non-tenure false 30 38 35 40
Rutgers 1 no non-tenure false 31 27 21 29
Washington State U 1 no non-tenure false 32 33 29 24 31
U of Maryland 1 no non-tenure false 33 45 58 61 62
SUNY Binghamton 1 no non-tenure false 34 47 36 42
Cornell 1 no non-tenure false 35 19 15 13 14
CUNY 1 no non-tenure false 37 64 74 81
Brown 1 no non-tenure false 38 56 9 11 9
UMass Amherst 1 no non-tenure false 39 99 39 43 45
U of Iowa 1 no non-tenure false 40.5 36 52 24
USC 1 no non-tenure false 40.5 54 49 57 39
Michigan State U 1 no non-tenure false 42 62 16 16 23
U of Florida 1 no non-tenure false 43 54 48 50
Boston U 1 no non-tenure false 44 65 40 79 48
U Illinois Chicago 1 no non-tenure false 45 60 58 44
Notre Dame 1 no non-tenure false 46 56 69 72
U of Virginia 1 no non-tenure false 47.5 80 68 70 69
U of Georgia 1 no non-tenure false 47.5 24 34 19
UConn 1 no non-tenure false 49 30 33 38
U of San Francisco 1 no non-tenure false 50.5 9 67 76 78
UC Santa Cruz 1 no non-tenure false 53 59 59 57
Boston College 1 no non-tenure false 55 79 37 71
U of Oregon 1 no non-tenure false 56.5 37 30 46
Syracuse 1 no non-tenure false 58 50 46 53
Brandeis 1 no non-tenure false 60 28 23 22
Iowa State U 1 no non-tenure false 61.5 51 47 54
U Missouri Columbia 1 no non-tenure false 63 42 49 51
Louisiana State U 1 no non-tenure false 65 32 39 34
Loyola 1 no non-tenure false 68 62 62 58
Tulane 1 no non-tenure false 72 71 80 66
U of Tokyo 1 no non-tenure false 16 80 75 79
Australian National U 1 no non-tenure false 38 77 67 77
U of Amsterdam 1 no non-tenure false 89 65 68 75
Caltech 1 no non-tenure false 4 44 51 49
LSE 1 no non-tenure false 34 33 31 32
Hong Kong U 1 no non-tenure false 60 41 42 41
U of Edinburgh 1 no non-tenure false 47 75 66 82
Hebrew U Jerusalem 1 no non-tenure false 82 72 71 73
U of Lund 1 no non-tenure false 76 82 65 74
Oxford 1 no non-tenure false 8 76 60 61
U of Newcastle 1 no non-tenure false 97 81 72 80
U of Queensland 1 no non-tenure false 91 69 77 68
Chinese U Hong Kong 1 no non-tenure false 96 45 50 55
U College London 1 no non-tenure false 25 74 81 65
U of Heidelberg 1 no non-tenure false 90 52 53 56
U of Zurich 1 no non-tenure false 46 46 44 52
MIT 1 no non-tenure false 7 34 29 27
McGill 1 no non-tenure false 42 57 55 60
Cambridge 1 no non-tenure false 6 78 73 70
Emory 1 no non-tenure false 93 43 40 28
U of Bristol 1 no non-tenure false 49 66 78 76
U of Munich 1 no non-tenure false 63 53 54 47
Uppsala 1 no non-tenure false 88 73 82 67
U of Vienna 1 no non-tenure false 72 55 56 64
UChicago 1 no non-tenure true 1 20 2 2 2
Wisconsin 1 no non-tenure true 2 28 1 1 1
Berkeley 1 no non-tenure true 3 5 5 4 5
UMichigan 1 no non-tenure true 4 11 4 5 4
UCLA 1 no non-tenure true 5 12 6 6 6
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UNC Chapel Hill 1 no non-tenure true 6 41 15 15 13
Harvard 1 no non-tenure true 7 1 3 3 3
Stanford 1 no non-tenure true 8 2 7 7 7
Northwestern 1 no non-tenure true 9 35 11 10 12
U of Washington 1 no non-tenure true 10 22 37 28 29
U of Pennsylvania 1 no non-tenure true 11 13 13 14 14
U Indiana Bloomington 1 no non-tenure true 12 19 16 20
Princeton 1 no non-tenure true 13 15 10 8 10
U of Arizona 1 no non-tenure true 14 8 9 8
Columbia 1 no non-tenure true 15 10 12 11 11
UT Austin 1 no non-tenure true 16 27 16 18 17
Johns Hopkins 1 no non-tenure true 17 24 48 44 32
Penn State 1 no non-tenure true 18 40 27 29 21
Yale 1 no non-tenure true 19 3 23 22 18
Duke 1 no non-tenure true 20 14 29 35 36
NYU 1 no non-tenure true 21 39 34 26 25
UCSD 1 no non-tenure true 22 23 14 21 19
UC Santa Barbara 1 no non-tenure true 23 59 22 19 22
U of Minnesota 1 no non-tenure true 24 30 30 27 39
Ohio State U 1 no non-tenure true 25.5 63 61 63
SUNY Stoneybrook 1 no non-tenure true 25.5 42 42 28
Vanderbilt 1 no non-tenure true 27.5 66 64 62 43
U Illinois Urbana 1 no non-tenure true 29 48 28 25 27
U of Albany 1 no non-tenure true 30 35 36 57
Rutgers 1 no non-tenure true 31 20 20 26
Washington State U 1 no non-tenure true 32 33 26 24 37
U of Maryland 1 no non-tenure true 33 45 58 59 54
SUNY Binghamton 1 no non-tenure true 34 39 38 40
Cornell 1 no non-tenure true 35 19 17 13 15
CUNY 1 no non-tenure true 37 82 78 82
Brown 1 no non-tenure true 38 56 9 12 9
UMass Amherst 1 no non-tenure true 39 99 43 43 64
USC 1 no non-tenure true 40.5 54 57 57 42
U of Iowa 1 no non-tenure true 40.5 52 52 30
Michigan State U 1 no non-tenure true 42 62 18 17 24
U of Florida 1 no non-tenure true 43 49 50 44
Boston U 1 no non-tenure true 44 65 36 37 56
U Illinois Chicago 1 no non-tenure true 45 61 64 47
Notre Dame 1 no non-tenure true 46 78 79 70
U of Virginia 1 no non-tenure true 47.5 80 65 69 76
U of Georgia 1 no non-tenure true 47.5 21 39 23
UConn 1 no non-tenure true 49 24 34 38
U of San Francisco 1 no non-tenure true 50.5 9 73 70 67
UC Santa Cruz 1 no non-tenure true 53 59 58 55
Boston College 1 no non-tenure true 55 68 68 69
U of Oregon 1 no non-tenure true 56.5 33 30 49
Syracuse 1 no non-tenure true 58 45 48 52
Brandeis 1 no non-tenure true 60 25 23 16
Iowa State U 1 no non-tenure true 61.5 50 49 51
U Missouri Columbia 1 no non-tenure true 63 46 51 59
Louisiana State U 1 no non-tenure true 65 38 33 34
Loyola 1 no non-tenure true 68 62 63 60
Tulane 1 no non-tenure true 72 76 73 71
Uppsala 1 no non-tenure true 88 77 80 80
U of Newcastle 1 no non-tenure true 97 80 76 75
Hebrew U Jerusalem 1 no non-tenure true 82 66 75 66
LSE 1 no non-tenure true 34 31 31 33
Hong Kong U 1 no non-tenure true 60 41 40 61
Oxford 1 no non-tenure true 8 60 60 41
U College London 1 no non-tenure true 25 71 81 68
U of Heidelberg 1 no non-tenure true 90 54 54 62
Emory 1 no non-tenure true 93 40 41 31
U of Bristol 1 no non-tenure true 49 74 71 81
U of Vienna 1 no non-tenure true 72 56 55 58
Australian National U 1 no non-tenure true 38 70 65 73
U of Zurich 1 no non-tenure true 46 51 45 53
U of Amsterdam 1 no non-tenure true 89 75 82 77
McGill 1 no non-tenure true 42 55 56 46
MIT 1 no non-tenure true 7 32 32 35
Cambridge 1 no non-tenure true 6 67 67 65
U of Munich 1 no non-tenure true 63 53 53 45
U of Tokyo 1 no non-tenure true 16 72 77 74
Chinese U Hong Kong 1 no non-tenure true 96 47 47 48
U of Lund 1 no non-tenure true 76 81 66 79
U of Queensland 1 no non-tenure true 91 79 72 78
Caltech 1 no non-tenure true 4 44 46 50
U of Edinburgh 1 no non-tenure true 47 69 74 72
UChicago 1 no student edges false 1 20 5 5 5
Wisconsin 1 no student edges false 2 28 2 1 1
Berkeley 1 no student edges false 3 5 6 6 6
UMichigan 1 no student edges false 4 11 4 4 4
UCLA 1 no student edges false 5 12 3 2 2
UNC Chapel Hill 1 no student edges false 6 41 23 28 28
Harvard 1 no student edges false 7 1 1 3 3
Stanford 1 no student edges false 8 2 8 8 10
Northwestern 1 no student edges false 9 35 11 13 12
U of Washington 1 no student edges false 10 22 66 56 68
U of Pennsylvania 1 no student edges false 11 13 29 21 19
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U Indiana Bloomington 1 no student edges false 12 19 17 22
Princeton 1 no student edges false 13 15 9 10 11
U of Arizona 1 no student edges false 14 12 14 8
Columbia 1 no student edges false 15 10 14 11 13
UT Austin 1 no student edges false 16 27 21 16 32
Johns Hopkins 1 no student edges false 17 24 24 40 33
Penn State 1 no student edges false 18 40 60 66 62
Yale 1 no student edges false 19 3 10 7 9
Duke 1 no student edges false 20 14 28 22 30
NYU 1 no student edges false 21 39 31 41 31
UCSD 1 no student edges false 22 23 13 20 16
UC Santa Barbara 1 no student edges false 23 59 20 18 17
U of Minnesota 1 no student edges false 24 30 43 54 46
SUNY Stoneybrook 1 no student edges false 25.5 33 29 34
Ohio State U 1 no student edges false 25.5 44 47 36
Vanderbilt 1 no student edges false 27.5 66 79 82 78
U Illinois Urbana 1 no student edges false 29 48 41 49 61
U of Albany 1 no student edges false 30 56 44 56
Rutgers 1 no student edges false 31 17 19 20
Washington State U 1 no student edges false 32 33 77 76 79
U of Maryland 1 no student edges false 33 45 72 72 60
SUNY Binghamton 1 no student edges false 34 47 32 35
Cornell 1 no student edges false 35 19 25 23 21
CUNY 1 no student edges false 37 68 64 71
Brown 1 no student edges false 38 56 7 9 7
UMass Amherst 1 no student edges false 39 99 51 62 66
U of Iowa 1 no student edges false 40.5 38 55 24
USC 1 no student edges false 40.5 54 62 67 53
Michigan State U 1 no student edges false 42 62 18 25 18
U of Florida 1 no student edges false 43 73 75 73
Boston U 1 no student edges false 44 65 36 59 55
U Illinois Chicago 1 no student edges false 45 48 58 43
Notre Dame 1 no student edges false 46 59 61 58
U of Georgia 1 no student edges false 47.5 32 35 25
U of Virginia 1 no student edges false 47.5 80 69 70 70
UConn 1 no student edges false 49 35 33 39
U of San Francisco 1 no student edges false 50.5 9 40 30 57
UC Santa Cruz 1 no student edges false 53 61 68 59
Boston College 1 no student edges false 55 64 51 49
U of Oregon 1 no student edges false 56.5 63 39 52
Syracuse 1 no student edges false 58 76 81 75
Brandeis 1 no student edges false 60 70 65 72
Iowa State U 1 no student edges false 61.5 54 38 42
U Missouri Columbia 1 no student edges false 63 75 78 76
Louisiana State U 1 no student edges false 65 46 42 45
Loyola 1 no student edges false 68 30 50 26
Tulane 1 no student edges false 72 67 63 65
Chinese U Hong Kong 1 no student edges false 96 50 60 64
U of Bristol 1 no student edges false 49 65 53 69
U of Amsterdam 1 no student edges false 89 57 43 54
U of Newcastle 1 no student edges false 97 53 36 44
U of Lund 1 no student edges false 76 37 45 50
Cambridge 1 no student edges false 6 15 15 15
McGill 1 no student edges false 42 82 74 74
Caltech 1 no student edges false 4 42 52 63
U of Munich 1 no student edges false 63 81 73 80
Hebrew U Jerusalem 1 no student edges false 82 39 31 51
U of Edinburgh 1 no student edges false 47 22 26 29
U of Heidelberg 1 no student edges false 90 78 79 82
Hong Kong U 1 no student edges false 60 49 69 67
U of Zurich 1 no student edges false 46 74 80 81
U of Tokyo 1 no student edges false 16 55 48 37
Australian National U 1 no student edges false 38 34 24 27
U of Vienna 1 no student edges false 72 80 77 77
LSE 1 no student edges false 34 26 27 23
Uppsala 1 no student edges false 88 45 34 38
MIT 1 no student edges false 7 27 46 40
Oxford 1 no student edges false 8 16 12 14
U of Queensland 1 no student edges false 91 58 57 48
Emory 1 no student edges false 93 71 71 47
U College London 1 no student edges false 25 52 37 41
UChicago 1 no student edges true 1 20 5 6 4
Wisconsin 1 no student edges true 2 28 1 1 1
Berkeley 1 no student edges true 3 5 6 5 6
UMichigan 1 no student edges true 4 11 3 4 3
UCLA 1 no student edges true 5 12 2 2 2
UNC Chapel Hill 1 no student edges true 6 41 17 28 16
Harvard 1 no student edges true 7 1 4 3 5
Stanford 1 no student edges true 8 2 10 8 8
Northwestern 1 no student edges true 9 35 11 12 12
U of Washington 1 no student edges true 10 22 44 54 58
U of Pennsylvania 1 no student edges true 11 13 27 20 27
U Indiana Bloomington 1 no student edges true 12 24 21 18
Princeton 1 no student edges true 13 15 7 10 10
U of Arizona 1 no student edges true 14 12 13 7
Columbia 1 no student edges true 15 10 15 11 13
UT Austin 1 no student edges true 16 27 22 15 21
Johns Hopkins 1 no student edges true 17 24 45 35 28
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Penn State 1 no student edges true 18 40 64 63 30
Yale 1 no student edges true 19 3 9 9 11
Duke 1 no student edges true 20 14 25 22 41
NYU 1 no student edges true 21 39 47 39 25
UCSD 1 no student edges true 22 23 21 18 14
UC Santa Barbara 1 no student edges true 23 59 18 19 23
U of Minnesota 1 no student edges true 24 30 55 47 65
SUNY Stoneybrook 1 no student edges true 25.5 72 27 40
Ohio State U 1 no student edges true 25.5 53 53 48
Vanderbilt 1 no student edges true 27.5 66 77 77 75
U Illinois Urbana 1 no student edges true 29 48 52 42 33
U of Albany 1 no student edges true 30 39 40 62
Rutgers 1 no student edges true 31 14 17 20
Washington State U 1 no student edges true 32 33 75 73 81
U of Maryland 1 no student edges true 33 45 71 72 56
SUNY Binghamton 1 no student edges true 34 31 32 36
Cornell 1 no student edges true 35 19 26 23 15
CUNY 1 no student edges true 37 63 67 54
Brown 1 no student edges true 38 56 8 7 9
UMass Amherst 1 no student edges true 39 99 59 61 52
USC 1 no student edges true 40.5 54 66 65 45
U of Iowa 1 no student edges true 40.5 58 59 24
Michigan State U 1 no student edges true 42 62 33 24 29
U of Florida 1 no student edges true 43 81 74 79
Boston U 1 no student edges true 44 65 51 57 43
U Illinois Chicago 1 no student edges true 45 60 55 31
Notre Dame 1 no student edges true 46 65 62 46
U of Virginia 1 no student edges true 47.5 80 68 70 67
U of Georgia 1 no student edges true 47.5 16 37 17
UConn 1 no student edges true 49 19 33 35
U of San Francisco 1 no student edges true 50.5 9 32 30 59
UC Santa Cruz 1 no student edges true 53 67 64 47
Boston College 1 no student edges true 55 41 52 49
U of Oregon 1 no student edges true 56.5 42 36 66
Syracuse 1 no student edges true 58 79 81 73
Brandeis 1 no student edges true 60 62 68 61
Iowa State U 1 no student edges true 61.5 37 44 53
U Missouri Columbia 1 no student edges true 63 73 75 78
Louisiana State U 1 no student edges true 65 54 50 32
Loyola 1 no student edges true 68 49 46 38
Tulane 1 no student edges true 72 61 66 60
U of Tokyo 1 no student edges true 16 35 49 70
U of Bristol 1 no student edges true 49 43 51 63
Oxford 1 no student edges true 8 20 14 19
Australian National U 1 no student edges true 38 29 26 42
U College London 1 no student edges true 25 36 45 68
U of Heidelberg 1 no student edges true 90 78 76 77
McGill 1 no student edges true 42 76 78 80
Uppsala 1 no student edges true 88 34 34 72
U of Zurich 1 no student edges true 46 80 82 74
U of Vienna 1 no student edges true 72 82 79 82
Caltech 1 no student edges true 4 48 56 44
U of Newcastle 1 no student edges true 97 38 43 71
Emory 1 no student edges true 93 70 71 39
Chinese U Hong Kong 1 no student edges true 96 57 58 55
Hebrew U Jerusalem 1 no student edges true 82 30 31 50
Cambridge 1 no student edges true 6 13 16 26
Hong Kong U 1 no student edges true 60 69 69 69
U of Amsterdam 1 no student edges true 89 40 41 64
U of Queensland 1 no student edges true 91 56 60 57
U of Lund 1 no student edges true 76 46 48 37
LSE 1 no student edges true 34 23 29 22
U of Munich 1 no student edges true 63 74 80 76
MIT 1 no student edges true 7 50 38 51
U of Edinburgh 1 no student edges true 47 28 25 34
UChicago 2 all edges false 1 20 6 7 8
Wisconsin 2 all edges false 2 28 10 11 9
Berkeley 2 all edges false 3 5 1 5 1
UMichigan 2 all edges false 4 11 13 17 15
UCLA 2 all edges false 5 12 12 15 13
UNC Chapel Hill 2 all edges false 6 41 23 18 18
Harvard 2 all edges false 7 1 5 8 6
Stanford 2 all edges false 8 2 7 9 10
Northwestern 2 all edges false 9 35 8 6 5
U of Washington 2 all edges false 10 22 22 24 28
U of Pennsylvania 2 all edges false 11 13 3 3 3
Princeton 2 all edges false 13 15 2 1 2
U of Arizona 2 all edges false 14 38 22 25
Columbia 2 all edges false 15 10 11 14 11
UT Austin 2 all edges false 16 27 27 37 32
Johns Hopkins 2 all edges false 17 24 14 10 12
Penn State 2 all edges false 18 40 63 61 70
Yale 2 all edges false 19 3 4 2 4
Duke 2 all edges false 20 14 20 27 21
NYU 2 all edges false 21 39 9 4 7
UCSD 2 all edges false 22 23 17 12 16
UC Santa Barbara 2 all edges false 23 59 28 34 34
U of Minnesota 2 all edges false 24 30 39 36 33
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SUNY Stoneybrook 2 all edges false 25.5 45 51 50
Ohio State U 2 all edges false 25.5 55 68 58
Vanderbilt U 2 all edges false 27.5 66 53 58 64
UC Riverside 2 all edges false 27.5 15 21 20
U Illinois Urbana 2 all edges false 29 48 44 55 47
Rutgers 2 all edges false 31 16 19 22
U of Maryland 2 all edges false 33 45 50 57 56
SUNY Binghamton 2 all edges false 34 57 52 42
Cornell 2 all edges false 35 19 26 26 24
Florida State U 2 all edges false 36 35 44 38
CUNY 2 all edges false 37 31 28 36
Brown 2 all edges false 38 56 40 53 52
UMass Amherst 2 all edges false 39 99 54 60 60
USC 2 all edges false 40.5 54 29 25 37
U of Iowa 2 all edges false 40.5 47 47 48
U of Florida 2 all edges false 43 66 65 66
Boston U 2 all edges false 44 65 64 64 61
U Illinois Chicago 2 all edges false 45 67 66 67
Notre Dame 2 all edges false 46 70 63 71
U of Virginia 2 all edges false 47.5 80 32 31 41
U of Georgia 2 all edges false 47.5 51 50 46
U of San Francisco 2 all edges false 50.5 9 62 62 68
UC Santa Cruz 2 all edges false 53 58 43 49
U of Kentucky 2 all edges false 54 65 67 57
Boston College 2 all edges false 55 52 49 45
Syracuse 2 all edges false 58 60 59 62
Brandeis 2 all edges false 60 34 35 31
Temple U 2 all edges false 61.5 36 33 27
U of New Hampshire 2 all edges false 70 69 71 65
LSE 2 all edges false 34 18 16 19
Emory 2 all edges false 93 46 45 59
U of Toronto 2 all edges false 18 42 39 43
Oxford 2 all edges false 8 25 23 14
Ecole Polytechnique 2 all edges false 43 59 56 54
cole Normale Suprieure 2 all edges false 79 48 46 51
U Indiana Bloomington 2 all edges false 12 30 29 26
McGill 2 all edges false 42 61 48 35
U of Alberta 2 all edges false 55 56 41 29
U of Lund 2 all edges false 76 49 40 53
MIT 2 all edges false 7 68 69 55
Cambridge 2 all edges false 6 33 32 40
U of Edinburgh 2 all edges false 47 24 30 30
U of Rochester 2 all edges false 67 71 70 69
Hebrew U Jerusalem 2 all edges false 82 19 13 17
U of Louvain 2 all edges false 92 43 54 63
Hong Kong U of S&T 2 all edges false 60 41 38 39
Australian National U 2 all edges false 38 21 20 23
Chinese U Hong Kong 2 all edges false 96 37 42 44
UChicago 2 all edges true 1 20 6 7 7
Wisconsin 2 all edges true 2 28 10 9 9
Berkeley 2 all edges true 3 5 3 6 5
UMichigan 2 all edges true 4 11 12 15 13
UCLA 2 all edges true 5 12 13 13 14
UNC Chapel Hill 2 all edges true 6 41 24 19 16
Harvard 2 all edges true 7 1 8 8 8
Stanford 2 all edges true 8 2 9 10 11
Northwestern 2 all edges true 9 35 5 4 4
U of Washington 2 all edges true 10 22 25 23 25
U of Pennsylvania 2 all edges true 11 13 1 1 1
Princeton 2 all edges true 13 15 2 2 2
U of Arizona 2 all edges true 14 19 22 30
Columbia 2 all edges true 15 10 11 12 10
UT Austin 2 all edges true 16 27 26 36 27
Johns Hopkins 2 all edges true 17 24 14 11 12
Penn State 2 all edges true 18 40 61 62 54
Yale 2 all edges true 19 3 4 3 3
Duke 2 all edges true 20 14 22 28 15
NYU 2 all edges true 21 39 7 5 6
UCSD 2 all edges true 22 23 18 14 22
UC Santa Barbara 2 all edges true 23 59 31 31 31
U of Minnesota 2 all edges true 24 30 38 35 38
Ohio State U 2 all edges true 25.5 66 67 61
SUNY Stoneybrook 2 all edges true 25.5 48 46 35
UC Riverside 2 all edges true 27.5 21 21 32
Vanderbilt U 2 all edges true 27.5 66 56 58 50
U Illinois Urbana 2 all edges true 29 48 55 56 65
Rutgers 2 all edges true 31 15 17 17
U of Maryland 2 all edges true 33 45 52 55 70
SUNY Binghamton 2 all edges true 34 57 53 28
Cornell 2 all edges true 35 19 23 24 19
Florida State U 2 all edges true 36 41 44 40
CUNY 2 all edges true 37 30 26 33
Brown 2 all edges true 38 56 42 52 39
UMass Amherst 2 all edges true 39 99 59 60 47
U of Iowa 2 all edges true 40.5 51 45 44
USC 2 all edges true 40.5 54 32 25 43
U of Florida 2 all edges true 43 62 64 67
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Boston U 2 all edges true 44 65 64 66 63
U Illinois Chicago 2 all edges true 45 63 65 51
Notre Dame 2 all edges true 46 71 63 60
U of Virginia 2 all edges true 47.5 80 35 33 62
U of Georgia 2 all edges true 47.5 49 51 68
U of San Francisco 2 all edges true 50.5 9 60 61 53
UC Santa Cruz 2 all edges true 53 53 43 46
U of Kentucky 2 all edges true 54 70 68 71
Boston College 2 all edges true 55 50 50 59
Syracuse 2 all edges true 58 58 59 58
Brandeis 2 all edges true 60 33 37 29
Temple U 2 all edges true 61.5 37 34 34
U of New Hampshire 2 all edges true 70 68 71 69
Ecole Polytechnique 2 all edges true 43 54 54 66
Chinese U Hong Kong 2 all edges true 96 36 40 41
MIT 2 all edges true 7 67 69 57
U of Alberta 2 all edges true 55 43 42 36
U of Toronto 2 all edges true 18 39 39 42
McGill 2 all edges true 42 65 57 48
U of Edinburgh 2 all edges true 47 28 29 26
Emory 2 all edges true 93 44 48 56
cole Normale Suprieure 2 all edges true 79 47 47 55
Australian National U 2 all edges true 38 20 18 23
Oxford 2 all edges true 8 29 27 20
Hong Kong U of S&T 2 all edges true 60 40 38 45
U of Louvain 2 all edges true 92 45 49 64
LSE 2 all edges true 34 16 20 18
Cambridge 2 all edges true 6 34 32 49
U Indiana Bloomington 2 all edges true 12 27 30 24
U of Lund 2 all edges true 76 46 41 37
Hebrew U Jerusalem 2 all edges true 82 17 16 21
U of Rochester 2 all edges true 67 69 70 52
UChicago 2 no non-tenure false 1 20 5 10 8
Wisconsin 2 no non-tenure false 2 28 9 6 9
Berkeley 2 no non-tenure false 3 5 4 5 7
UMichigan 2 no non-tenure false 4 11 11 8 12
UCLA 2 no non-tenure false 5 12 14 14 13
UNC Chapel Hill 2 no non-tenure false 6 41 24 16 14
Harvard 2 no non-tenure false 7 1 6 11 10
Stanford 2 no non-tenure false 8 2 12 15 16
Northwestern 2 no non-tenure false 9 35 3 3 4
U of Washington 2 no non-tenure false 10 22 23 24 24
U of Pennsylvania 2 no non-tenure false 11 13 1 2 1
Princeton 2 no non-tenure false 13 15 2 1 3
U of Arizona 2 no non-tenure false 14 20 23 33
Columbia 2 no non-tenure false 15 10 10 12 11
UT Austin 2 no non-tenure false 16 27 19 21 27
Johns Hopkins 2 no non-tenure false 17 24 13 9 6
Penn State 2 no non-tenure false 18 40 39 43 48
Yale 2 no non-tenure false 19 3 8 7 5
Duke 2 no non-tenure false 20 14 22 19 21
NYU 2 no non-tenure false 21 39 7 4 2
UCSD 2 no non-tenure false 22 23 32 26 25
UC Santa Barbara 2 no non-tenure false 23 59 21 20 19
U of Minnesota 2 no non-tenure false 24 30 27 25 20
SUNY Stoneybrook 2 no non-tenure false 25.5 48 47 49
Ohio State U 2 no non-tenure false 25.5 49 44 51
UC Riverside 2 no non-tenure false 27.5 18 18 18
Vanderbilt U 2 no non-tenure false 27.5 66 35 35 39
U Illinois Urbana 2 no non-tenure false 29 48 36 36 30
Rutgers 2 no non-tenure false 31 16 22 22
U of Maryland 2 no non-tenure false 33 45 42 37 43
SUNY Binghamton 2 no non-tenure false 34 46 38 29
Cornell 2 no non-tenure false 35 19 15 17 17
Florida State U 2 no non-tenure false 36 33 41 45
CUNY 2 no non-tenure false 37 17 13 15
Brown 2 no non-tenure false 38 56 26 33 36
UMass Amherst 2 no non-tenure false 39 99 38 45 52
U of Iowa 2 no non-tenure false 40.5 29 28 23
USC 2 no non-tenure false 40.5 54 52 49 38
U of Florida 2 no non-tenure false 43 41 40 50
Boston U 2 no non-tenure false 44 65 54 54 54
U Illinois Chicago 2 no non-tenure false 45 53 55 46
Notre Dame 2 no non-tenure false 46 70 58 62
U of Virginia 2 no non-tenure false 47.5 80 37 34 34
U of Georgia 2 no non-tenure false 47.5 40 42 42
U of San Francisco 2 no non-tenure false 50.5 9 68 68 63
UC Santa Cruz 2 no non-tenure false 53 64 59 69
U of Kentucky 2 no non-tenure false 54 56 56 47
Boston College 2 no non-tenure false 55 60 70 66
Syracuse 2 no non-tenure false 58 43 39 40
Brandeis 2 no non-tenure false 60 25 32 26
Temple U 2 no non-tenure false 61.5 57 57 65
U of New Hampshire 2 no non-tenure false 70 51 51 56
U of Louvain 2 no non-tenure false 92 50 50 53
Hebrew U Jerusalem 2 no non-tenure false 82 28 31 31
U of Rochester 2 no non-tenure false 67 61 69 60
McGill 2 no non-tenure false 42 66 71 70
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Australian National U 2 no non-tenure false 38 69 64 59
Oxford 2 no non-tenure false 8 44 48 35
U of Alberta 2 no non-tenure false 55 34 30 32
U of Lund 2 no non-tenure false 76 55 53 55
Emory 2 no non-tenure false 93 59 67 67
cole Normale Suprieure 2 no non-tenure false 79 71 61 64
Chinese U Hong Kong 2 no non-tenure false 96 63 60 58
U Indiana Bloomington 2 no non-tenure false 12 30 29 37
LSE 2 no non-tenure false 34 45 46 44
U of Toronto 2 no non-tenure false 18 31 27 28
Cambridge 2 no non-tenure false 6 62 62 61
Ecole Polytechnique 2 no non-tenure false 43 58 65 57
Hong Kong U of S&T 2 no non-tenure false 60 65 66 68
MIT 2 no non-tenure false 7 67 63 71
U of Edinburgh 2 no non-tenure false 47 47 52 41
UChicago 2 no non-tenure true 1 20 4 8 6
Wisconsin 2 no non-tenure true 2 28 9 7 9
Berkeley 2 no non-tenure true 3 5 5 4 7
UMichigan 2 no non-tenure true 4 11 11 9 12
UCLA 2 no non-tenure true 5 12 29 14 13
UNC Chapel Hill 2 no non-tenure true 6 41 22 16 16
Harvard 2 no non-tenure true 7 1 8 10 8
Stanford 2 no non-tenure true 8 2 13 13 14
Northwestern 2 no non-tenure true 9 35 2 2 2
U of Washington 2 no non-tenure true 10 22 25 22 25
U of Pennsylvania 2 no non-tenure true 11 13 1 1 1
Princeton 2 no non-tenure true 13 15 3 3 4
U of Arizona 2 no non-tenure true 14 20 24 24
Columbia 2 no non-tenure true 15 10 10 12 11
UT Austin 2 no non-tenure true 16 27 17 23 20
Johns Hopkins 2 no non-tenure true 17 24 12 11 10
Penn State 2 no non-tenure true 18 40 38 42 49
Yale 2 no non-tenure true 19 3 7 6 5
Duke 2 no non-tenure true 20 14 19 20 18
NYU 2 no non-tenure true 21 39 6 5 3
UCSD 2 no non-tenure true 22 23 57 27 30
UC Santa Barbara 2 no non-tenure true 23 59 21 19 21
U of Minnesota 2 no non-tenure true 24 30 30 25 28
Ohio State U 2 no non-tenure true 25.5 41 45 52
SUNY Stoneybrook 2 no non-tenure true 25.5 49 47 57
Vanderbilt U 2 no non-tenure true 27.5 66 33 35 38
UC Riverside 2 no non-tenure true 27.5 16 17 23
U Illinois Urbana 2 no non-tenure true 29 48 39 37 45
Rutgers 2 no non-tenure true 31 15 21 17
U of Maryland 2 no non-tenure true 33 45 35 36 37
SUNY Binghamton 2 no non-tenure true 34 47 40 27
Cornell 2 no non-tenure true 35 19 14 18 15
Florida State U 2 no non-tenure true 36 40 41 51
CUNY 2 no non-tenure true 37 18 15 19
Brown 2 no non-tenure true 38 56 27 32 31
UMass Amherst 2 no non-tenure true 39 99 37 43 40
U of Iowa 2 no non-tenure true 40.5 31 29 36
USC 2 no non-tenure true 40.5 54 51 50 39
U of Florida 2 no non-tenure true 43 36 39 47
Boston U 2 no non-tenure true 44 65 53 53 56
U Illinois Chicago 2 no non-tenure true 45 50 55 44
Notre Dame 2 no non-tenure true 46 66 71 60
U of Georgia 2 no non-tenure true 47.5 42 44 54
U of Virginia 2 no non-tenure true 47.5 80 32 33 42
U of San Francisco 2 no non-tenure true 50.5 9 65 66 58
UC Santa Cruz 2 no non-tenure true 53 58 64 68
U of Kentucky 2 no non-tenure true 54 55 56 48
Boston College 2 no non-tenure true 55 67 61 65
Syracuse 2 no non-tenure true 58 44 38 43
Brandeis 2 no non-tenure true 60 23 34 22
Temple U 2 no non-tenure true 61.5 56 57 53
U of New Hampshire 2 no non-tenure true 70 45 48 50
Australian National U 2 no non-tenure true 38 71 70 69
Hong Kong U of S&T 2 no non-tenure true 60 61 59 63
U of Edinburgh 2 no non-tenure true 47 52 52 34
Oxford 2 no non-tenure true 8 43 51 32
U of Toronto 2 no non-tenure true 18 28 26 33
cole Normale Suprieure 2 no non-tenure true 79 62 62 62
Chinese U Hong Kong 2 no non-tenure true 96 63 63 67
U of Lund 2 no non-tenure true 76 54 54 46
U of Rochester 2 no non-tenure true 67 59 68 64
Cambridge 2 no non-tenure true 6 64 60 59
Hebrew U Jerusalem 2 no non-tenure true 82 24 31 35
MIT 2 no non-tenure true 7 60 69 61
Emory 2 no non-tenure true 93 70 58 70
LSE 2 no non-tenure true 34 48 46 41
U Indiana Bloomington 2 no non-tenure true 12 26 28 26
U of Louvain 2 no non-tenure true 92 46 49 55
U of Alberta 2 no non-tenure true 55 34 30 29
McGill 2 no non-tenure true 42 68 67 71
Ecole Polytechnique 2 no non-tenure true 43 69 65 66
UChicago 2 no student edges false 1 20 11 12 15
Wisconsin 2 no student edges false 2 28 7 8 9
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institution sample inclusion partite prestige prestige rank rank rank
Berkeley 2 no student edges false 3 5 4 4 5
UMichigan 2 no student edges false 4 11 16 17 22
UCLA 2 no student edges false 5 12 12 15 14
UNC Chapel Hill 2 no student edges false 6 41 19 19 18
Harvard 2 no student edges false 7 1 6 11 11
Stanford 2 no student edges false 8 2 5 7 7
Northwestern 2 no student edges false 9 35 9 6 6
U of Washington 2 no student edges false 10 22 24 23 30
U of Pennsylvania 2 no student edges false 11 13 3 2 1
Princeton 2 no student edges false 13 15 1 3 4
U of Arizona 2 no student edges false 14 20 18 23
Columbia 2 no student edges false 15 10 10 14 13
UT Austin 2 no student edges false 16 27 41 46 40
Johns Hopkins 2 no student edges false 17 24 14 10 8
Penn State 2 no student edges false 18 40 66 67 67
Yale 2 no student edges false 19 3 2 5 3
Duke 2 no student edges false 20 14 22 28 24
NYU 2 no student edges false 21 39 8 1 2
UCSD 2 no student edges false 22 23 15 13 12
UC Santa Barbara 2 no student edges false 23 59 37 39 55
U of Minnesota 2 no student edges false 24 30 38 34 27
SUNY Stoneybrook 2 no student edges false 25.5 56 49 58
Ohio State U 2 no student edges false 25.5 46 58 60
Vanderbilt U 2 no student edges false 27.5 66 51 56 61
UC Riverside 2 no student edges false 27.5 13 22 19
U Illinois Urbana 2 no student edges false 29 48 40 45 41
Rutgers 2 no student edges false 31 25 29 29
U of Maryland 2 no student edges false 33 45 47 50 54
SUNY Binghamton 2 no student edges false 34 61 60 47
Cornell 2 no student edges false 35 19 28 33 28
Florida State U 2 no student edges false 36 54 57 52
CUNY 2 no student edges false 37 29 25 32
Brown 2 no student edges false 38 56 44 43 50
UMass Amherst 2 no student edges false 39 99 58 51 56
USC 2 no student edges false 40.5 54 27 24 33
U of Iowa 2 no student edges false 40.5 48 42 46
U of Florida 2 no student edges false 43 67 66 63
Boston U 2 no student edges false 44 65 71 71 69
U Illinois Chicago 2 no student edges false 45 62 62 62
Notre Dame 2 no student edges false 46 68 68 68
U of Virginia 2 no student edges false 47.5 80 31 30 34
U of Georgia 2 no student edges false 47.5 53 52 37
U of San Francisco 2 no student edges false 50.5 9 65 63 66
UC Santa Cruz 2 no student edges false 53 55 37 45
U of Kentucky 2 no student edges false 54 59 59 57
Boston College 2 no student edges false 55 52 53 38
Syracuse 2 no student edges false 58 60 65 65
Brandeis 2 no student edges false 60 39 38 44
Temple U 2 no student edges false 61.5 34 27 20
U of New Hampshire 2 no student edges false 70 70 70 71
Ecole Polytechnique 2 no student edges false 43 50 48 48
Oxford 2 no student edges false 8 23 21 17
MIT 2 no student edges false 7 64 61 53
McGill 2 no student edges false 42 45 40 26
U Indiana Bloomington 2 no student edges false 12 33 32 25
U of Louvain 2 no student edges false 92 69 69 70
LSE 2 no student edges false 34 17 16 16
U of Rochester 2 no student edges false 67 63 64 64
Cambridge 2 no student edges false 6 30 31 36
Emory 2 no student edges false 93 43 44 59
U of Edinburgh 2 no student edges false 47 26 26 39
U of Alberta 2 no student edges false 55 49 54 43
Hebrew U Jerusalem 2 no student edges false 82 18 9 10
Chinese U Hong Kong 2 no student edges false 96 32 47 42
Hong Kong U of S&T 2 no student edges false 60 36 36 31
U of Lund 2 no student edges false 76 57 55 51
Australian National U 2 no student edges false 38 21 20 21
U of Toronto 2 no student edges false 18 35 35 35
cole Normale Suprieure 2 no student edges false 79 42 41 49
UChicago 2 no student edges true 1 20 67 9 12
Wisconsin 2 no student edges true 2 28 9 8 10
Berkeley 2 no student edges true 3 5 4 6 8
UMichigan 2 no student edges true 4 11 13 14 13
UCLA 2 no student edges true 5 12 12 16 14
UNC Chapel Hill 2 no student edges true 6 41 21 21 17
Harvard 2 no student edges true 7 1 8 11 7
Stanford 2 no student edges true 8 2 7 7 6
Northwestern 2 no student edges true 9 35 5 3 3
U of Washington 2 no student edges true 10 22 22 20 21
U of Pennsylvania 2 no student edges true 11 13 1 1 1
Princeton 2 no student edges true 13 15 3 4 5
U of Arizona 2 no student edges true 14 20 17 27
Columbia 2 no student edges true 15 10 10 13 11
UT Austin 2 no student edges true 16 27 47 49 55
Johns Hopkins 2 no student edges true 17 24 14 10 9
Penn State 2 no student edges true 18 40 66 66 68
Yale 2 no student edges true 19 3 2 5 2
Duke 2 no student edges true 20 14 24 29 22
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edge bi- domestic foreign eigen closeness degree
institution sample inclusion partite prestige prestige rank rank rank
NYU 2 no student edges true 21 39 6 2 4
UCSD 2 no student edges true 22 23 15 15 16
UC Santa Barbara 2 no student edges true 23 59 53 37 42
U of Minnesota 2 no student edges true 24 30 38 34 36
Ohio State U 2 no student edges true 25.5 55 57 66
SUNY Stoneybrook 2 no student edges true 25.5 42 42 31
UC Riverside 2 no student edges true 27.5 36 22 25
Vanderbilt U 2 no student edges true 27.5 66 44 55 43
U Illinois Urbana 2 no student edges true 29 48 46 50 57
Rutgers 2 no student edges true 31 19 27 20
U of Maryland 2 no student edges true 33 45 39 47 47
SUNY Binghamton 2 no student edges true 34 63 64 33
Cornell 2 no student edges true 35 19 23 30 24
Florida State U 2 no student edges true 36 50 58 54
CUNY 2 no student edges true 37 27 24 23
Brown 2 no student edges true 38 56 43 43 37
UMass Amherst 2 no student edges true 39 99 57 54 67
USC 2 no student edges true 40.5 54 28 25 35
U of Iowa 2 no student edges true 40.5 49 44 32
U of Florida 2 no student edges true 43 65 65 60
Boston U 2 no student edges true 44 65 69 70 70
U Illinois Chicago 2 no student edges true 45 60 61 64
Notre Dame 2 no student edges true 46 68 68 44
U of Georgia 2 no student edges true 47.5 51 53 50
U of Virginia 2 no student edges true 47.5 80 30 32 48
U of San Francisco 2 no student edges true 50.5 9 62 62 46
UC Santa Cruz 2 no student edges true 53 11 38 39
U of Kentucky 2 no student edges true 54 59 59 65
Boston College 2 no student edges true 55 52 52 62
Syracuse 2 no student edges true 58 61 67 61
Brandeis 2 no student edges true 60 37 39 34
Temple U 2 no student edges true 61.5 34 28 38
U of New Hampshire 2 no student edges true 70 70 69 71
Chinese U Hong Kong 2 no student edges true 96 31 40 40
cole Normale Suprieure 2 no student edges true 79 41 41 51
McGill 2 no student edges true 42 54 46 45
U of Toronto 2 no student edges true 18 33 35 30
Australian National U 2 no student edges true 38 18 19 19
MIT 2 no student edges true 7 64 63 53
U Indiana Bloomington 2 no student edges true 12 32 33 29
U of Edinburgh 2 no student edges true 47 26 26 28
Oxford 2 no student edges true 8 25 23 26
LSE 2 no student edges true 34 16 18 15
U of Rochester 2 no student edges true 67 56 60 49
U of Alberta 2 no student edges true 55 48 51 58
U of Louvain 2 no student edges true 92 71 71 69
Emory 2 no student edges true 93 45 48 56
U of Lund 2 no student edges true 76 58 56 59
Hong Kong U of S&T 2 no student edges true 60 35 36 41
Cambridge 2 no student edges true 6 29 31 63
Ecole Polytechnique 2 no student edges true 43 40 45 52
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